Disciplinary transformation of late Ottoman legal education (1826-1926) : an interactional field analysis by Nur, Abdurrahman
DISCIPLINARY TRANSFORMATION OF LATE OTTOMAN 
LEGAL EDUCATION (1826-1926): 
AN INTERACTIONAL FIELD ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABDURRAHMAN NUR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
İSTANBUL ŞEHİR UNIVERSITY 
SEPTEMBER 2015 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY TRANSFORMATION OF LATE OTTOMAN 
LEGAL EDUCATION (1826-1926):  
AN INTERACTIONAL FIELD ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO 
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
OF 
İSTANBUL ŞEHİR UNIVERSITY 
 
 
 
BY 
 
 
 
 
ABDURRAHMAN NUR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR 
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS  
IN 
SOCIOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SEPTEMBER 2015 
 


   
 
 iv 
ABSTRACT 
 
DISCIPLINARY TRANSFORMATION OF LATE OTTOMAN LEGAL 
EDUCATION (1826-1926): AN INTERACTIONAL FIELD ANALYSIS 
 
Nur, Abdurrahman. 
MA, Department of Sociology 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Alim Arlı 
September 2015, 135 pages 
 
The variety of theoretical approaches that have emerged as results of extensive 
empirical research within the new sociology of knowledge during the last fifty years 
may offer useful perspectives for explaining the dizzying historical processes of the 
late Ottoman period in a way to cope with the substantialist, teleological, and 
dichotomist perspectives that have long dominated late Ottoman historiography. 
Located within the new sociology of knowledge, this thesis seeks to provide a 
historical sociological explanation of the disciplinary transformation of Ottoman 
legal education from 1826 to 1926, primarily based on the available historical 
scholarship. Utilizing Abbott’s theory of linked ecologies/interactional fields and a 
Bourdieusian analysis of modern state formation, this thesis offers first a structural 
analysis of the formations of the Ottoman higher educational ecology to the 
nineteenth century as the historical background of later transformations. It then 
analyses the historical conditions of possibility for the disciplinary transformation of 
the Ottoman legal education from 1826 to 1926. The thesis has two main arguments. 
The first is that the disciplinary transformation of Ottoman legal education took place 
as a result of several processes of competition, which constituted aspects of the 
overarching process of modern state formation, between diverse bureaucratic, higher 
educational, judicial, and disciplinary collective actors within an interactional field at 
the intersection of bureaucratic, higher educational, and judicial ecologies. The 
second argument is that the increasing amount of symbolic power emergent 
collective actors (such as the Maarif Nezareti or Mekteb-i Hukuk) accumulated to the 
detriment of rooted collective actors (such as the Meşihat or madrasa system) within 
the aforementioned interactional field during the processes of modern state formation 
allowed the discipline of law to gradually dominate curricular space of legal 
education at the expense of fiqh, thus transforming Ottoman legal education from a 
fiqh-centered to a law-centered disciplinary structure. 
  
Keywords: New sociology of knowledge, late Ottoman legal education, interactional 
field, linked ecologies, symbolic power, historical sociological analysis. 
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ÖZ 
 
GEÇ DÖNEM OSMANLI FIKIH-HUKUK EĞİTİMİNİN DİSİPLİNER 
DÖNÜŞÜMÜ (1826-1926): BİR ETKİLEŞİM ALANI ANALİZİ 
 
Nur, Abdurrahman. 
YL, Sosyoloji Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Alim Arlı 
Eylül 2015, 135 sayfa 
 
Yaklaşık son elli yıl içerisinde yeni bilgi sosyolojisi çerçevesinde yürütülen kapsamlı 
ampirik araştırmalar sonucu ortaya çıkan çeşitli teorik yaklaşımlar geç dönem 
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun baş döndürücü tarihsel süreçlerini ilgili tarihyazımına 
çok uzun süredir hakim olagelen tözcü, teleolojik ve dikotomist perspektiflerden 
sıyrılarak açıklayabilmek için elverişli bakış açıları sunma imkanı taşıyor. Yeni bilgi 
sosyolojisi literatürüne bir katkı olarak tasarlanan bu tez, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda 
fıkıh-hukuk eğitiminin 1826-1926 yılları arasındaki disipliner dönüşümünün esas 
olarak ikincil literatüre dayalı tarihsel-sosyolojik bir açıklamasını yapmaya 
çalışmaktadır. Açıklayıcı araçlarını büyük ölçüde Abbott’un bağlı 
ekolojiler/etkileşim alanları teorisinden ve kısmen Bourdieu’nün modern devletin 
oluşumuna dair analizlerinden devşiren bu çalışma, ilk olarak Osmanlı fıkıh-hukuk 
eğitiminin son dönemdeki dönüşümlerinin tarihsel arkaplanını oluşturması itibariyle 
Osmanlı yükseköğretim ekolojisinin ondokuzuncu yüzyıla kadarki oluşumlarının 
yapısal bir analizini sunmaktadır. Ardından da Osmanlı fıkıh-hukuk eğitiminin 
1826’dan 1926’ya kadarki disipliner dönüşümünün tarihsel imkan koşullarını analiz 
etmektedir. Tezin iki temel çıkarımı vardır. Birinci çıkarıma göre; Osmanlı fıkıh-
hukuk eğitiminin 1826-1926 arasındaki disipliner dönüşümü modern devlet oluşumu 
sürecinin farklı cihetlerini teşkil eden ve çeşitli kolektif aktörler arasında cereyan 
eden mücadele süreçlerinin bir sonucu olarak gerçekleşmiştir. Sözkonusu mücadele 
süreçleri bürokratik ekoloji, yükseköğretim ekolojisi ve adli ekolojinin kesişiminde 
oluşan bir etkileşim alanı içerisinde vuku bulmuştur. İkinci çıkarıma göre; on 
dokuzuncu yüzyıldan itibaren yeni ortaya çıkan kolektif aktörlerin (Maarif Nezareti, 
Mekteb-i Hukuk, Darülfünun vesaire) varolagelen kolektif aktörlerin (Meşihat, 
medrese sistemi vesaire) aleyhine olarak modern devlet oluşumu süreci boyunca 
mezkur etkileşim alanı içerisinde biriktirdikleri gittikçe artan sembolik iktidar 
miktarı hukuk disiplininin eğitim müfredatı mekanındaki akademik yerleşim alanının 
fıkıh disiplininkini daraltacak şekilde genişlemesini ve böylece Osmanlı fıkıh-hukuk 
eğitiminin fıkıh merkezli bir disipliner yapıdan hukuk merkezli bir disipliner yapıya 
doğru dönüşmesini mümkün kılmıştır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Yeni bilgi sosyolojisi, geç Osmanlı fıkıh-hukuk eğitimi, 
etkileşim alanı, bağlı ekolojiler, sembolik iktidar, tarihsel-sosyolojik analiz. 
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 CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
Let us imagine a fellow living in Istanbul in the first half of the nineteenth century. If 
this now dead fellow had wanted to get a proper legal education, he would most 
likely have gone to a madrasa to embark upon a serious course of education at the 
center of which was the discipline of fiqh. For when he came of age for higher 
education, say in 1826, the madrasa system was the main venue providing higher 
education in the Ottoman Empire. As the continuation of a centuries old institutional 
tradition, legal education was at the center of higher education in the 19th century 
madrasa system. The legal education provided in the madrasa system was based on 
the discipline of fiqh, thus conceived in a larger sense than what the term legal 
education generally implies today, as an education transmitting the normative 
knowledge of the rights and duties of men in their relations with Allah and with other 
beings, human or otherwise, in a way to regulate all aspects of a man’s life in a 
holistic perspective. After having graduated from the madrasa, our former student 
might well obtain an office as a judge in the Empire’s judicial system, organized 
around sharia courts, and would thus participate in the application of the legal 
knowledge he acquired through his education.  
Now let us change the temporal setting and say that our aspiring jurist had 
born in Istanbul exactly a century later, yet without making any change neither in his 
birthplace nor in his will to get legal education. This time, when he came of age for 
higher education in 1926, he would have faced a completely different higher 
educational setting. He would probably not have even considered getting a legal 
education from a madrasa, as the madrasa system had been officially abolished two 
years previously. He might have been able to pursue an education at one of the 
madrasas that had gone underground and de facto continued providing education 
after their abolition. In this case, however, he would not have been able to find 
employment in the official judicial system, as it was by this time no longer based on 
legal knowledge deriving from fiqh. As the legal and judicial systems were now 
completely based on the discipline of law, our student would have had to obtain a 
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legal education based on law. He would not have had much trouble in getting such an 
education, as law-based legal education would have been the only legitimate legal 
education on offer at the time. He could have gone to the İstanbul Darülfünunu, a 
higher educational institution mainly modeled on the French university, and applied 
to the faculty of law. If accepted to the faculty, he would have engaged in a course of 
legal education transmitting the normative knowledge of rights and duties of citizens 
in their relations with the State and other citizens, regulating the public and private 
aspects of a man’s life within different legal frameworks. Throughout this education, 
he would have taken a whole set of courses dealing with different aspects and topics 
of law without encountering any discussion of fiqh except perhaps in some sections 
of the class on the history of law, where fiqh was defined as a legal discipline 
gradually superseded during the “progressive course of history.”  
Had we allowed our hypothetical law student to preserve his former 
memories and experiences from his previous life during the first half of the 
nineteenth century, he would surely have been astonished and confused with what he 
confronted in his second life, in terms of both legal education and general life, when 
we gave him a second birth at the outset of the twentieth century and thus a second 
chance to experience legal education in 1926. In such a case, our student would quite 
likely renounce his desire for legal education and head for a history education instead 
in order to find out what had happened in-between. Looking back from the first 
quarter of the twenty-first century, we may have a similar feeling of surprise and 
confusion in realizing the extent of the radical transformation that Ottoman higher 
education in general, and legal education in particular, underwent during the century 
between the two lives of our imagined fellow. Luckily enough, however, we are 
more equipped than he for coping with our confusion, as we have at our disposal 
both a considerable amount of historical scholarship on the period of concern and 
diverse sociological tools and models we can use in order to make sense of the 
transformations that surprised and confused us. 
1.1. Rationale, Topic, and Research Questions 
This study is a modest attempt to deal with the surprise and confusion I have 
experienced since I had first became aware of the great processes of transformation 
that had preceded us in these lands and consequently conditioned our current lives, as 
person and as people, as individual selves and as collective selves. Within the scope 
   
 
3 
 
of this thesis, I will focus on a particular process of transformation, namely the 
disciplinary transformation of Ottoman legal education. I will try to understand and 
explain the social dynamics at work that transformed the disciplinary structure of the 
Ottoman legal education from 1826 to 1926. In order to achieve this objective, I will 
pursue two main research questions. The first one is descriptive: “how did the 
disciplinary structure of the Ottoman legal education transform between 1826 and 
1926?” The second question is analytical: “why did Ottoman legal education 
transform from its disciplinary structure in 1826 to its disciplinary structure in 
1926?” In order to answer these questions, I will make use of a general theoretical 
model, which I deem suitable for explaining the social processes at work that 
transformed Ottoman legal education. A brief conceptual note is in order here, before 
going further. I conceive of legal education as a social process through which 
knowledge of what is legitimate/illegitimate, in its larger sense, is reproduced and 
inter-generationally transmitted in a systematic and disciplined way within an 
institutional framework. The adjective “legal” comprises both what is related to fiqh 
and what is related to law without excluding either of them. Thus legal education 
serves as an umbrella concept that is not a priori related either to law or fiqh. The 
term disciplinary structure implies here the structural configuration of the cultural 
space of legal education in terms of disciplines’ academic settlements1 within that 
space. Disciplinary transformation means an overall change in disciplinary structure.  
 I believe making legal education an object of sociological research is 
important, for legal education is one of the main social processes through which both 
the symbolic reproduction and legitimation of a general social order takes place. 
Thus studying the transformation of legal education may provide important insights 
into general transformations of a social order. This is especially so for Ottoman 
social space, as Ottoman legal education based on fiqh was truly central to both the 
symbolic reproduction and legitimation of the Ottoman social order until the mid-
19th century, as I will elaborate on in the second chapter. Thus understanding the 
social conditions of the transformation of Ottoman legal education goes hand in hand 
with understanding the general transformation of the Ottoman social order. One 
cannot be achieved without the other. Thus legal education cannot be properly 
analyzed by assuming a perpective limited to the higher educational space where 
                                                 
1 For the concept of academic settlement, see pages 36-37. 
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legal education takes place, or to the actors directly involved in legal education, as 
providers or learners. It should be conceived in relation to other processes and actors 
in bureaucratic, judicial, economic, and other social spaces, as these relations are not 
external to but constituent parts of legal education. Available scholarship on Ottoman 
legal education does not present a pleasant view in this respect. 
1.2. Historiography of Late Ottoman Legal Education: A General Assessment of 
the Literature 
As far as I am aware, there is not a single work specifically dealing with legal 
education in the late Ottoman Empire in a holistic perspective either in sociological 
or in historical terms. Nevertheless, there are specific studies that shed light on 
different aspects, periods, or institutions of the field of late Ottoman legal education. 
Akiba’s article on the foundation and later transformation of “a new school for 
qadis,” namely the Muallimhane-i Nüvvab, is based on extensive archival research 
and remains the primary reference work on the subject (2003). Yörük’s master’s 
thesis on the establishment and later development of the Mekteb-i Hukuk provides a 
comprehensive yet mainly descriptive history of the Mekteb-i Hukuk based on 
extensive archival and literature research (2008). Another of Yörük’s works locates 
the biography of Rizeli Hafız Kasım Efendi, whose educational trajectory crosscut 
several higher educational institutions providing different types of legal education, 
within the general context of legal education in the Meşrutiyet period (2014). There 
are also some other works that briefly touch upon late Ottoman legal education while 
dealing essentially with the history of legal education in the Turkish Republic (e.g. 
Bedir 2004; Mumcu 1977). 
One can also find information about late Ottoman legal education to varying 
degrees within the general histories of Ottoman-Turkish higher education. Osman 
Nuri Ergin’s Türkiye Maarif Tarihi (1977) remains the sole work providing a truly 
holistic account of higher education in the late Ottoman Empire, including both the 
post-1900 higher educational institutions, i.e. higher schools and universities, and the 
pre-existing ones, i.e. mainly madrasas. Other general histories of late Ottoman 
higher education deal either with universities and higher schools or with madrasas. 
Emre Dölen’s Türkiye Üniversite Tarihi (2010), and Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu’s 
Darülfünun (2010a) stand out as comprehensive works providing histories of the 
higher educational institutions that emerged from the nineteenth century on. In 
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contrast, Sarıkaya’s work (1997) deals only with the madrasa part of the late 
Ottoman higher educational transformation. 
There are some common historiographical problems most of the 
abovementioned works suffer, which constitute obstacles for understanding late 
Ottoman legal education in a holistic and empirically grounded way. The first 
problem is their lack of relational perspective. Generally descriptive in approach, 
many of the aforementioned works depict the histories of particular higher 
educational institutions and developments as self-contained entities or processes 
isolated from the social relations that actually constitute them and they are embedded 
in. This problem is present in most of the aforementioned works to varying degrees. 
For instance, Yörük (2008) narrates the institutional history of the Mekteb-i Hukuk 
and the legal education therein as isolated from the history of madrasas and fiqh 
education, which constitute the “constitutive other” of the former.  
In a similar vein, Ergin’s work (1977) provides descriptive narratives of 
almost all the higher educational institutions of the late Ottoman Empire one by one, 
yet does not conceive of them as reciprocally constituting actors situated within 
interactional processes of coordination and conflict. It is not that these works pretend 
there is no relation between different types of higher educational institutions and 
processes, of course. However, when the aforementioned works set out to relate 
different types of higher educational institutions, they generally do so from a 
dichotomist perspective.  
This dichotomist perspective is closely related to and partly engendered by a 
third overarching problem: a teleological historiographical perspective that perceives 
historical process as oriented by a transcendental temporal course that proceeds 
toward a telos, i.e. a predetermined mode of being towards which the intentions and 
actions of past actors were oriented. In the historiography of the late Ottoman period, 
this transcendental temporal course appears as secularization, modernization, or 
westernization and the telos becomes the secular, modern, and westernized Turkish 
Republic. The fact that the Turkish Republic was actually founded in some moment 
in history is illusionistically deemed, within this perspective, as the actualization of 
telos. This illusionistic move, however, is actually a form of historiographical 
violence perpetrated against past reality. For it transfers a telos retrospectively 
constructed in present, based on the historian’s knowledge of the later historical 
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process, into the historical reality reconstructed by the historian within the 
historiographical process. However, the event or mode of being that is 
retrospectively deemed as telos was no more than a contingency for the actors who 
lived before its actualization, whether it was conceived by them or not, and certainly 
was not a necessary end they were moving towards.  
Once a historian assumes this teleological perspective, explicitly or implicitly, 
all historical reality the historian reconstructs is contaminated with its effects, and 
consequently all past actors and events are conceived either for or against the 
temporal course towards the telos. Thus emerges the dichotomist perspective 
immanent in teleological historiography. I suggest Lewis’ seminal work, The 
Emergence of Modern Turkey (1968), which had greatly affected later historical 
scholarship on the late Ottoman Empire, constitutes a good example of teleological 
reconstruction of historical reality. As Lewis states in the very first sentence of the 
book, in the preface, “the theme of this book is the emergence of a new Turkey from 
the decay of the old” (1968, Preface). The general perspective and the grand thesis of 
the book are concisely included in this brief statement. In a nutshell, there are two 
grand movements in the late Ottoman history, according to Lewis’ account. On the 
one hand, there is a movement towards the good “new,” described by Lewis as 
modernization or Westernization (and by some others as secularization), which 
ultimately results in “the emergence of a new Turkey.” On the other hand, there is a 
movement towards the bad “old,” described as traditionalism or reactionism, which 
ultimately fails by “the decay of the old.” Late Ottoman history is grosso modo the 
history of struggle between these two movements, where the latter had no chance and 
the former appears as the ultimate winner. Let Lewis himself summarize the point: 
By 1871 (...) the destruction of the old order had been too thorough for any 
restoration to be possible; for better or worse, only one path lay before 
Turkey, that of modernization and Westernization. She could move fast or 
slowly, straight or deviously; she could not go back (1968, p. 128). 
Thus, all actors and events of late Ottoman history take their place within this general 
schema. They are either for modernization and Westernization, thus progressive and 
reformist, or against it, thus reactionary and conservative. Within the histories of 
higher education written from such a perspective, new higher schools and the 
Darülfünun, and all the actors affiliated with them, represent the progressive 
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movement, of which the telos is the Republican university system, whereas the 
madrasas and all actors affiliated with them represent the reactionary movement that 
was doomed to perish. Although this historiographical perspective is more salient in 
the works of Ergin and of Dölen, most of the aforementioned works are to varying 
degrees influenced by it. Conceiving the struggle over higher education in the late 
Ottoman Empire as a battlefront between two antagonistic camps, as the dichotomist 
perspective suggests, these works fail to see that different actors and positions 
competing for higher education struggle both in and over same social space. They 
thus also fail to explain the interconnections, overlaps, commonalities, and even 
instances of coordination between the two perceived “camps” as well as the 
differences and struggles within an individual camp.   
 Of the aforementioned works, Akiba (2003) and Yörük (2014) constitute 
exceptions with regard to my general criticisms above. Akiba deals with the history 
of the Meşihat’s new school for vocational legal education, from its foundation as the 
Muallimhane-i Nüvvab to its abolition as the Medresetü’l-Kuzât, as constituted and 
shaped in and by the relations of competition between the Meşihat and Adliye ve 
Maarif Nezaretleri on the one hand, and between the Muallimhane and the Mekteb-i 
Hukuk on the other. He also demonstrates how the changes in judicial system 
constantly affected the configurations of these schools. Akiba does not conceive the 
aforementioned parties in dichotomous terms, however, and constantly points out the 
convergences and overlaps between the parties as well as the differences between the 
Muallimhane and traditional madrasa education. Finally, Akiba’s article refrains 
from using the teleological approach, and thus avoids casting the institutions in this 
period as mere precursors to those in the Turkish Republic. However, the scope of 
Akiba’s article is limited to the development of the Muallimhane-i Nüvvab-
Medresetü’l-Kuzât line, and does not deal with other institutions, aspects, or 
processes of the late Ottoman legal education system.  
Yörük’s work (2014) is also brilliant in its relational perspective as well as its 
distance from any teleological or dichotomist perspective. Based both on the 
personal archives of a man called Rizeli Hafız Kasım Efendi, who had pursued legal 
education in several types of higher educational institutions during the Meşrutiyet 
period, and on official archives, Yörük locates the biography of the man in the 
historical context of the transformation of Ottoman legal education. Yörük’s work 
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constitutes an excellent setting for invalidating the aforementioned historiographical 
perspectives and demonstrating that the very minds and bodies of the students 
constitutes parts of a social space in which actors entered into multifarious types of 
relations transforming legal education. He also demonstrates the contingencies of the 
late Ottoman higher educational transformation, focusing on the case of legal 
education. Although Yörük deals at once with different aspects, institutions, and 
processes of late Ottoman legal education, in contrast to Akiba, the temporal scope of 
Yörük’s work is mainly limited to the educational lifespan of Rizeli Hafız Kasım 
Efendi, which roughly corresponds to the Meşrutiyet period.  
There are some other recent works that are not specifically focused on legal 
education, but on different aspects of education in the late Ottoman Empire (e.g. 
Fortna 2003; Bein 2011). Based on extensive archival research, these works provide 
empirically grounded and well-articulated narratives invalidating the dichotomist and 
teleological perspectives. However, they neither attempt nor intend to develop a 
general theoretical model derived from or checked against empirical reality that 
would help to construct a new grand narrative of late Ottoman history that could 
dethrone the teleological and dichotomist grand narrative still dominates the field 
despite its decreasing historiographical legitimacy, which has been consistently 
undermined by partial narratives of the aforementioned kind. A new grand narrative, 
in order to be truly different from the former one, requires a new vision and 
conceptualization of the historical process not contaminated by the problematic 
aspects of the philosophy of history that underpins the present grand narrative.2 
 I believe the relational paradigm within sociology,3 which has been 
undergoing a process of self-description and self-positioning for at least some thirty 
years now, may offer important opportunities for conceiving of social reality and the 
historical process independently from the aforementioned biased perspectives, as the 
proponents of this paradigm have strived to fight off the substantialist philosophies 
of consciousness and of history. Although the late Ottoman empirical reality as well 
as the Ottomans’ own visions and conceptualizations of the historical process they 
had gone through are indispensable sources for constructing a new grand narrative 
based on a new grasp of historical process; the questions, concepts, and perspectives 
the relational sociological paradigm have yielded may also be of service in such a 
                                                 
2 For a critique of this philosophy, see Açıkel (2006). 
3 For a “manifesto” of relational sociology, see Emirbayer (1997). 
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task. Andrew Abbott is a sociologist considered to be within the relational 
sociological paradigm and has produced a significant amount of work meditating on 
how to conceptualize social reality and historical process in relational terms based on 
empirical research. In this study, I will utilize Abbot’s sociological theory to explore 
my topic and answering my research questions. 
1.3. Research Design and Outline of Chapters 
Abbott’s sociological theory is quite broad and demands extensive empirical research 
on several levels and dimensions of social reality in order to fully operationalize his 
theoretical model in explaining a historical process. The scope of a master’s thesis is 
too narrow for such a full operationalization. Thus I will exclude from the outset 
some levels and dimensions of social reality from my analysis. I will not engage in 
any analysis at the individual actor level. Thus, in principle, I will not deal with the 
actions, intentions, or positions of individual actors or with the relations between 
them. I will also not deal with the symbolic dimensions of the late Ottoman legal 
transformation, by which I mean the actual content of legal knowledge and thought. 
To deal with these, I might engage in an analysis focusing on specific actors and 
their works, which would require in turn narrowing both the temporal and the spatial 
scope of my thesis. Thus, it would be a different project. Instead, I will limit my 
analysis here to the collective actor level. The main collective actors within my 
analytical range will be the bureaucratic, higher educatianal, and judicial institutions 
in social space, and disciplines in cultural space, with a specific focus on their effects 
on the configuration of legal education. Finally, my temporal scope will be mainly 
limited to the last century of the Ottoman Empire in terms of legal education. I take 
the moment of total elimination of the fiqh discipline from the curricular space of 
higher education in the imperial center as the end of the Ottoman Empire in terms of 
legal education, which corresponds to the year 1926. Because the legal education in 
the Turkish Republic represented a radical rupture from late Ottoman legal 
education, especially from 1933 on, I will not be able to deal with the aftermath of 
1926 within the scope of this thesis. 
 This kind of a research would surely be more solid and better elaborated if 
based on a direct primary source research. However, the scope of my research 
question makes such research nearly impossible within the scope of a master’s thesis. 
Thus, my analysis of the disciplinary transformation of late Ottoman legal education 
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will be mainly based on secondary sources, which consist of the available historical 
scholarship on both Ottoman history in general and the history of Ottoman legal 
education in particular. The fact that there are many excellent descriptive works 
based on extensive primary source research, and that many primary sources are 
directly available within secondary sources (such as the curricula of the late Ottoman 
legal education system as provided in different institutions across time) to some 
extent minimizes the disadvantages and problems that may stem from the secondary 
source-based character of this analysis. There are, however, parts of my analysis that 
have suffered from an exclusive reliance on secondary sources, as the narratives the 
available secondary sources offer are sometimes quite problematic. My structural 
analysis of the Ottoman higher educational ecology in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries is of this kind, to give an example. This is because Zilfi’s works, which 
consitute the main secondary sources I rely on for analyzing this period, include 
problematic aspects, as criticized by Pierce (1991).  
 The main method I will use in my study is structural historical analysis as 
guided by Abbott’s interactional field approach and based on a systematic reading of 
the available scholarship. The thesis consists of five chapters: an introduction, three 
main chapters, and a conclusion. In the introduction, I offer a general presentation of 
my research and briefly assess the previous literature on late Ottoman legal 
education.  
In the second chapter, I undertake first a panoramic review of sociology of 
knowledge, identifying the main research traditions with regard to their stances on 
epistemological, theoretical, and empirical levels, and classifying them at once 
chronologically and analytically. Having located my study in one of the research 
lines within the new sociology of knowledge, namely the historical sociology of 
disciplinary knowledge, I then set out to critically engage the available general 
theoretical perspectives for a sociology of disciplinary knowledge. Having for 
several reasons chosen Abbott’s sociological theory over the other options, I finally 
present an overview of Abbot’s sociological theory, both of social reality in general, 
and of disciplinarity in particular.  
In the third chapter, I offer a general structural analysis of the historical 
formation and evolution of the Ottoman higher educational ecology from the early 
fourteenth century to the early nineteenth century. Classifying this immense interval 
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of time into three main periods, I trace the structural developments both in the 
Ottoman higher educational ecology and in legal education during each period. At 
the end of the chapter, I argue there are two structural characteristics of the Ottoman 
higher educational ecology that were present in each period, to varying degrees, until 
the nineteenth century. The first characteristic was the centrality of the fiqh discipline 
to the social and cultural structures of the ecology. The second was the relative 
administrative and financial autonomy of the Ottoman higher educational ecology 
from other ecologies, and of the ilmiye corps as the main collective actor dominating 
the ecology against other actors within the dynastic bureaucratic ecology, albeit to a 
decreasing degree from the mid-fifteenth century on.  
In the fourth chapter, I begin by articulating a Bourdieusian concept, namely 
symbolic power, to complement my Abbotian theoretical framework, in order to 
more effectively deal with the processes of modern state formation, for which Abbott 
does not offer any specific theoretical formulation. Then I analyze, in the remaining 
part of the fourth chapter, the disciplinary transformation of late Ottoman legal 
education as divided into three historical periods: the reign of Mahmud II, the Long 
Tanzimat period, and the Meşrutiyet period.  
Finally, in the conclusion, I both reassert my main arguments and reformulate 
my analysis from a different perspective. As an answer to my first main research 
question, I argue that the disciplinary transformation of Ottoman legal education 
between 1826 and 1926 took place as a result of several processes of competition, 
which constituted aspects of the overarching process of modern state formation, 
between diverse bureaucratic, higher educational, judicial, and disciplinary collective 
actors within an interactional field at the intersection of bureaucratic, higher 
educational, and judicial ecologies. As an answer to my second main research 
question, I argue that the increasing amount of symbolic power the emergent 
collective actors (such as the Maarif Nezareti, Mekteb-i Hukuk, or Darülfünun) 
accumulated to the detriment of the rooted collective actors (such as the Meşihat, 
Muallimhane, or madrasas) within the aforementioned interactional field during the 
process of modern state formation made possible the gradual expansion of the law 
discipline’s academic settlement in curricular space while narrowing down that of the 
fiqh discipline, thus transforming the Ottoman legal education from a fiqh-centered 
disciplinary character to a law-centered disciplinary character. Finally, in the 
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conclusion, I offer first a general summary of the second and third chapters, which 
reasserts my central arguments as well as the auxiliary ones. Then I engage in a brief 
reanalysis of the transformation of legal education in a different perspective. I finish 
with a brief theoretical note on Abbott’s theory. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE NEW SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND ABBOTT’S THEORY OF 
LINKED ECOLOGIES/INTERACTIONAL FIELDS  
2.1. A Panoramic Review of the Sociology of Knowledge and the Location of 
Research within the Literature 
The term “social” implies relational human activity, and any human relationality has 
a symbolic aspect, which relates to meaning and knowledge. Thus, knowledge is 
inherent and integral to any social phenomenon. Therefore, any sociological study 
implies an understanding pertaining to the sociology of knowledge, be it deliberately 
undertaken or not. For this reason, it is difficult to define the boundaries of sociology 
of knowledge as an area of sociological inquiry. It is possible, however, without 
attempting to draw strict lines, to discern certain clusters of problems that stand out 
within the sociology of knowledge. As a preliminary categorization, one could say 
that there are three kinds of questions sociologists of knowledge grapple with: 
epistemological, theoretical,4 and empirical questions. These questions are not, of 
course, independent of each other. They may well be nested together in sociological 
research, and this is often the case. In fact, any empirical research is based, whether 
explicitly problematized or not, on epistemological and theoretical grounds. In the 
same vein, any epistemological stance has implications for social theory, 
methodology, and empirical research. However, this categorization may help us 
broadly classify the sociologists of knowledge on the basis of their stances with 
regard to these kinds of questions. 
Within this perspective, we can distinguish between three periods in the 
history of the sociology of knowledge: the foundation period (pre-1960s), the 
transition period (the 1960s), and the re-foundation period (from the 1970s on).5 In 
                                                 
4 By “theoretical”, I am referring to the fields of social/sociological theory in general, and the 
sociology of knowledge in particular. 
5 1) Camic and Gross (2004) distinguish between “the new sociology of ideas” (from the 1980s on) 
and “the old sociology of ideas” (before the 1980s). Although I agree in principle with the general 
distinction they make between the new and the old sociologies of knowledge, I add another period 
(roughly corresponding to the 1960s) to account for the transition from the old to the new and thus to 
provide an arguably more accurate picture. Placing all works written before the 1980s under the label 
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the following pages I will present the main approaches in these periods, paying 
attention to their stances on epistemological, theoretical, and empirical issues. 
2.1.1. The Foundation Period (Prior to the 1960s) 
Major epistemological debates in the sociology of knowledge revolve around two 
central and interrelated questions: the validity (i.e. truth/falsity) of knowledge and the 
status of scientific knowledge. The first question concerns the problem of the 
possibility of universally accepted knowledge and how to achieve it. The second 
questions whether scientific knowledge has a higher status than other types of 
knowledge (e.g. ordinary, religious, artistic, etc.) in terms of its validity.  
The foundation period is when the sociology of knowledge was founded and 
gradually grew into a distinct area of research with all its questions and concepts. As 
Hekman (1986) rightly argues, almost all approaches within the early sociology of 
knowledge derive their conception of knowledge as well as their research principles 
from Enlightenment philosophy, which finds one of its earliest examples in Bacon’s 
theory of idols (1844, 9–116). According to this conception of knowledge, there are 
basically two types of knowledge: objective knowledge, which is true/universal 
knowledge acquired through the scientific method, and subjective knowledge, which 
is false/culturally and socially determined knowledge acquired through irrational 
means such as religion, superstition, emotions, and so on. These two categories of 
knowledge are mutually exclusive, and it is on the basis of objective knowledge that 
truth should be pursued and social life organized. Accordingly, subjective knowledge 
should be systematically excluded both from scientific endeavor and public space in 
favor of objective knowledge. It is against the background of this conception of 
knowledge based on the dichotomy between objectivity and subjectivity that modern 
social sciences in general, and the sociology of knowledge in particular, are 
elaborated. Based on this matrix, the sociology of knowledge was meant to 
“determine the nature and function of socially determined subjective beliefs in a way 
to promote the achievement of objective knowledge in the social sciences” (Hekman 
2012, 30). 
                                                                                                                                          
“old sociology of ideas” is an oversimplification and hampers any effort explain the transition from 
the old to the new. I also take into account the continuities between periods unlike Camic and Gross, 
who almost exclusively focus on change and differences. 2) As with all other periodizations, this 
periodization is also inevitably a generalization. I would ask that the reader view the distinctions 
between periods and categories not as clear-cut frontiers, but as boundary areas, or buffer zones, 
where many intersections, fusions, and encounters occur. 
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The sociology of knowledge did not exist as a field as such before the 1920s. 
However, a sociology of knowledge was certainly present in the works of the 
founders of sociology. Thus I treat the conceptions of knowledge and intellectual 
reality present in the founding works of sociology under the rubric of sociology of 
knowledge. Having said that, I would argue there are three main approaches in the 
foundation period, according to their stances on the aforementioned epistemological 
questions: materialist, positivist, and German sociologies of knowledge. 
The positivist sociology of knowledge is the primary heir to Enlightenment 
thought and its conception of knowledge. Essentially based on the works of Comte 
and Durkheim and arriving at its peak in the work of Merton, the positivist sociology 
of knowledge has a hegemonic character in the field during the foundation period. Its 
epistemological stance is largely the same as that of Enlightenment philosophy as 
described above. Thus, I will not repeat it here. 
The materialist sociology of knowledge, which is essentially based on the 
thought of Karl Marx, can be equated with Marxist tradition of sociology.6 The 
premise of the materialist sociology of knowledge, which is centered around the 
questions of ideology and false consciousness, can be most concisely seen in a 
famous maxim of Marx, where he objects to the German idealist tradition: “The 
mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual 
life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, 
but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness” (Tucker 
1978, 4). Marx essentially preserves the dichotomy between true/objective and 
false/subjective knowledge, yet he changes the criterion of validity. What makes 
knowledge true or false is its accordance to the material conditions/organization of 
life. True/objective knowledge is the only type of knowledge to truly express the 
actual mode of production in a way that reveals the exploitation and alienation 
therein and thereby revolutionizes it. All other types of knowledge misrepresent 
reality in ways that maintain the relations of domination are forms of false 
consciousness. Although this ideas is significantly refined and revised by later 
thinkers (e.g. Lukacs, Althusser, and Gramsci), this basic conception of knowledge 
                                                 
6 I should also mention that a radical materialist conception of knowledge was prevalent among 
natural scientists in this period. Although I do not include them in the category of “materialist 
sociology of knowledge”, simply because they are not sociologists, one should not overlook this fact 
given that natural sciences constituted the “role model” for social sciences in general, and sociology in 
particular. 
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underpins all Marxist tradition. Accordingly, the primary objective of the sociology 
of knowledge inherent within Marxism is to achieve and express true/objective 
knowledge in a way that eliminates forms of false consciousness in order to 
revolutionize capitalist mode of production. Although the materialist sociology of 
knowledge differs from its positivist counterpart in many aspects, the structural 
homology between their basic conceptions of knowledge inherited from 
Enlightenment philosophy is obvious. 
It is in the German tradition that the sociology of knowledge was given its 
name. I am aware that the label “German” sounds odd after “materialist” and 
“positivist.” I could not give this tradition a name of the latter kind because of its 
lack of a similarly clear stance on epistemological questions. This ambiguity on 
epistemological issues is both a weakness and a strength of this tradition. Initiated by 
Max Scheler and Karl Mannheim, the German sociology of knowledge was a child 
of the renowned Methodenstreit that occurred at the end of the nineteenth century 
(Hekman 2012, 73–108). One of the central problems of the Methodenstreit and 
following debates was the question of the accuracy of the positivist scientific 
epistemology (and methodology) for human and social sciences 
(Geisteswissenschaft). No one in the debate questioned the authority of positivist 
epistemology in the realm of the natural sciences. In this sense, the German tradition 
was loyal to Enlightenment philosophy. When it came to Geisteswissenschaft, 
however, the accuracy of positivist epistemology was severely questioned, if not 
rejected, by many scholars. The constitutive opposition of the Methodenstreit was 
between positivism, the position of those advocating the use of positivist 
epistemology for Geisteswissenschaft, and historicism, the position of those 
advocating for a relativist, or contextualist, conception of truth by confining it to 
historical context. It is from the tension between these two positions that the German 
sociology of knowledge emerged (Hauser 1988). An effort to resolve this tension is 
omnipresent in the works of Scheler and Mannheim as well as Rickert and Weber. 
Thus, I would argue, what makes the German sociology of knowledge a tradition in 
itself is not a clear epistemological stance they commonly adopt, but a persistent 
resistance to the hegemony of positivist epistemology in the realm of 
Geisteswissenschaft and an accompanying effort to establish an alternative scientific 
epistemology and methodology for Geisteswissenschaft. A sound evaluation of their 
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achievements would require a separate book. In the main, however, I believe their 
efforts to establish an alternative scientific epistemology ultimately failed, mainly 
because they adopted the two radical distinctions posited by positivism: the one 
between “natural” and “social,” both as scientific endeavors and sectors of reality, 
and the other between objective and subjective knowledge. What they did was 
mainly rearranging the elements falling under these already-defined categories 
without seriously challenging the logic of categorization itself. Although they failed 
to establish a well-elaborated epistemology, however, they certainly inspired and laid 
the foundations for later developments in the sociology of knowledge. They did so 
mainly by keeping central questions and debates alive instead of closing them up 
with clear-cut answers.  
These major epistemological stances have their implications on the theoretical 
level. I will briefly present the positions of the aforementioned approaches on the 
central theoretical question of the sociology of knowledge: the relation between 
knowledge and social reality. My formulation of the question gives a sense of the 
terms in which the question is conceived and discussed in this period. I would argue 
the two main approaches, viz. positivist and materialist sociologies of knowledge, 
have conceptualized knowledge and social reality mainly in substantialist terms.7 In 
other words, they conceptualize knowledge and social reality as two distinct 
ontological substances that have a relation of determination to each other. This 
relation implies that one of the substances has ontological primacy over the other in a 
way that determines its existence. What separates them is the direction of this 
relation of determination as well as their conceptions of knowledge and of social 
reality. 
Within these two main approaches, one can distinguish three positions with 
regard to this central question. The positions they adopt change according to the type 
of knowledge concerned, so I will treat these three positions accordingly. As for 
subjective/false knowledge, both materialists and positivists agree that social reality 
determines knowledge. Their positions diverge, however, according to their 
conceptions of social reality.  
Materialists argue that it is above all the dominant mode of production, i.e. 
the organization of material reality, which determines knowledge and consciousness. 
                                                 
7 I use the terms “substantial(ist)” and “relational(ist)” here as defined by Emirbayer (1997). 
   
 
18 
 
This is not a direct determination, however, as widely described in the mainstream 
sociological literature. The determination of consciousness is mediated by class 
structure. In other words, material reality determines consciousness via one’s 
position within the class structure. The dominant class has the upper hand in being 
able impose its vision of reality, which is also determined by material reality, upon 
all society.8 This dominant vision of reality is a false consciousness, as it conceals 
the exploitation and alienation on which the mode of production is based and thus 
serves to maintain it by normalizing it. Acknowledging this mediation is important, 
since it has implications on the question of false consciousness, which I will discuss 
at greater length below. Positivists also argue that social reality determines subjective 
knowledge. However, their conception of social reality is different from that of 
materialists. According to positivists, material reality is not the sole basis of social 
reality, or thus of subjective knowledge. Social reality is a composition of different 
kinds of realities such as political, economic, religious, ideological, and so on. All 
these realities affect and determine the formation of subjective knowledge and 
beliefs. As Hamilton concisely puts it in his analysis of Durkheim’s sociology of 
knowledge, “collective representations are, as social facts, the ‘surface’ 
manifestations of the social ‘essence’: systems of values, beliefs, norms and 
knowledge correspond to and underlying social reality which is their ultimate 
foundation” (1974, 108).  
As for the relation between objective knowledge and social reality, the 
materialists’ position seems equivocal. On the one hand, they embrace the idea that 
social reality determines consciousness and firmly reject the idea that knowledge or 
consciousness may have a transformative effect on either social or intellectual 
reality. For instance, Marx confidently states that “all forms and products of 
consciousness cannot be dissolved by mental criticism (…) but only by the practical 
overthrow of the actual social relations which gave rise to this idealistic humbug; that 
not criticism but revolution is the driving force of history, also of religion, of 
                                                 
8 As Marx succinctly formulates: “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: 
i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual 
force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same 
time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who 
lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal 
expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as 
ideas (…)” (Tucker 1978, 172–3). 
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philosophy and all other types of theory". (Tucker 1978, 164). On the other hand, 
they seem unclear on how this revolution will occur without a conscious volition. 
Some Marxists, such as Lukacs (1971), go further and establish a necessary causal 
link between the revolution and the achievement by proletariat of its class 
consciousness, thus implicitly assuming an almost idealistic position. If we do not 
read between the lines, however, the materialists’ explicitly stated position does not 
change: objective/true knowledge is also subjected to social determination, to laws of 
historical change. It is “the practical overthrow of the actual social relations” that 
drives the change in all types of knowledge – “of religion, of philosophy and all 
other types of theory” – towards the achievement of objective knowledge, the 
ultimate knowledge of communist society. The positivists’ position is clear with 
regard to the relation between objective knowledge and social reality. Objective 
knowledge is independent of any social determination. For objective knowledge is 
acquired through positivist methodology, which is based on logical and mathematical 
treatments and reports of sensory experience acquired through empirical observation, 
and thus free of social determination. Consequently, objective knowledge cannot be a 
research subject for the sociology of knowledge, which analyses the social 
determination of knowledge. I would argue that materialists agree with positivists on 
this last point, although they have not stated it explicitly on theoretical level. The 
lack of any specific treatment of objective scientific knowledge, of natural sciences 
for instance, within the literature on ideology reinforces my argument. 
 Since German sociology of knowledge finds its most elaborate version in the 
work of Mannheim, I will treat the position of this approach with reference to 
Mannheim’s work (1979).9 To begin with, Mannheim maintains the basic distinction 
between objective knowledge and subjective knowledge with regard to the question 
of the relation between knowledge and social reality. Unlike positivists, however, 
Mannheim confines objective knowledge only to the realms of mathematics and 
natural sciences. Conceived in this narrower sense, objective knowledge is not 
subject to social determination. In exempting objective knowledge from the analysis 
of the sociology of knowledge Mannheim and positivists then assume the same 
position, even though their delimitations of objective knowledge are significantly 
                                                 
9 Even though there may be some differences between Mannheim and other German sociologists of 
knowledge (such as Scheler, Weber, or Dilthey), I believe these differences are not so great as to 
warrant treating them as separate positions. 
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different. All other types of knowledge, however, are socially determined. This is at 
once the basic premise and the raison d’être of the Mannhemian sociology of 
knowledge.  
What I have said so far about Mannheim’s work would not have required 
conferring him a distinct place among the approaches mentioned so far, were it not 
for his conception of social reality. Mannheim’s conception of reality is essentially 
Weberian. He conceives social reality “in terms of a structure of meaningful social 
actions of individual actors” (Hamilton 1974, 121). He thus significantly differs both 
from positivists, who consider society as a natural reality, and from materialists, who 
conceive of social reality in material terms. However, their conceptions of social 
reality diverge not only on how social reality is constituted, but also on how it is 
conceptualized. As opposed to positivists and materialists, who conceptualize 
knowledge and social reality as two ontologically distinct substances, as stated 
above, Mannheim injects knowledge within social reality on an ontological level by 
conceptualizing it as composed of “meaningful social actions.”  
Within such a conception of social reality, the social determination of 
knowledge assumes a significantly different meaning. Knowledge is determined by 
social reality, of which it is a constitutive part. Therefore, this determination is not 
unidirectional. As a constitutive part, knowledge also partially determines social 
reality. Thence Mannheim’s sociology is a “relationist” sociology of knowledge 
(1979, 70-78, 253-75). The social determination of knowledge implies, in 
Mannheim’s language, that all knowledge is knowledge of a position within social 
reality, and cannot be grasped outside of its relations with other positions, that is, its 
social context. It is via this position that social reality determines one’s knowledge, 
and that one’s meaningful, knowledge-based actions structure social reality. Let 
Mannheim speak for himself:  
 
Relationism signifies merely that all of the elements of meaning in a given 
situation have reference to one another and derive their significance from this 
reciprocal interrelationship in a given frame of thought. Such a system of 
meanings is possible and valid only in a given type of historical existence, to 
which, for a time, it furnishes appropriate expression. When the social 
situation changes, the system of norms to which it had previously given birth 
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ceases to be in harmony with it. (…) The concepts which we have and the 
universe of discourse in which we move, together with the directions in 
which they tend to elaborate themselves, are dependent largely upon the 
historical-social situation of the intellectually active and responsible members 
of the group. We have, then, as the theme of this non-evaluative study of 
ideology, the relationship of all partial knowledge and its component 
elements to the larger body of meaning, and ultimately to the structure of 
historical reality. (1979, 76–77).  
 
Mannheim’s theoretical approach plants the seeds of all later approaches that can be 
gathered under the loose label of “relational paradigm” within the sociology of 
knowledge. 
Although the foundation period has a richness and diversity in terms of the 
efforts and approaches dealing with epistemological and theoretical questions, the 
scene gets darker when it comes to empirical research. I must note at the outset that I 
will limit myself with the overview of the empirical work done on the production of 
relatively specialized and systematic knowledge (scientific knowledge, 
scholarly/academic knowledge, systems of thought, etc.), for without such a 
limitation the task would require a separate book. To begin with the weakest of the 
three groups mentioned above, materialists have done little in terms of empirical 
research, let alone establishing an empirical research agenda and tradition. Most of 
the energy within the materialist sociology of knowledge was channeled to 
theoretical works on ideology and consciousness. The only empirical works dealing 
with systematic knowledge within a materialist approach are, as far as I know, 
Hessen’s article on the “social and economic roots of Newtons’ Principia” and 
Grossman’s work on the social origins of mechanistic philosophy (Hessen and 
Grossmann 2009). 
Though the German tradition produced a considerable number of works 
dealing with the sociology of knowledge on the epistemological and theoretical 
levels, it has not made an equally good showing in empirical research. Mannheim, 
for instance, makes an impressive articulation of a theory of the sociology of 
knowledge but ultimately fails to establish a solid and operational methodology and 
research agenda out of his theory. To put it in Hamilton’s words, “whilst Mannheim 
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is concerned to produce a sociological epistemology as a critique of the formalism 
and abstract nature of philosophic theories of knowledge, his methods of doing so are 
so philosophical. The technical language of concepts which he employs remains non-
empirical (…)” (1974, 120). Consequently, the lack of a Mannheimian tradition of 
empirical research, which seems prima facie surprising if one consider his founding 
work in the sociology of knowledge, is not actually that surprising. As opposed to 
Mannheim, Weber not only accomplished much in establishing a solid methodology 
for empirical research, but also himself produced a substantial amount of empirical 
work in what one might call historical sociology. As far as the sociology of 
knowledge is concerned, however, almost all his work can be read as the account of 
the emergence and gradual establishment of a modern Western weltanschauung, of 
rationalization, together with all its material and social institutions. For someone who 
looks for a sociology of specialized knowledge, therefore, Weber does not provide 
much example of concrete empirical analysis. As for his intellectual lineage, 
although he has had considerable influence, one way or the other, on later work in 
the sociology of knowledge, as is also the case for all later sociological work, it does 
not seem possible to speak of a specifically Weberian tradition of the sociology of 
knowledge.  
 Positivists have the best record in terms of empirical research. I would argue 
that there are two main streams of empirical research within the positivist sociology 
of knowledge. A dominant stream dates from the late 19th-early 20th century, when a 
large number of sociologists and anthropologists consecrated their efforts to analyze 
systems of thought in pre-modern societies. The works of Durkheim and Mauss 
(1903), Levy-Bruhl (1910), and Evans-Pritchard (1976) represent this stream of 
research, although there are differences in their arguments (Schmaus 1996). Another 
important stream is the sociology of scientific knowledge, which is to a great extent 
undertaken by Merton. This stream of research is almost exclusively American. 
Beginning with his pioneering book analyzing the relation between Protestant 
pietism and early experimental science (1938), Merton produced an influential 
corpus of work in the sociology of science, where he analyzes science as a social 
structure (1965; 1973; Merton and Barber 2006). I believe it would not be 
exaggerating to say that Merton is the founder of the sociology of science as a 
legitimate and feasible research field within the discipline of sociology. There were 
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also a few other American sociologists undertaking empirical work, such as Veblen 
(2009) and Mills (1964), who seem to not have a particularly strong influence on 
later work in the sociology of knowledge.  
 There are two dominant ways of explanation, one or the other of which one 
finds in all empirical works written in the foundation period: internalist explanation 
and externalist explanation. This bifurcation is based upon a distinction made 
between internal and external factors affecting the formation and change of 
intellectual/scientific knowledge within society. Internal factors are those intellectual 
elements pertaining to the interior of an intellectual universe embodied in text (or any 
other intellectual product): concepts, arguments, theories, styles, and so on. By 
contrast, external factors are those non-intellectual elements situated outside of the 
intellectual universe of thinking, arguing, and writing: all kinds of material, 
biological, political, or economic factors.  
Adherents of the internalist position basically argue that the formation and 
change of intellectual/scientific knowledge occurs according to an internal logic of 
development shaped by intellectual intercourse, negotiation, and debate between 
knowledge producers. The content of intellectual activity is then free of any external 
determination. Although that German tradition has never offered any empirical 
explanation of this kind, they theoretically hold this position with regard to objective 
knowledge (limited to the natural sciences). However, it is primarily positivists who 
employ the internal explanation. Merton’s two works (1965; Merton and Barber 
2006), where he traces “the travels and adventures” of a maxim (“on the shoulders of 
giants”) and a concept (serendipity), are almost ideal-typical examples of internal 
explanation. However, all positivists do not adopt the same level of internalism in 
their works. Some positivists, especially those influenced by the work of Mannheim, 
accept some level of external determination, certainly not with regard to the content 
of intellectual/scientific activity, but with regard to its focus and orientation, such as 
the choice of research subjects. Merton clearly expresses this position: “In science, 
the focus of attention may be socially determined but not, presumably, its conceptual 
apparatus.” (1968, 523–4). Interestingly enough, it is again Merton who provides 
arguably the best example of this relatively less internalist position. In his pioneering 
book Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England, Merton 
provides “an empirical examination of the genesis and development of some of the 
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cultural values which underlie the large-scale pursuit of science” (1938, 360). He 
basically argues both Puritanism and emergent military-economic needs have 
contributed to the growing rise of interest in scientific and technological research.10 
Externalists defend the opposite argument: it is above all external factors that 
determine the formation and change of intellectual/scientific knowledge, its content 
as well as its form. Thus, no knowledge has an intellectual/scientific value per se 
independently of its social function. Materialists are the primary clients of this mode 
of explanation. Hessen’s work (2009) provides an excellent sample of an externalist 
explanation. He argues that Newton’s Principia was first and foremost a result of the 
social and economic context that determined Newton’s intellectual activity, rather 
than a product of Newton’s intellectual genius as Whitehead or Carlyle would argue 
(Hessen and Grossmann 2009, 41–43).  
As the reader has probably already noticed, these modes of explanation 
correspond to the aforementioned theoretical positions on the relation between 
knowledge and social reality. To put it grosso modo, those who advocate for the 
social determination of knowledge while ascribing to social reality an ontological 
primacy over knowledge prefer the external explanation. Yet those who argue for the 
independence of (objective) knowledge from social determination consequently tend 
to favor the internal explanation. Although the German tradition did not produce 
considerable empirical research, as I said before, one may argue, considering their 
theoretical positions, that they occupy a middle position with regard to this internal-
external debate. Their consistently in-between position will make them an important 
source of inspiration for later sociologists of knowledge.  
This dichotomist conception of “internal(ist)” and “external(ist),” along with 
its counterparts on the theoretical and epistemological levels (knowledge/social 
reality and objective/subjective), constitutes the matrix upon which almost all works 
produced in the foundation period are built. Consequently, it is above all against this 
dichotomist conception that re-founders of the sociology of knowledge are united. It 
is no coincidence that it is difficult to find a work in the sociology of knowledge 
written in the refoundation period (and partially in the transition period) where the 
                                                 
10 I have not mentioned any work from such fields as the history of science or phiolosophy, since I 
limit myself here with the literatüre of sociology of knowledge. It is possible to say, however, that 
almost all of the work dealing with the history of any intellectual/scientific activity adopts an 
internalist position in its explanations, thus implicitly embracing an internalist and positivist sociology 
of knowledge. 
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author does not devote a passage, or a chapter, to refuting this dichotomist 
conception (e.g. Berger and Luckmann 1991; Mullins 1975; Bourdieu 1997). I will 
now offer a brief overview of the transition period, focusing especially on two works 
that arguably made possible the transition to what some have called “the new 
sociology of knowledge/ideas” (Swidler and Arditi 1994; Camic and Gross 2004). 
2.1.2. The Transition Period (the 1960s) 
The transition period, roughly covering the 1960s, may be characterized by the 
writing of two paradigmatic books, one by Kuhn (1962), and the other by Berger and 
Luckmann (1966), which significantly upset established ways of carrying out work 
in the sociology of knowledge and laid the foundations for a new sociology of 
knowledge. Kuhn’s book brought about a “paradigm shift,” to formulate it in Kuhn’s 
own terms, in the understanding of scientific truth and scientific change. He argued 
that science does not progress in a linear and continuous way with the gradual 
accumulation of accepted scientific facts and theories; it rather advances in an 
episodic manner where periods of “normal science,” of conceptual continuity and 
scientific convention, are interrupted by periods of “revolutionary science,” where 
established intellectual frameworks and scientific conventions are severely 
questioned and ultimately abandoned in favor of new ones. Kuhn also argues, in a 
parallel way, that competing paradigms are often incommensurable. Thus, scientific 
truth cannot be established according to universal objective criteria; it is rather 
defined by the consensus of a scientific community sharing the same paradigm. The 
consequences of Kuhn’s book for the sociology of knowledge are not difficult to 
observe. First, he dealt a fatal blow to the positivist understanding of scientific 
knowledge with all its claims of monopoly over universality and objectivity. Second, 
he set the grounds for a sociological analysis of scientific knowledge, which would 
constitute one of the main articles in the research agenda of the sociology of 
knowledge in the re-foundation period. 
Berger and Luckmann’s book (1966) is the best-elaborated and most 
successful of the several attempts undertaken in the transition period with the goal of 
achieving a theoretical synthesis between the aforementioned dichotomies 
(knowledge/social reality and internal/external), which had haunted the sociology of 
knowledge in the foundation period (e.g. Gurvitch 1966; Habermas 1971; Stark 
1958). Essentially based on Schutz’ phenomenological approach, yet also solidly 
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anchored in the classical sociology of knowledge, Berger and Luckmann simply 
argue it is at the basis of social interaction that both knowledge and social reality are 
constructed. In fact, knowledge and social reality are not separate things, but 
dimensions or aspects of the same reality. Since all social interaction is inevitably 
symbolic, knowledge is ontologically integral to any social reality, just as what is 
subjective and internal is ontologically nested with what is objective and external. 
Thus, any theory of knowledge assuming an ontological distinction between 
knowledge/subjectivity and social reality/objectivity is unfounded and fallacious. I 
would argue that the essential argument of Berger and Luckmann (on the ontological 
inseparability of knowledge and social reality) remains a basic convention among 
sociologists of knowledge in the re-foundation period. Even the materialists and 
positivists of the re-foundation period do not hold to the old strict positions of either 
the social determination or the social independence of knowledge. To put it in terms 
of a horticultural metaphor, Kuhn and Berger and Luckmann replaced the old soil in 
the orchard of the sociology of knowledge where the pre-1960 approaches had 
flourished, with new soil where new epistemological and theoretical saplings would 
grow, yielding empirical fruits. Considering the abundance of both theoretical 
saplings and empirical fruits in the new orchard of the sociology of knowledge, one 
can retrospectively say that their soil was good and their seeds fruitful. 
2.1.3. The Re-foundation Period (after the 1970s) 
The re-foundation period abounds with such a wide range of theoretical approaches 
and empirical works that even a general overview would require a great deal of time 
and space. I will limit myself here to naming only the most prominent approaches 
and research programs, and presenting the general points that distinguish them from 
the earlier works in the foundation period. 
 There are many self-proclaimed epistemological positions within the 
sociology of knowledge in the re-foundation period: realism, culturalism, naturalism, 
constructivism, historical rationalism, feminist epistemology, and so on. I would 
argue, however, that there are often only slight differences between them with regard 
to basic epistemological questions, thus they can be gathered under two main 
epistemological positions: relativism and post-positivism. Interestingly enough, both 
positions adopt, implicitly or explicitly, the Kuhnian argument as their departure 
point even if their ultimate destinations substantially differ. Relativists wholly 
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embrace the Kuhnian argument at its extreme to reject any idea of objective truth and 
any recognition of a higher status for scientific knowledge. All knowledge is totally 
bounded by culture and context, according to this position, and therefore truth is 
always relative to a particular frame of reference, such as a language or a culture. 
Although post-positivists also accept the Kuhnian argument, they do not interpret it 
as leading to relativism. Instead, they substantially redefine the basic concepts and 
premises of positivism in order to found a plausible epistemological position 
coherent with Kuhn’s theory, which nevertheless does not completely renounce the 
idea of objective truth, its possibility and desirability. Postpositivists agree that there 
is an external reality independent of us, that this reality limits our knowledge of it 
(thus all knowledge cannot be true), and that objective knowledge of reality can best 
be acquired through empirical methodology.  
Rooted in one of these main epistemological positions, a substantial amount 
of both theoretical and empirical work has been done in the re-foundation period. 
Cultural or interpretive studies of knowledge (e.g. Geertz 1983; Hekman 1986; 
McCarthy 1996), the feminist sociology of knowledge (e.g. Harding 2008; Hekman 
2010), an important part of science and technology studies (e.g. Latour and Woolgar 
1986; Knorr-Cetina 1981; Latour 1987) are some research lines that stand out among 
those adopting a relativist epistemological position. Among those adopting different 
versions of the post-positivist position, the following research programs particularly 
stand out: The Britain-centered “strong programme” in the sociology of scientific 
knowledge (e.g. Barnes 2008; Bloor 1991; MacKenzie 1981; H. M. Collins and 
Pinch 1993), the Bourdieusian sociology of knowledge (e.g. Bourdieu 1975; 
Bourdieu 1984; 1997; 2001; Ringer 1992; 2000; Kauppi 1996; 2010; Sabour 2001), 
Foucault’s sociology of knowledge11 (e.g. Foucault 1966; 2008), and Abbot’s 
sociology of knowledge (Abbott 1982; Abbott 1999; Abbott 2001a). Furthermore, 
there is a substantial amount of work written in the field of historical sociology of 
scientific/disciplinary knowledge, which also comprises some of the aforementioned 
works (e.g. Ringer 1990; Brannigan 1981; Kohler 2008; Becher 2001; Charle 1994; 
Heilbron 1995; Shapin 2008; Lenoir 1997; Strydom 2000). Although the materialist 
                                                 
11 My categorization of Foucault under the post-positivist position may seem odd to some. Although 
Foucault’s epistemological position is largely embraced as relativist, I believe it is more akin to 
historical rationalism, as found in the work of Bachelard and Canguilhem, who had strong influence 
on Foucault’s thought. 
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sociology of knowledge has to a great extent lost its erstwhile influential position in 
the re-foundation period, there are nevertheless some works dealing with knowledge 
within a primarily materialist perspective (e.g. Abercrombie 1980; Wuthnow 1989; 
Lee 2003). Finally, there are numerous important individual works, not directly 
located within one of the aforementioned research lines or programs, which focus on 
the sociology of philosophy and of academic knowledge (e.g. Mullins 1973; Kusch 
1995; R. Collins 1998; Gross 2008; Fuller 2009; Lamont 2009; Fabiani 2010; Camic 
et al. 2011).  
As can be understood from the abovementioned selected list of works, one of 
the striking characteristics of the re-foundation period is that almost all prominent 
theoretical approaches of the period are solidly rooted in empirical research. This is 
in stark contrast to the foundation period, which is rich in theoretical articulation 
while being poor in empirical research. Apart from its empirically based character 
and post-positivist (or post-Kuhnian) condition, there are five common theoretical 
and methodological principles that almost all works written in the sociology of 
knowledge during the re-foundation period share, despite all their differences. I will 
now briefly describe these principles.12 
First of all, the new sociology of knowledge considers the sociological study 
of knowledge as an end in itself, as a legitimate scientific concern in its own right, as 
opposed to the old sociology of knowledge, which often considers the sociology of 
knowledge as a means to social-critical and political ends, as a way to politically 
intervene in the world. The latter is particularly relevant for the materialist sociology 
of knowledge as well as for the Mannheimian sociology of knowledge. The second 
common principle is the rejection of the internal/external distinction that constitutes 
one of the central elements of the intellectual matrix of the old sociology of 
knowledge, which I elaborated above.13 The third principle is the adoption of a 
“contextualist methodology” based on the premise that “meanings are always 
embedded in socio-intellectual contexts which must be opened up to in-depth 
investigation before the ideas themselves can be understood” (Camic and Gross 
                                                 
12 In describing these principles, I follow Camic and Gross (2004) who contrast “the new sociology of 
ideas” with “the old sociology of ideas.” However, I use the expression “new/old sociology of 
knowledge” instead. 
13 I should note however that the theoretical rejection of the internal/external dichotomy does not 
necessarily guarantee an empirical explanation that truly overcomes this dichotomous conception. 
Many empirical works rejecting the dichotomy in theoretical formulation may well apply it in 
empirical explanation. 
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2004, 245). In parallel with this contextualist methodology, the new sociology of 
knowledge acknowledges the importance of local institutional factors affecting 
knowledge production processes and puts more emphasis on them, as opposed to the 
old sociology of knowledge, which almost entirely focuses on macro social factors. 
Finally, in contrast to the old sociology of knowledge which considers intellectuals 
(or knowledge producers) as an objective and distinct category of people within 
society and focuses on their intellectual activities, the new sociology of knowledge 
tends to see knowledge producers as positioned within certain fields or contexts 
where they struggle with each other as well as with others outside of the field over 
power, authority and legitimacy, and their struggles in turn affect the production of 
knowledge. 
My study is broadly located within the new sociology of knowledge, not 
because it is chronologically written in the re-foundation period, but because it 
adopts the basic common principles described above. More specifically, my study is 
a contribution to the literature on the historical sociology of disciplinary knowledge. 
Historical sociology of disciplinary knowledge is not a self-proclaimed research area. 
However, there is a plethora of research dealing with similar questions and subjects 
that can be gathered under such a common category. Heilbron undertakes the task of 
staking out the boundaries of the historical sociology of disciplinary knowledge 
(2004). As Heilbron documents, significant sociological interest in disciplinarity as a 
form of social organization of knowledge and historical formation of academic 
disciplines is quite recent. This “curious lack of fundamental research is (…) 
surprising,” as Heilbron states, “since disciplines are in the academic world what 
nation-states are in the political realm” (2004, 25). Considering how nation-states 
changed the rules of the game in the political realm, maybe even the nature of the 
politics itself, Heilbron’s analogy implicitly argues that the disciplinary organization 
of knowledge has significantly altered the rules of the game in the academic field and 
maybe even the nature of knowledge itself. Put in this way, the question seems all the 
more important. However, current scholarship on the historical sociology of 
disciplinary knowledge does not seem to offer satisfying theoretical answers to these 
questions. In Heilbron’s words, “the existing social science literature on disciplines 
consists essentially of case studies, clarifying various aspects of the question, yet 
often remaining disconnected from more general issues.” (2004, 25).  The historical 
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formation of specific disciplines and sub-disciplines as well as disciplinary 
transformations (Lemaine et al. 1976; Abbott 1982; Heilbron 1995; Lenoir 1997; 
Abbott 1999; Kohler 2008), the effects of disciplinary specialization on the dynamics 
of knowledge production (Dogan and Pahre 1989; Abbott 2001a; Becher 2001), and 
the social production, uses, and functions of disciplinary histories (Lepenies 1978; 
Graham, Lepenies, and Weingart 1983; Laudan 1993; Levine 1995) are among the 
central subjects and questions historical sociologists of disciplinary knowledge deal 
with.  
Although substantial work has been produced within the last three decades in 
the historical sociology of disciplinary knowledge, this work remains deficient 
especially in two aspects. First, current knowledge produced within the field remains 
highly, if not exclusively, Eurocentric. It is the formation of scientific and academic 
disciplines in Europe from the early modern period onwards that almost all historical 
sociologists of knowledge study. Second, all studies are about either the natural 
sciences or social sciences and humanities. Religious sciences do not seem worthy of 
any study in this research area, despite the potentially rich insights a sociological 
study of the transformations that classical religious sciences and education 
underwent during the last centuries would yield. My study focusing on one aspect of 
these transformations, namely the disciplinary transformation of legal education in a 
non-European context may constitute a modest contribution to partly remedy these 
deficiencies. 
2.2. Theoretical Perspective 
2.2.1. General Theoretical Perspectives for A Sociology of Disciplinary 
Knowledge 
Most of the works dealing with the disciplinary organization of knowledge lack an 
explicit general theoretical perspective that locates their analysis of disciplinary 
knowledge within a more general understanding of social reality. As far as I am 
aware, there are three scholars whose work constitutes exceptions to this rule: Rudolf 
Stichweh, Pierre Bourdieu, and Andrew Abbott. I will argue that Stichweh’s 
perspective is overly narrow and objectivist in comparison with those of Bourdieu 
and Abbott. Then, after a brief note on the comparative advantages of Bourdieu’s and 
Abbott’s theories, I will state the reason why I prefer Abbott’s theory in this study. 
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Finally, I will outline the general theoretical perspective I adopt with reference to 
Abbott. 
 Stichweh offers a theoretical account of the genesis and stability of the 
disciplinary structure of modern science (1992). His account is a structural 
functionalist one bearing conspicuous marks of Luhmannian systems theory. 
Stichweh conceives discipline as “the primary unit of internal differentiation of the 
modern system of science” (1992, 4). Scientific disciplines emerge as a result of the 
historical process of the emergence of modern society as the most encompassing 
social system. Modern society is internally differentiated between functional 
systems, one of which is the modern system of science. The modern system of 
science is in turn differentiated between disciplines. Disciplines themselves are 
above all systems of communication bringing together a community of scientists 
internally differentiated along axes of specialization and functional division of labor. 
The main problem with Stichweh’s approach is that it is too objectivist and 
deterministic. It conceives of social reality as being produced by automatically 
functioning social systems. The question of individual or collective actors 
contributing to or challenging the functioning of systems, and thereby the shaping of 
social reality, seems absent in this approach. Consequently, the idea of social systems 
serving as the main agents generating social reality assumes their ontological 
supremacy over their constitutive elements in a way that determines their mode of 
existence. In the same vein, social systems bear in themselves the principles of their 
own functioning, which unfolds continuously towards a telos immanent in the 
system. Social processes thus assume a naturalistic quality unfolding in a 
systemically predetermined course leaving no room for contingency. These 
theoretical problems also constitute obstacles to adequately analyzing empirical 
reality. Consequently, Stichweh’s main argument, that the distinctive quality of the 
modern system of science lies in its unprecedented internal differentiation and the 
idea that the disciplines are the outcome of this differentiation, proves fragile when 
confronted with historical reality, where “the world of higher learning already had a 
fairly differentiated structure well before the second half of the eighteenth century,” 
as Heilbron convincingly demonstrates (2004, 28–29). Ultimately, in comparison 
with the approaches of both Abbott and Bourdieu, Stichweh’s approach is too narrow 
and objectivist to adequately explain social reality.  
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 I think that, Abbott’s and Bourdieu’s theories, while both more useful than 
that of Stichweh, rank relatively equally against one another. Beyond the differences 
of their respective theoretical languages, which are mainly differences of 
terminology and methapor use, they share a common way of understanding and 
explaining social reality, which may be loosely labeled as relationalism. Both of 
them conceive of social reality as fundamentally constituted of and by relations. 
They reject the existence of fixed substances at the social ontological level and thus 
refuse to conceptualize aspects of social reality in substantialist terms. They do not, 
however, conceive of social reality as a constant flux of relations, without any 
regularities or structural features. There are relatively autonomous social spaces that 
are structured by relatively regular relations that provide the social world with its 
enduring stability. The image of the social world both sociologists present looks like 
an archipelago where islets (relatively stable and autonomous social spaces), with sea 
waters flowing between them (boundary areas where social flux is only loosely 
structured, if at all), combine together to form a somewhat integrated geographical 
space (social world). Abbott calls the islets ecologies, whereas Bourdieu calls them 
fields. Yet both take these relatively stable and autonomous social spaces as their 
primary unit of analysis in sociological research. There are surely differences 
between them. Abbott deals more with boundary areas than Bourdieu does, while 
Bourdieu pays more attention to conceptualizing the embodiment of the social world 
in individual agents, for instance.14 These differences may render one theory more 
preferable than other in different empirical contexts. I insist, nevertheless, that these 
differences are of secondary importance and both theories can be used 
interchangeably in many empirical contexts and demonstrate, if skillfully used, 
similar levels of explanatory power. I will choose Abbott over Bourdieu in this 
work,15 not because his theory is ultimately better, but because of two other reasons. 
First, Bourdieu’s theory is more firmly integrated and totalizing than 
Abbott’s. It is more ambitious in its demand to clothe empirical facts with theoretical 
garb. Abbott’s theory instead lends itself to a more flexible and eclectic use. It allows 
                                                 
14 One can enumerate many differences, of course, between the two sociologists in terms of theoretical 
language, empirical endeavor, or intellectual lineage. A comparison of Abbott’s and Bourdieu’s 
theories is not possible here. Still, I contend the overall scope of their theoretical edifices overlap to a 
great extent.  
15 I should note here that although I will adopt Abbott’s theory as my general theoretical perspective 
in this study, I will also make use of a Bourdieusian concept, namely symbolic power, in order to deal 
with the processes of modern state formation in the third chapter. 
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empirical facts to appear onstage without necessarily having a theoretical costume 
on. To be honest, this possibility of a more flexible use renders Abbott’s theory more 
attractive to me in this research, where I do not have an encompassing command 
over related empirical data. Second, Abbott’s empirical engagement with disciplines 
is more related to disciplinary structures than Bourdieu’s. Bourdieu’s analyses of 
academic fields focus more on a field’s configuration in terms of relations of 
domination (1984), or on the formation of a particular intellectual habitus (that of 
Martin Heidegger) in a disciplinary/academic field (philosophical field) (1988). 
Abbott instead focuses more directly on the formation and dynamics of disciplinary 
structures and thus proves more “user friendly” for someone intending to analyze 
transformation of the disciplinary structure of legal education.  
2.2.2. An Abbottian Perspective on Social Reality and Disciplinarity 
As I just stated, my general theoretical perspective here is primarily informed by 
Abbott’s sociological theory.16 At the center of Abbott’s sociological theory, if there 
is one, lies the concept of ecology. An ecology is basically a set of social relations, 
that is, interactions between multiple elements. This set of social relations is 
structured as regularities and/or patterns in a social continuum essentially 
characterized by continuous flux. In Abbott’s theory the concept of structure is 
disrobed from the unified and coercive character it bears in the classical theoretical 
language of social theory related to structure and system. It implies still, however, a 
regularized and patterned entity partially autonomous and able to exercise a certain 
degree of constraint on its constitutive elements.  
The origin and basis of an ecology’s autonomy and power of coercion is not 
the ontological supremacy an ecology bears over its constituent elements, but the 
historical configuration of the very relations that constitute an ecology. It is 
theoretically possible, then, that there may be parts of a social world where relations 
are not historically patterned into regularities in such a way as to establish an 
ecology. On such occasions, let alone for a moment the question whether such a 
thing is empirically possible, ecologies simply do not exist and thus no structural 
coercion is exercised on the constituent elements of social reality. This is 
theoretically possible since in Abbott’s social ontology events and boundaries are 
                                                 
16 The following presentation of Abbott’s sociological theory is primarily based on the following 
works: “Linked Ecologies” (Abbott 2005), Chaos of Disciplines (Abbott 2001a), Time Matters 
(Abbott 2001c),” and “Of Time and Space” (Abbott 1997). 
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prior to entities and things. In Abbott’s simple formulation, “boundaries come first, 
then entities” (2001b, 263). There exist in social world, then, some boundary areas 
where ecological constraints do not operate in a structured way. New social 
things/entities emerge inc these boundary areas. On the other side of the coin, the 
concept of ecology is held aloof from the atomistic and reductionist conceptions of 
social reality where fully autonomous actors enter into relations with each other in a 
free environment. In short, in the ecological conception of social reality, it is 
relations, and not substances (be they systems/structures or actors/individuals), that 
constitute and shape both the beings/entities in relation and the environment in which 
they relate to each other. These relations are not static ties between elements, 
however, but dynamic processes. In other words, it is in relational processes that both 
social beings and the social environment are constituted. Abbott thus offers a deeply 
relationalist understanding of social reality (Emirbayer 1997). 
  Analytically, an ecology consists of three elements: actors, locations, and 
ligation. Any ecology involves a set of actors and a set of locations in relation with 
each other. Locations are sets of things that are at stake in an ecology. Actors 
compete with each other to control the locations. Actors can be both individual and 
collective actors. Ligation is the process whereby an actor or a set of actors takes and 
maintains control over a location or a set of locations. None of these elements are 
predefined entities, which are exogenous to ecology. Both actors and locations are 
constituted and delimited within the relational/interactional process between them. 
They are thus endogenous to the social interactional processes constitutive of an 
ecology. “Ligation,” then, “constitutes at one and the same time an actor, a location, 
and a relation between them” (Abbott 2005, 248), and gives an ecology its distinctive 
character. An ecology then, to reformulate, is a social continuum structured by a 
certain form of ligation. Thus different ecologies have different topologies. 
 Abbott does not conceive ecologies as closed systems with a fixed relation to 
their surroundings. On the contrary, he develops the concept of linked ecologies in 
order to overcome the relatively fixed conceptualization of the relation of an ecology 
to its surrounding in classical ecological theory, as developed by the Chicago school. 
According to Abbott’s conception, ecologies do not exist eeither as isolated regions 
within social space or as isolated processes across social time; they are linked to each 
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other. The social world is constituted of linked ecologies, “each of which acts as a 
(flexible) surround for others” (Abbott 2005, 246).  
The concept of linked ecologies reveals a further level of social interaction. 
Interactional processes occur not only within ecology, but also between ecologies. 
This in turn implies that the internal configuration of an ecology is partly external, 
that is, dependent on the configuration of its adjacent ecologies. In simpler words, 
events within a particular ecology have an impact on events in its adjacent ecologies 
and this is a mutual process. The interactional process between ecologies is mainly 
carried out by actors who act in multiple ecologies at the same time, following 
strategies and seeking alliances and resources across ecological boundaries. Actors in 
adjacent ecologies also constitute audiences for each other’s claims of ligation. 
Actors in an ecology compete among themselves to have control over 
locations and consequently they have claims over locations which may well coincide. 
Several audiences judge these claims. Some are from among the actors in the same 
ecology and others are from adjacent ecologies. The recognition or rejection by these 
audiences affects the way and the degree to which a ligation actually takes place. 
Audiences are of central importance for substantiating claims of ligation since they 
have control and power over both actors and locations in a way that can affect the 
ligation process. In the professional ecology, for instance, “it is fairly clear who are 
the actors and who are the audiences for actors’ claims: the professions on the one 
hand; the workplace, public, and state on the other” (Abbott 2005, 250). In the 
university ecology, however, the situation is a bit more complicated. “The typical 
academic settlement has two levels of audiences,” according to Abbott, “immediate 
and distant. The immediate audiences are students, administrators, and other 
academics” (Abbott 2001a, 141). Parents, trustees, legislators, and the general public, 
on the other hand, constitute the distant audience. These audiences “explicitly or 
implicitly judge claims by disciplines to legitimate authority over subject matters, 
techniques, and the like” (Abbott 2001a, 141). Immediate audiences are not merely 
audiences, however, they are also actors endogenous to the university ecology.  
In order to better understand the internal configuration of an ecology, we 
should resort to another concept Abbott often uses: interactional field. An 
interactional field denotes a social continuum where multiple levels of social and 
temporal contextuality are at once in operation. In this sense, an ecology constitutes 
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an interactional field. One can say that levels of contextuality roughly correspond to 
the different levels of ecological structuring. An ecology is constituted of different 
units of interaction, each constituting in itself a microcosm of the ecology. 
Disciplines, for instance, are the main units constituting the interactional field of a 
university. Yet within each discipline one can observe a local (ecologically speaking) 
process of ligation involving actors competing over locations at the disciplinary 
level. Actors at this level may be individual academics as well as university 
departments, and academic settlement (a form of ligation particular to university 
ecology) can take diverse forms such as subfields or specialties. Each subfield again 
is marked with a similar ecological structuring process. This continues at lower 
levels where ecological structures are embodied in individual actors17. Ecology thus 
is like a matryoshka doll, in a sense. As a matryoshka doll is constituted of nested 
dolls gradually becoming smaller while preserving a similar form, an ecology is an 
interactional field constituted of nested units of interaction (discipline, subfield, and 
specialty, for instance), each one of which is formally structured through similar 
processes of interaction at ever-decreasing scales.18 These units of interaction 
correspond to the aforementioned multiple levels of social contextuality. Multiple 
levels of temporal contextuality, on the other hand, correspond to diverse 
interactional processes that have different temporal structures. Everyday interactional 
processes between academics doing research or lecturing in a department have a 
different temporal structure than the unfolding of a fractal cycle of knowledge 
generation, for instance. The degrees of social and cultural contextuality are likely to 
correspond to each other in increasing/decreasing scales: changes at the disciplinary 
level are likely to occur more slowly than changes at the specialty level, for example.  
The elements of an ecology, which are analytically defined above (actor, 
location, and ligation), assume different characters in each particular ecology based 
                                                 
17 It seems to me that Abbott’s ecological theory lacks an elaborate theoretical articulation of the 
linkage between an ecology and an individual actor. Actors are mainly collective ones (professions, 
disciplines, etc.) in Abbott’s analyses, thus one cannot witness Abbott clearly articulating how 
ecological structures operate at the individual actor level, or by which means individual actors are able 
to restructure or reconfigure the ecology. To put it briefly, one’s eyes are looking for a counterpart in 
Abbott’s theory of Bourdieu’s concept habitus, which links the field to the individual agent. I should 
repeat once again, however, that this is a lack of theoretical articulation. At the empirical level, 
Department and Discipline (Abbott 1999) abounds with masterful historical narrative analyses 
manifesting the linkage between individual actors and ecological structuration through many 
examples, among which Albion Small’s is particularly revealing.  
18 Here the reader should take the nesting part of the analogy and leave the part that all dolls constitute 
fixed structures aside. 
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on the empirical reality concerned. In Abbott’s conceptualization of professional 
ecology, for example, actors are the professions, locations are a set of controlled 
tasks, and ligation is a certain type of relational process between them, which Abbott 
calls jurisdiction (1988). Within this general perspective, then, any particular ecology 
should be treated empirically in order to identify and conceptualize the characteristic 
features and peculiarities of ligation structuring a particular ecology. Abbott provides 
such an empirical analysis of university ecology (2001a). Based on the empirical 
analysis of American academia, Abbott develops a refined theoretical language that 
may be useful and guiding in empirical research on any academic context, provided 
that it is checked against the empirical reality concerned. 
The actors in a university ecology are not as clearly demarcated as 
professions, according to Abbott, yet they are still fairly definite: “some of them are 
professions themselves, others are well-defined academic disciplines, and still others 
are the many would-be professions, disciplines, and interdisciplines that are 
perpetually condensing out of specializations and interdisciplinary space” (2005, 
249–250). Nevertheless, the main actors in academia appear to be disciplines in 
Abbott’s general account. Disciplines compete over defining and controlling the 
locations in the university ecology. These locations are material, demographic and 
financial resources on the one hand, and areas of knowledge and 
intellectual/scientific work on the other.  
Disciplines compete to establish themselves in departments at universities, to 
assume thereby a spatial and institutional existence, to be allocated financial 
resources by decision makers, to attract human beings (both students and scholars) of 
high intellectual capacity, to establish authority over certain areas of knowledge as 
well as over legitimate ways of intellectual endeavor and knowledge production in 
these areas, and so on. The set of locations of the first type (i.e. material, financial, 
institutional, etc.) over which a discipline establishes a certain degree of control 
constitutes an organizational turf for the discipline. In the same vein, the set of 
locations of the second type (i.e. intellectual, scientific, etc.) constitutes a discipline’s 
intellectual/scientific turf. These turfs in university ecology, however, are far from 
being as clearly defined as in professional ecology. Abbott thus prefers the term 
settlement, which implies a looser control over locations as compared to the term 
jurisdiction, in order to denote ligation in university ecology.  
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Academic settlements can assume as diverse a number of forms as locations 
can be assembled. They can take “the form of a special faculty, a major or 
concentration, a set of courses, a body of more or less controlled knowledge, or any 
combination of these. They may involve research practices, evidentiary conventions, 
and perhaps systems of knowledge application, as well as the structural apparatus of 
journals, degrees, conferences, and so on” (Abbott 2005, 250). Academic settlement 
denotes, then, the relational process whereby disciplines claim, take and maintain 
control over a set of locations, which are to constitute their organizational and 
intellectual turf. A corollary of this form of looser control is a significant degree of 
overlapping and cross-cutting across academic settlements: “there is no sharp 
separation between academic disciplines, which often overlap in methods, theories, 
and subject matters and which often differ more in style and heritage than in 
substance” (Abbott 2005, 250).  
 Abbott distinguishes between two main types of structures in academic 
settlements: social structures and cultural structures. Both types of structures work 
together simultaneously, and condition the processual configuration of an ecology’s 
topology.19 Social structures are patterned relations that involve actors on the one 
hand, and locations related to the material, demographic, and financial sources in an 
ecology on the other. As for cultural structures, they are patterned relations that 
involve actors on the one hand, and locations related to the nonmaterial (i.e. 
intellectual, emotional, artistic, etc.) sources in an ecology on the other. Here, the 
analytical distinction between social and cultural should not lead us to conceive them 
as implying two empirically/ontologically distinct realms of reality. Both are 
analytical terms at once theoretically merged in Abbott’s general relational 
conception of social reality (more specifically in the concept of ecology) and 
empirically merged in social reality itself.20 The variety of both social and cultural 
                                                 
19 I did not come across an overt theoretical articulation of the concept of structure in Abbott’s 
writings. Yet according to what I understand from Abbott’s work, structures are regularized/patterned 
relations-in-process that assume a certain constraining effect on the actors and locations involved in 
the relational process. This definition of structure also implies that social reality is not exclusively 
composed of structures, since there are also a plethora of relations that are not regularized as patterns, 
simply arising and disappearing without having a lasting constraining effect on the constitution of 
social reality. These unstructured relations are more likely to arise in the boundary areas of social 
space that are not yet constituted as ecologies. 
20 Here I intuitively seize on an effort by Abbott to take two hitherto central concepts of sociology and 
anthropology (social and cultural) and subsume them under the more general concept of relational 
implied in ecology, which Abbott may be intending to establish as the new central concept of 
sociology. 
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structures is potentially endless and may change from one ecology to another. In a 
similar vein, a certain kind of structure (economic structure or legal structure, for 
instance) may assume different forms in different ecologies. These are ultimately to 
be identified in empirical research.  
Abbott identifies many social and cultural structures operating effectively in 
the American university ecology. I will not provide the reader here with a summary 
of all these structures, since the presentation of the functioning of American 
university ecology is not among my aims in this work. I will give instead two 
examples from Abbott’s work for each kind of structure in order to better elucidate 
these concepts before proceeding on to the functions these structures perform. One of 
the central social structures that have kept the American disciplinary system 
functioning in a stable way for roughly a century is the career structures it builds in 
American university ecology. Institutionalized in departments and undergraduate 
majors, disciplines remain the unique channel providing a stable and foreseeable 
academic career. With the main motivation in the hiring of faculty being 
undergraduate education, obtaining a Ph.D. in established disciplines, rather than in 
interdisciplinary or problem-based areas, remains the central requirement for career 
building in academia. This in turn strengthens the disciplinary system (Abbott 2001a, 
124–128).  
As for the cultural structuring of university ecology, the central structure of 
knowledge generation in the disciplinary system is what Abbott calls fractal 
structures. Considering that it took an entire book for Abbott to elaborate his 
argument for fractal structures, it is not easy to summarize the argument in a few 
sentences. I will give it a try though. The gist of the argument goes as follows: there 
are many bipolar-opposite positions in the interactional field of disciplines, 
constituted both at the level of theory and method, and within and across disciplines, 
such as quantitative vs. qualitative, determinism vs. free will, realism vs. 
constructionism, and so on. These bipolar opposite positions reproduce themselves 
similarly and repetitively in fractal distinctions. For instance, sociology is more akin 
to qualitative methods and data when compared to economics, which is coupled with 
the quantitative side of the distinction.21 Yet in each of these disciplines, there are 
                                                 
21 The same example may go with sociology and history, this time the first coupled with quantitative 
and the second with qualitative. For the position of an actor in these fractal distinctions is indexical, 
i.e. configured in relation to other actors’ positions.  
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those who adopt a more qualitative position and those who adopt a more quantitative 
position when compared to each other. Among those adopting these positions within 
a discipline, once again, the same positions reproduce themselves again in relation to 
each other: some qualitative sociologists are more prone to use quantitative methods 
than others and vice-versa. Other bipolar distinctions also follow the same basic 
fractal pattern.  
These self-reproducing fractal distinctions combine together to form the 
cultural structure of knowledge production in the modern disciplinary system. This is 
a mere synchronical view, however. Perceived in time, the process of reproduction of 
fractal distinctions constitutes what Abbott calls fractal cycles. A fractal cycle 
unfolds basically in the following sequences. First, opposing groups emerge around a 
set of bipolar distinctions. Second, one of the groups overthrows the other. Third, the 
victorious group splits again and reproduces in itself a bipolar distinction similar to 
the one it was once part of, albeit distinct in terms of the intellectual context and 
language in which the distinction is posed. Then the process starts over. Through this 
process of fractal cycles, then, a set of similar basic ideas are continuously 
reproduced in new rhetorical and terminological attires. Thence follows Abbott’s 
epistemological conclusion that the social process of knowledge generation is more a 
cyclical reiterative process than a linear cumulative one.  
Social structures and cultural structures work through the functions they 
perform. Abbott calls them social structural functions and cultural functions, 
respectively. From Abbott’s use of the term function I understand the relation 
between a structure and its effects. In other words, function denotes the ways in 
which a structure exercises its effect on the constitution of social reality. The forms 
of the social structural and cultural functions disciplinary structures perform, like the 
structures themselves, may change according to context and are thus ultimately to be 
identified in empirical research. Yet one can also identify a set of functions likely to 
be found in any disciplinary context and Abbott reveals some of them. To begin with 
social structural functions, disciplines provide academics with certain relatively 
stable career path alternatives and channel the organization of labor markets within 
the university ecology. Disciplines thereby organize the occupational configuration 
of the university ecology. Another social structural function disciplinary structures 
serve is to educate and “discipline” a great number of students in ways preparing 
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them to adapt to different ecologies constituted within social space. They thereby 
channel new generations of demographic resources across social space and thus 
reconfigure social topology.  
As for the cultural functions disciplinary structures serve, a central one of 
them is to provide academics with “a general conception of intellectual existence, 
(…) dreams and models both of reality and of learning,” in short, a core intellectual 
identity that conditions their relation to knowledge (Abbott 2001a, 130). Another 
cultural function of disciplinary structures is to delimit and legitimize certain areas of 
knowledge and certain ways of dealing with knowledge. They also thereby 
demarcate the boundaries of academics’ scientific/occupational responsibility and of 
their legitimate ignorance. In Abbott’s words, “disciplines legitimate our necessarily 
partial knowledge. They define what is permissible not to know and thereby limit the 
body of books one must have read. They provide a specific tradition and lineage. 
They provide common sets of research practices that unify groups with diverse 
substantive interests” (2001a, 130–131).  
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CHAPTER 3  
FORMATIONS OF OTTOMAN HIGHER EDUCATIONAL ECOLOGY AND 
OF LEGAL EDUCATION UP TO THE 19TH CENTURY 
In this chapter, I will undertake a general analytical reconstruction of the historical 
processes of both the early formation and later configuration of the Ottoman higher 
educational ecology, where legal education took place, from the fifteenth century to 
the nineteenth century, as this period constitutes the historical background for the 
transformation of the Ottoman legal education during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. My primary aim throughout this chapter will be to identify and 
trace in time, albeit in general terms, both the place of the discipline of fiqh and the 
relationship between the Ottoman dynastic center and the scholars of fiqh within the 
changing higher educational ecology.  
3.1. A Panoramic Outlook of the Configurations of Higher Educational Ecology 
in the Ottoman Social Space (14th to 18th Centuries) 
I will offer here a general sketch of the configurations of the Ottoman higher 
educational ecology up to the nineteenth century, against the background of which 
the transformations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries took place. Since the 
historical process of concern comprises an immense interval of time (approximately 
five centuries), I will focus at a general level on continuities and changes in the main 
characteristics of higher educational ecology, and inevitably reduce the infinitely 
multiple and complex set of events and interactions constituting the historical process 
in question. Yet this reduction will not be too unfair, I hope. 
The social space of the Ottoman higher educational ecology was almost 
exclusively structured by the madrasa system, although there were exceptions such 
as the Enderun School of the Ottoman Palace, which provided higher education for 
the members of the Ottoman ruling class affiliated with the palace (Kenan 2015, 
342). The madrasa system was made up of social structures that governed the 
generation and reproduction of disciplinary knowledge and scholars through 
institutional channels on the one hand, and both spatial and hierarchical distribution 
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of scholars within social space by regulating their professional trajectories through 
career structures on the other. In short, the madrasa system was based around a 
certain structural logic of institution building and career regulation. This logic was 
not transcendent and fixed, however, but social and dynamic. It unfolded and 
changed in interactional process. One cannot thus speak of a single madrasa system 
keeping hold of the Ottoman higher educational ecology during its lengthy historical 
existence. The label and the basic logic remains more or less the same, yet the 
content and the applications change. I will roughly distinguish here between three 
historical periods of the Ottoman higher educational experience, which correspond to 
different modes of structuration in the Ottoman higher educational ecology through 
the madrasa system: the period of early configuration (14th and early 15th centuries), 
the period of expansion and centralization (late 15th and 16th centuries), and the 
period of crisis and reconsolidation (from 17th to early 19th centuries).22  
3.1.1. The Ottoman Entrance to Islamicate Higher Educational Ecology (14th 
and Early 15th Centuries) 
The first period begins with the building of the first madrasa in the lands of the 
Ottoman polity in the first half of the 14th century and continues to the latter half of 
the 15th century. The logic of institution building in this period was no Ottoman 
invention. It was modeled on the pre-existing madrasa system that was in existence 
in the already established Islamicate higher educational ecology, to which the 
Ottoman polity entered as an actor by setting out to build higher educational 
institutions and to raise scholars for its service. The institutional lineage of the 
madrasa system structuring the higher educational ecology in the Anatolia prior to 
the entrance of the Ottoman polity goes back to the 10th-11th centuries when masjid, 
the main institution of higher learning before the 10th century, evolved first to 
masjid-khan complex, and then to the early form of the madrasa (Makdisi 1981, 9–
32). The madrasa, as an institutional form, firmly established itself with the 
foundation of Nizamiyye madrasas in the 11th century and then remained the main 
institutional form of higher education up to the 14th century, when the Ottoman polity 
entered the game. Setting out to build their first higher educational institution, the 
Ottomans stepped into a higher educational ecology already prevalently constituted 
                                                 
22 Particularly the works of Atçıl (2010), Repp (1986), and Zilfi (1988) provides the empirical basis 
for my periodization. 
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in most parts of the Islamicate lands, similarly structured by the madrasa system 
regardless of the differences of geographical location or political-military control. 
Consequently, the madrasa constituted the single institutional model the 
Ottoman rulers and notables would follow when they were to build higher 
educational institutions. The Ottoman polity thus did not initiate a higher educational 
ecology of its own; it rather participated into an already established Islamicate higher 
educational ecology that had a certain autonomy vis-à-vis the interactional field of 
military-politics, of which the actors were the then-ruling dynasties. This trans-
dynastic higher educational ecology had been constituted over centuries and had its 
proper ecological logic, which was not subordinate to the logic of military-political 
ecology, though it was affected by it (Hodgson 1974, 2:48). It was the scholars 
coming to the Ottoman lands from the established educational centers of the 
Islamicate higher educational ecology that constituted the channel through which the 
emerging Ottoman polity incorporated the social and cultural structures of the 
Islamicate higher educational ecology (Atçıl 2010, 51–8; Veinstein 1997, 73).   
Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to state the exact number of 
madrasas built by the members of the Ottoman state up to the late 15th century, one 
can say, based on the archival data provided by Bilge (1984, 65–210) and İhsanoğlu 
(2002a, 884–897), that the number was between 73 and 84, with the majority being 
in Anatolia (53 of them, according to İhsanoğlu), more specifically in İznik, Bursa, 
and Edirne (36 of them, according to both authors). There were also other madrasas 
in Ottoman lands that predated Ottoman control, the number of which we cannot 
exactly ascertain.23 Thus, by the latter half of the 15th century, one can speak of the 
Ottoman dynastic state as a powerful actor competing for the patronage and control 
of scholars in the Islamicate higher educational ecology. It seems difficult to argue, 
however, that the Ottomans brought about a significant institutional or cultural 
innovation to the ecology in this period. They established themselves, nevertheless, 
as renowned and powerful patrons of knowledge and scholars. 
The autonomy of the Islamicate higher educational ecology was preserved 
above all by the legal practice of waqf, which constituted an integral part of the 
madrasa system. The legal status, financial resources and expenditures, 
                                                 
23 According to Demiralp (1999), there were a total number of 172 madrasas built in the Ottoman 
lands between the years 1300-1500, either by the members of the Ottoman dynasty or by others. 
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administrative regulation, curricular scope, qualifications of staff, and many other 
things pertaining to the functioning of madrasas were defined within the legal 
framework provided by the fiqh of the waqf and enacted by a deed of endowment 
prepared by the founder of the madrasa who enjoyed a “wide latitude in the 
establishment of his foundation” (Makdisi 1981, 35). The symbiotic relation between 
legal practice of waqf and madrasa dates back to the constitution of the early forms 
of madrasa. This relation theoretically conferred a significant degree of autonomy to 
the madrasa against the arbitrary political interference to its functioning, since the 
madrasa functions, thanks to this relation, as a self-governing administrative body, 
the “constitutional autonomy” of which is secured by the deed of endowment 
(Makdisi 1981, 35–74; Hallaq 2009, 47–54).  
The degree to which this theoretical autonomy was actualized varied 
according to historical context. I will not make sweeping generalizations here. Yet in 
the period of concern, the madrasas and scholars in the Ottoman lands enjoyed a 
significant degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the Ottoman rulers when compared to later 
periods. The Ottoman rulers’ observance of the legal practice of waqf was one of the 
reasons for this autonomy, albeit not the only one. There was another central factor 
in this period contributing to the autonomy of the scholars. The Ottoman sultan’s 
door was not the only place for scholars to look for patronage or to gain a livelihood 
or prestige. The Ottoman dynasty was a competing actor in a higher educational 
ecology that extended beyond the Ottoman territories and into areas the Ottomans 
did not control. In this ecology, scholars constituted locations over which different 
polities and dynasties competed to control and take into service.  
The Ottoman polity was particularly in need of scholars who were both to 
staff its higher educational, legal, and bureaucratic ecologies, which were in an initial 
stage of formation, and to assure symbolic legitimation for the rule of the Ottoman 
dynasty (İhsanoğlu 2002a, 859–863, 871). There were also many madrasas founded 
by past rulers or dynasty-independent notables that were not under the direct control 
of any political entity. Scholars in Anatolia thus had options other than taking office 
in the Ottoman higher educational institutions, such as working in madrasas located 
in the territories under other Anatolian principalities’ control, going to the madrasas 
in the Arab lands under Mamluk control, or working in the madrasas founded by 
people other than the members of the Ottoman dynasty. This multiplicity of options 
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fostered the autonomy of the scholars in Anatolia vis-à-vis the Ottoman rulers (Atçıl 
2010, 47–51, 54–55, 60, 64–66). 
An Ottoman professional ecology had yet to be formed in this period. There 
were of course a plethora of tasks to be done and a plethora of actors willing to do 
them. Yet the process of ligation that colligates a clearly defined set of tasks to a 
well-defined set of actors did not result in clearly demarcated professional 
jurisdictions either in higher educational ecology or in judicial and bureaucratic 
ecologies until the late 15th and early 16th centuries. The Ottoman rulers did not have 
a say in the career regulation of the scholars who served in the madrasas built by 
those outside the Ottoman dynasty. The professional trajectories of the scholars 
serving in the Ottoman madrasas, on the other hand, were under more direct control 
of the Ottoman rulers. Yet the latter had the opportunity to hire both types of 
scholars, with their consent of course, to serve in judicial or bureaucratic ecologies 
and used this opportunity in many occasion (Atçıl 2010, 47). On these occasions too, 
however, there was not a clearly defined career path one was to traverse in the 
ecology one entered. Neither a structured pattern in the distribution of offices 
between scholars nor an established hierarchy between offices was constituted in this 
period. Although there were some customary practices and weak patterns, the 
professional trajectory of a scholar affiliated with the Ottoman state was above all 
determined by the ruler’s personal decisions made within an interactional process 
between the ruler, the scholar in question, and the other actors of concern in the 
ecology. As Atçıl demonstrates, scholars in the Ottoman lands served in as many 
different jobs as “judges, professors, jurists, tutors to the princes, prayer leaders, 
viziers, governors, envoys, and administrators of religious foundations,” and “these 
jobs were not linked to each other and were not ranked in order to create a hierarchy” 
(Atçıl 2010, 65).  
If we take disciplines as actors while looking at the higher educational 
ecology, we need to investigate the forms of academic settlement that disciplines had 
in this period. We must reiterate that the Ottomans had entered into an already 
established Islamicate higher educational ecology. The same is valid in terms of 
cultural structures. Both the forms of different disciplines’ academic settlements and 
the demarcation of different disciplines’ intellectual turfs had long since been 
established when the Ottomans became a part of the Islamicate higher educational 
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ecology (Makdisi 1981, 75–99). While building the Ottoman madrasas, the scholars 
in the service of the Ottoman state took over both the disciplinary system (or we may 
call it the system of classification of sciences), which is more related to disciplines’ 
intellectual turf wars, and the curricular system, which is more related to disciplines’ 
organizational turf wars, from the earlier Islamicate higher educational ecology, 
especially as they were configured in the Anatolian Saljukid and Ilhanid states as 
well as other Anatolian polities (İhsanoğlu 2002a, 871–883). These systems should 
not be thought of as fixed systems. On the contrary, they were dynamic systems 
continuously reconfigured through time. 
The division of cultural space of knowledge between different disciplines 
dates back to the early periods of the formation of Islamic disciplines and since then 
had been subject to constant negotiation and contention, the degree and intensity of 
which increased with the entrance of a new candidate discipline into the process, 
such as the challenges the Mu‘tazili kalam or the Ancient Greek philosophy posed to 
the then established configuration of the Islamicate cultural space. Nevertheless, the 
constitution of main disciplines controlling the cultural space of knowledge and the 
demarcation of each one’s respective settlements had been more and more 
established over time. On the eve of the Ottoman entrance to the Islamicate higher 
educational ecology, there were roughly three clusters of sciences established in the 
cultural space: “the Islamic sciences, the philosophical and natural sciences, and the 
literary arts,” or the ancillary sciences (Makdisi 1981, 75). Although intellectual turf 
wars were still continuing between the Islamic sciences and the philosophical 
sciences, particularly between the kalam and the rational philosophy, the intellectual 
boundaries of most of the disciplines were more or less staked out. The intellectual 
competition between the kalam and the rational philosophy also resulted in a quite 
original synthesis, especially in the works of Jurjani and Taftazani, which was 
inherited and further developed by Ottoman scholars (Türker 2015; Arıcı 2015). 
However, I will focus my attention here only on the fiqh discipline, for it is my main 
subject and investigating other disciplines goes far beyond my scope. 
If we take a general picture of the fiqh discipline in the Islamicate higher 
educational ecology prior to the eve of the Ottoman entrance, say roughly the 12th 
century, the intellectual turf of fiqh discipline seems internally divided between two 
main subdisciplines: practical jurisprudence (furu‘ al-fiqh) and theoretical 
   
 
48 
 
jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh). The intellectual space of practical jurisprudence 
involved the substantive contents of legal reasoning and adjudication and was 
inhabited by the four Sunni madhhabs as the main collective actors. The intellectual 
space of theoretical jurisprudence, on the other hand, involved theoretical concepts, 
general principles and methodologies of legal reasoning and inference, and was 
inhabited by two schools of theoretical jurisprudence, namely the jurists’ school and 
the theologians’ school, as the main collective actors. The Ottoman scholars inherited 
both subdisciplines, yet in somehow different ways.  
The Ottoman scholars’ reception of practical jurisprudence did not leave a 
significant place for competition between different madhhabs in the discipline’s 
intellectual space. Since this space was constituted, from early on, in a way to be 
dominated by a single collective actor: the Hanafi madhhab. Both the works inherited 
from earlier scholars and the works written on practical jurisprudence in this period 
demonstrate this (Cici 2005). The works on practical jurisprudence taught in the 
madrasas were exclusively those of Hanafi writers (Bilge 1984, 48–50). In the same 
vein, of the six works on practical jurisprudence written in this period, as enumerated 
by Atçıl, all were located within the Hanafi madhhab (2010, 293–308). This may be 
related to the fact that the cultural structures of the fiqh discipline had developed in 
close relation with the social structures of the legal and bureaucratic ecologies, which 
had been constituted according to the needs of the ever-growing Ottoman state; for 
the Ottoman rulers increasingly needed a more comprehensive and coherent system 
of legal rules and adjudication than scholarly debates between different legal systems 
to ensure the effective functioning of the politico-judicial system. In theoretical 
jurisprudence’s intellectual space, which was more independent from the functioning 
of the legal and bureaucratic ecologies, different collective actors found a place for 
themselves. Of the two remarkable works among a very few works written in this 
period, Şemseddin Fenari’s Fusûlü’l-Bedâyi‘ was written in the theologians’ style 
whereas Molla Hüsrev’s Mirkâtü’l-Vusûl was written in the jurists’ style. 
Furthermore the works of earlier scholars from different legal and theological 
madhhabs were received, referenced, and discussed within the works on theoretical 
jurisprudence written by Ottoman scholars (Atçıl 2010, 237–242).  
 The main form of academic settlement disciplines had in the Islamicate 
higher educational ecology was the courses given in the madrasa curriculum. The 
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madrasa was neither exclusive to any particular discipline nor organizationally 
divided between different disciplines, such as the university system where different 
disciplines are located in different organizational turfs called departments. Thus, the 
locations different disciplines compete for to settle in within the higher educational 
ecology were above all the space they were allocated within the curricula of 
madrasas.  
The Ottomans inherited the central organizational principal of the Islamicate 
higher educational ecology: the institution of the madrasa was central to the ecology, 
and the discipline of fiqh was central to the madrasa system. This centrality was in 
terms of both social structure and cultural structure. The institutional organization of 
the madrasa was centered around legal practice of the waqf and the curricular system 
of the madrasa was centered around fiqh education (Makdisi 1981, 35–80; İhsanoğlu 
2002a, 872–873). The places of both the other Islamic sciences (hadith, tafseer, and 
kalam) and the literary arts (such as logic and grammar) had also long been 
established within the madrasa curricula. Yet the ideal-typical scholar the madrasa 
education aimed at raising was more of a jurist than of a muhaddith or a mufassir 
proper (İhsanoğlu 2002b, 368–9). Thus the instruction of the other Islamic sciences 
as well as of the literary arts was in an auxiliary position in relation to fiqh 
education.24 This may also explain why the Ottomans who built Darülhadises, i.e. 
madrasas built specifically for the instruction of the hadith discipline, on different 
occasions, did not feel any need to build Darülfıkhs, which were to teach the fiqh 
discipline only. It was most likely because the madrasas, where fiqh discipline was at 
the very heart of education, already functioned as Darülfıkhs. The place of 
philosophical sciences within the madrasa curricula, however, seems to be a matter 
of dispute and negotiation in this period. The existence of deeds of endowment from 
this period that explicitly ban the education of philosophical sciences suggests there 
was a certain opposition among some actors against the philosophical sciences’ 
taking hold of an organizational turf within the madrasa curriculum (Bilge 1984, 229; 
İhsanoğlu 2002a, 875). As İhsanoğlu argues, however, the fact that the founder of a 
                                                 
24 An interesting point that seems to demonstrate the auxiliary position of especially hadith and tafseer 
is that among the books that were taught in the Ottoman madrasas in this period there were no books 
on the methodologies of either hadith or tafseer whereas books on theoretical jurisprudence 
constituted an important part of the madrasa education (Bilge 1984, 40–63). The auxiliary position of 
the literary arts was already explicit in the original Arabic denomination: al-‘ulûm al-âliyye, which 
literally means instrumental sciences. 
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madrasa needed to add such a stipulation in the deed of endowment suggests there 
were also madrasas where philosophical sciences were instructed (İhsanoğlu 2002a, 
875–877). One can conclude, thus, that the issue of the instruction of philosophical 
sciences in madrasas constituted a battlefront in the organizational turf wars between 
disciplines in this period.  
 What has been said so far about madrasa education does not imply that in this 
period there was a clearly defined and officially regulated set of courses and books to 
be taught in a previously arranged sequence, or in other words a standardized 
curriculum. Yet there was a flexible pattern of courses and books commonly taught 
in different madrasas, which may be accepted as the curriculum of the period in a 
loosely conceived sense (Bilge 1984, 40–64). This common curriculum, however, 
was not officially regulated through a central authority; it rather emanated from a 
common vision and practice of the madrasa education among the scholars acting in 
the Ottoman higher educational ecology (Akgündüz 1997, 373–376). 
3.1.2. The Ottomanization of Islamicate Higher Educational Ecology (Late 15th 
and 16th Centuries) 
The second period of development of the Ottoman higher educational ecology25 
begins with the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul and ends together with the reign of 
Süleyman I. There are three overarching processes that were simultaneously and 
interdependently in operation, and increasingly so throughout the period, in all three 
ecologies: higher educational ecology, judicial ecology, and bureaucratic ecology.26 I 
will try to outline these processes here as they unfolded within higher educational 
ecology. The first process was the gradual, and ultimately enormous, expansion of 
the ecology in geographical, demographical, and organizational terms. The second 
process was the increasing centralization and standardization in the regulation of the 
functioning of the ecology, both in social structural and cultural terms. These two 
processes combined together to form a third process that one may call the 
                                                 
25 By the “Ottoman higher educational ecology” I do not mean an ecology proper to the Ottoman state 
and exclusively different from the Islamicate higher educational ecology. On the contrary, the 
Ottoman higher educational ecology constitutes part of the Islamicate higher educational ecology. 
More specifically, it consists of the parts of the Islamicate higher educational ecology that had been 
controlled and structured by the Ottoman madrasa system, albeit to various degrees. 
26 By bureaucratic ecology I am referring to a social continuum that involves all social spaces and 
processes related to the organizational functioning of a central political authority. Bureaucratic 
ecology thus overlaps with parts of higher educational ecology and judicial ecology.  
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“Ottomanization” of the ecology, in the sense that the Ottomans left their imprint on 
the parts of Islamicate higher educational ecology they held under control. 
 The Ottoman conquest of Constantinople brought about a significant change 
in the Ottomans’ self-perception and dynastic ideology and resulted in an imperial 
project, initially set up by Mehmed II and later maintained and furthered by his 
predecessors. An important part of the project was to establish the central Ottoman 
cities, above all Istanbul, as important centers of education and scholarship. 
Consequently, from Mehmed II’s reign on, the number of madrasas built by the 
Ottoman ruling elites grew exponentially, and so did the number of the offices for 
scholars in the higher educational ecology.  
It is possible to roughly trace the expansion of the number of higher 
educational institutions relying on the works of Ayverdi (1974) and Yüksel (1983; 
2004). A total of 56 higher educational institutions were built during the reign of 
Mehmed II, 19 of them located in Istanbul (Ayverdi 1974, 901–2).27 Bayezid II 
added 48 higher educational institutions to this number whereas Yavuz I added only 
seven (Yüksel 1983, 469).28 Finally, Süleyman I saw 123 higher educational 
institutions built under his reign, of which Istanbul hosted 46 (Yüksel 2004, XI). 
Thus in this period, a total of 234 higher educational institutions were added to the 
Ottoman higher educational ecology, three times the number built in the first 
period.29  
This organizational expansion of the ecology went hand in hand with 
territorial gains made possible by the successive Ottoman conquests in this period, 
the conquest of the Arab lands under the Mamluk control being the most significant 
(İhsanoğlu 2002b, 381). As a corollary of these two processes, the number of the 
scholars holding an office in the Ottoman higher educational ecology multiplied 
enormously. It was the Ottoman higher educational institutions that supplied an 
important part of the demographical demand of the expanding Ottoman higher 
                                                 
27 I include darülhadis and darülkurras in the higher educational institutions while counting, yet their 
number are miniscule in comparison with that of madrasas.  
28 Although only a handful of higher educational institutions were built during Yavuz I’s reign, one 
should bear in mind that Yavuz I’s military achievements resulted in a significant territorial 
expansion, which added many higher educational institutions formerly in the Mamluk lands into the 
Ottoman higher educational ecology. 
29 The expansion in the number of higher educational institutions was in line with the expansion in the 
number of all kinds of architectural works built in this period: 982 in Mehmed II’s reign, 740 in 
Bayezid II’s and Yavuz I’s reigns, and 1445 in Süleyman I’s reign (Yüksel 2004, XI–XII). 
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educational ecology. However, there were also many scholars who were raised 
outside of the Ottoman higher educational ecology and later came to take office 
there, either from the Safavid lands especially in the reign of Selim I, or from the 
Arab lands after the Ottomans put an end to the Mamluk Empire. 
 From Mehmed II’s reign onward, a centralizing thrust, of which the degree 
varies in different periods, accompanied the process of ecological expansion. This 
gradual centralization process unfolded in three interrelated streams. In the first 
stream, there were the attempts by the Ottoman rulers to more effectively control the 
administrative and financial functioning of the ecology through direct control of the 
endowments. Mehmed II’s attempts to bring under his direct control some of the 
madrasas not built by the members of the Ottoman dynasty as well as his decision to 
annul all freeholds including endowments that pre-dated Ottoman control were the 
first and probably most decisive steps in the process of centralization he himself 
initiated. Although Bayezid II’s reign apparently constituted a step backwards in the 
attempts of centralization, it made possible, according to Atçıl, a smooth inclusion of 
the scholars, who had shown some signs of disturbance and resistance to Mehmed 
II’s aggressive politics of centralization, and to the dynasty’s centralization process. 
Finally, during the reign of Süleyman I, the centralizing thrust grew still stronger. By 
the end of Süleyman I’s reign, there were almost no parts of the Ottoman higher 
educational ecology in the central lands of the Empire that were not under 
administrative and financial control of the Ottoman state, albeit the degree of state 
control varied. It was rare for a scholar to remain outside of the Ottoman madrasa 
system while being in the central parts of higher educational ecology (Atçıl 2010, 
74–7, 97–105, 136–82). 
 The second stream was an ever-increasing establishment of a hierarchical 
arrangement of higher educational institutions and offices that also meant an 
increasingly more established system of career regulation. It was Mehmed II who 
clearly designated for the first time a hierarchy of positions for scholars and rules for 
appointments to these positions in the law code he promulgated.30 Although he 
initiated an officially designated career regulation system, however embryonic it 
was, he did not allow to the scholars in the ecology to self-regulate in accordance 
                                                 
30 I deliberately ignore here the historiographic debate about the authenticity of the aforementioned 
law code, since even if the law code as it exists now is not authentic, the information it provides about 
the hierarchical organization of the time is pertinent, as Repp demonstrates (1977, 280). 
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with the system, and made sure that the operation of the system was mediated 
through his personal regulation, which suspended the system at will.  
Even if Mehmed II’s regulation was not binding on himself, it was so for his 
predecessors. In Bayezid II’s and Yavuz I’s reigns, the appointments of scholars 
followed a certain hierarchical pattern in accordance with the stipulations in Mehmed 
II’s law code, which suggests that the idea and practice of a hierarchically ordered 
career regulation system was established and further developed in this period. The 
establishment of a centrally regulated career system had been to a further extent 
completed under Süleyman I’s reign, when possible career lines for scholars were 
both defined within the higher educational ecology and closely linked to the judicial 
ecology on the one hand, and separated from bureaucratic ecology on the other (Atçıl 
2010, 77–81, 121–36, 193–200). According to this career regulation system, to put it 
generally, a madrasa graduate had two main possible career lines before him. He 
could either become a professor at a low-ranking madrasa and gradually move up to 
higher-ranking madrasas, or to become a judge in a local court and get promotion in 
time. These two career lines were not totally separate, however, they crosscut each 
other. Indeed to get a mevleviyet, i.e. judgeship in a great city, one had to be 
professor first in one of the higher-ranking madrasas such as the Sahn or 
Süleymaniye, and those madrasa graduates who started their careers as local judges 
rarely arrived at high offices in judicial ecology. The career regulation system 
established during this period is a clear indicator of the strong linkage between 
higher educational and judicial ecologies (Repp 1986, 30–62). Finally, the door to a 
career in the bureaucratic ecology outside of the higher educational and judicial 
ecologies was as a rule closed to the madrasa graduates after Süleyman I’s reign. As 
with any rule, this rule had also its exceptions of course (Atçıl 2009, 489–90).  
 The Ottoman dynasty’s attempts to centralize the control of the higher 
educational ecology were not limited to social structures alone, such as the 
centralization of administrative and financial control, or the establishment of a 
centrally regulated career system. The third stream of centralization was more related 
to cultural structures of the ecology. Beginning with the personal interferences of 
Mehmed II in the cultural interactions among scholars, especially those affiliated 
with the dynastic center, the Ottoman dynastic figures assumed increasingly more 
right to interfere in the regulation of the cultural space of the higher educational 
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ecology. It is in this period that we attest, for the first time in both the Ottoman and 
Islamic history, a central political authority attempting to lay down a curriculum, or a 
scholarly canon, to centrally regulate and demarcate the cultural/intellectual space to 
be navigated by the scholars in their higher educational activities: In 1565, Süleyman 
I promulgated an edict where he enumerates the books to be taught in the madrasas 
(Ahmed and Filipovic 2004). This edict was not a unique instance of central 
interference in the regulation of curricular structure, but part of a larger process of 
canon formation, which Burak calls “the imperial jurisprudential canon” (2015, 124). 
According to Burak, there was “a concerted effort,” especially during the 16th 
century, “on behalf of the Ottoman dynasty, and particularly on behalf of the 
imperial learned hierarchy, to define a corpus of jurisprudential texts (…) that 
members of the imperial learned hierarchy were to consult in their teachings and 
rulings” (2015, 124). Thus, during this period, a corpus of jurisprudential texts was 
officially sanctioned as reliable and authoritative texts and came to form a centrally 
approved frame of reference for the scholars affiliated with the Ottoman imperial 
project (Burak 2015, 122–139).  
The dynastic intervention does not seem to have changed the curricular 
structure in its essence, however. Fiqh as a discipline retained its central importance 
in the curricula in this period. According to the data provided by Baltacı (1976, 37–
43) and Hızlı (2008, 30; 2012, 151–8), fiqh is the only discipline to have been taught 
at every single level of the madrasa education in this period. Given the strengthened 
and more institutionalized linkage between higher educational and judicial ecologies, 
one may even argue the centrality of fiqh discipline within the madrasa curriculum 
became more established. Furthermore, the books to be taught had not undergone a 
significant change. The dynastic interventions seem to have been limited to approve 
the established curricular practice (Akgündüz 1997, 378–9). Finally, the Ottoman 
sultans’ occasional interventions “in the development of religious law” by specifying 
“particular opinions to be followed in some areas of practical jurisprudence” may 
have eventually led to some changes in the scholarly knowledge production 
processes (Atçıl 2010, 291). In short, the main change in this period in terms of the 
configuration of cultural space of the ecology was that the actors controlling the 
locations of central political authority (either external to ecology, such as the sultan, 
or internal to it such as the şeyhülislam or kazaskers) had a say in the processes of 
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both canon formation and curricular regulation, regardless of the effect of their 
intervention, as opposed to previous periods when both scholarly canons and 
madrasa curricula were shaped almost exclusively by scholars. 
 The combined effect of all the aforementioned processes was an increasing 
Ottomanization of the Islamicate higher educational ecology. This Ottomanization 
was both triggered and reinforced by the important politico-cultural challenges the 
Ottomans confronted through the struggle with the Safavids on the one hand, and the 
conquest of the Arab lands on the other. The former forced the Ottomans to secure 
and strengthen the centrality of both Sunni Islam at the general level, and the Hanafi 
madhhab at the jurisprudential level, in all aspects of its socio-political organization, 
which required the Ottoman state to penetrate more into the social space under its 
control. The Ottoman state’s will to penetrate more into the social space required 
both further expansion and effective central regulation of bureaucratic, higher 
educational, and judicial ecologies (Atçıl 2010, 159–63). To control higher 
educational ecology was particularly crucial for securing and maintaining the 
centrality of an Ottoman Sunni Islam and of Hanafi madhhab within the Ottoman 
realm. The conquest of the Mamluk lands did not pose as big a cultural challenge as 
the Safavids did, of course. Yet it was a challenge indeed. What was at stake here 
was the true definition of Sunni Islam. At the jurisprudential level, interactions with 
the Arab scholars after the conquest forced the Ottoman scholars to engage in a finer 
definition of their place within the cultural space of Sunni Islam in general, and of 
the Hanafi madhhab in particular. Consequently in this period, according to Burak, 
the Ottoman dynasty not only adopted Hanafism as its official madhhab, but also 
actively intervened with the scholars in “the structure of the school of law and its 
doctrines” in order to define and adopt a particular branch within the Hanafi 
madhhab as the Ottoman official madhhab (2015, 207–8). 
 Another aspect of the Ottomanization of the ecology was that some informal 
exclusion mechanisms started to operate in this period in order to prevent those 
scholars who had not acquired proper education and culture from reaching the top 
hierarchy located at the center of the ecology. This informal exclusion was reflected 
in the decreasing possibility for “émigré scholars who completed or started their 
education in their home country,” i.e. outside the Ottoman madrasa system, “to 
impress people, have a large following, or reach significant positions” (Atçıl 2010, 
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190). In a similar vein, “graduates of educational institutions in the central cities 
were favored over religious scholars who received their education elsewhere” (Atçıl 
2010, 167). This informal exclusion of provincial and foreign scholars was a 
corollary of the centralization process that rendered the scholars and madrasas in 
Istanbul, Edirne, and Bursa almost exclusively central to the social and cultural 
organization of the ecology. 
 Finally, this period witnessed the gradual incorporation of most of the 
scholars in the core lands of the Empire (i.e. Anatolia and the Balkans), particularly 
in the central cities, to the Ottoman imperial project through the madrasa system, 
which constituted another aspect of the Ottomanization of the higher educational 
ecology. The emergence of the Ottoman “scholar-bureaucrats,” as Atçıl names them, 
who constituted an integral part of the ruling apparatus and whose mode of thinking 
was more and more inclined to melt in the same pot the ideals of Islam and the ideals 
of the Ottoman dynasty, as the typical actors in the higher educational ecology was a 
distinctive process of the period (Atçıl 2010, 99–100, 136–41, 200–2). Atçıl 
succinctly contrasts the change in the self-identification of the scholars in the 
Ottoman higher educational ecology: 
 
In the previous period, especially in the fourteenth and early fifteenth 
centuries, scholars around the Ottoman rulers identified themselves primarily 
as members of the international community of religious scholars. Their 
distinguishing characteristics depended on their religious worldview and their 
specialization in the study of religious disciplines. On the other hand, the 
primary identity of religious scholars who served in the Ottoman bureaucracy 
in the sixteenth century was determined by their association with the Ottoman 
enterprise. In other words they became “Ottoman”; that is, they adopted 
Ottoman ideals, attire, and manners. (2010, 167) 
 
As a result of this process, the operative logic of the higher educational ecology was 
subjected more to the political-bureaucratic ecology, as can be observed in the 
centralization processes mentioned above. This does not mean that the Ottoman 
dynasty was the sole, or even main, determinant actor in the higher educational 
ecology. The Ottoman scholar-bureaucrats still enjoyed certain autonomy. However, 
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this autonomy had decreased on the one hand, and changed in kind on the other. The 
Ottoman scholars no longer enjoyed significant autonomy from the ruling apparatus, 
as opposed to earlier periods; they rather enjoyed certain autonomy within the ruling 
apparatus vis-à-vis its other components (Zilfi 1988, 13, 26–30). 
3.1.3. The Crisis and Reconsolidation of the Established Order of the Ecology 
(17th to 19th Centuries) 
The scarcity of serious scholarship on the condition of the Ottoman scholars in 
general, and of the fiqh discipline in particular, in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries makes it extremely difficult to offer a general picture of the configuration 
of the higher educational ecology and the place of fiqh therein during this period. 
Zilfi’s work (1983a; 1983b; 1986; 1988) remains, as far as I am aware of, the only 
serious research bringing a comprehensive perspective to the analysis of the Ottoman 
scholars in the period of concern. Nevertheless, based on Zilfi’s extensive research 
along with Repp’s single yet important article (1977), one can observe the 
continuation and consolidation during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of the 
aforementioned trends that had structured the higher educational ecology in the 
previous period. Although the economic and political crises of the seventeenth 
century along with the successive Kadızadeli movements posed challenges for both 
social and cultural structures of the ecology, the established order restored itself with 
the expansion and the hierarchical rearrangement of the ecology in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.  
 Two unprecedented events were particularly expressive of the crisis the 
Ottoman ruling system underwent in the 17th century: the strangulation of Osman II 
by the janissaries and the execution of three şeyhülislams during the century.31 These 
deaths underscored the fact that the Ottoman ruling system, including its central parts 
such as the sultanate and the ilmiye corps, was under a significant threat (Zilfi 1988, 
110–21). It had been ineffective and unable for a while to ensure order and security 
in the realm and thus losing its legitimacy. The Kadızadeli movement emerged from 
the ideo-political vacuum the ineffectiveness of the Ottoman ruling system 
engendered. The Kadızadelis, a group of successive preachers who commanded 
                                                 
31 It is far beyond my scope here to describe the seventeenth century crisis as well as to analyze its 
causes and effects. For an account focusing on the directly political aspect of the crisis, see Abou-el-
Haj (1984). For an analysis of the crisis in terms of  “politics of piety,” see Zilfi (1988). 
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significant influence both in elite and public levels, undertook a zealous criticism of 
what they saw as the innovated aspects of the Ottoman religious life and set out to 
exterminate them, among which the “wrong” religiosity as practiced by Sufis 
occupies a central place. Although neither the sultanate nor the madrasa-trained 
ilmiye corps was among the targets of the expressed criticism of the Kadızadelis, the 
latter had strong implications for both of the former.  
As for the ilmiye, the criticism of the Kadızadelis implied first that the 
official madrasa-trained Ottoman scholars had failed to establish a true 
understanding and practice of Islam by allowing lots of innovations to become 
widely established in Ottoman life. The second implication of the Kadızadeli 
criticism was that the Kadızadelis were the ones who would achieve what the official 
madrasa-trained scholars had failed to do: securing the true understanding and 
practice of Islam in the Ottoman realm. Given that the Kadızadelis were to some 
extent representatives of both the provincial scholars and the corps of preachers, the 
movement may well be considered also as a centrifugal counteraction to the firm grip 
of the increasingly centralized and hierarchical madrasa system over higher 
educational and judicial ecologies. Although the Kadızadelis had stormed Istanbul 
during much of the seventeenth century, they ultimately lost their influence and 
failed to achieve their goals (Zilfi 1986; Zilfi 1988, 129–83). The official hierarchy 
of scholars in turn restored their authority from the mid-seventeenth century onward 
and maintained their firm grip over the higher educational and legal ecologies. The 
restoration of the social and cultural structures of the ecology, however, was affected 
by the Kadızadeli episode; since it was partly in reaction to the latter the restoration 
took place (Zilfi 1986, 233). 
  The restoration was particularly apparent in three aspects: the expansion, 
further centralization (or Istanbulization), and de facto “aristocratization” in terms of 
the organization of the ecology. The late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries 
attested a threefold increase in the numbers of the madrasa graduates (Zilfi 1988, 79, 
94). Yet “in contrast to the more prosperous sixteenth century, the personnel 
explosion of the seventeenth century occurred despite shrinking resources” and thus 
resulted in an “uncontrolled inflation in the ulema numbers that characterized ulema 
recruitment in the century” (Zilfi 1988, 94, 71). This inflation exerted pressure on all 
positions in the ilmiye hierarchy and gave rise to demands for more “job security,” 
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which were to bring about changes in career regulation and to enforce the tendency 
toward de facto aristocratization. The growing number of scholars, which affected 
more heavily the novices and sub-hierarchy whose career prospects get more 
obscure, added to the crisis atmosphere of the century. The restoration of the madrasa 
system would not be possible without measures to deal with this rise. It is from the 
second half of the seventeenth century onward that we attest “a dramatic surge in the 
number of new madrasa foundations, resulting in a near two-fold increase in the total 
number of Istanbul-system madrasas” (Zilfi 1988, 205). The foundation of new 
madrasas constituted a provisional remedy for the employment problem by 
alleviating some of the pressure from below and helped the ilmiye elites to restore 
their central position in the organization of the ecology. However, the chronic rise in 
the numbers of scholars was to establish itself soon as a constant problem for the 
madrasa system in later periods (Zilfi 1988, 205–8). The main reason for this chronic 
problem was that unlike previous centuries, the ecological expansion of higher 
education was no longer paralleled by the geographical and financial expansion of 
the Empire. 
 The centralizing thrust also continued in the eighteenth century. Although 
Istanbul had been the center of higher educational ecology from Mehmed II’s reign 
on, in terms of both academic scholarship and recruitment of scholars, it had not held 
a monopoly over either of them. Istanbul had not been a monopolistic center, but 
rather the core of a larger central region including the cities such as Edirne and Bursa 
(Atçıl 2009, 495–6). This had changed for good in the eighteenth century, however, 
especially after the two decrees promulgated by Ahmed III in 1715, which excluded 
all but the Istanbulite scholars the right to name novices, i.e. to recruit new scholars. 
“By the beginning of the eighteenth century,” thus, “education, rearing and 
socialization within Istanbul were absolute prerequisites to success,” for “it had 
become increasingly evident that an exclusivist Istanbul system, complete with 
Istanbul-centered social networks, governed not only promotion opportunities but 
recruitment as well” (Zilfi 1988, 212). The implementation of the arpalık system that 
granted the Istanbulite scholars, to the detriment of the provincial scholars, the most 
important provincial judgeships as sinecures further enforced the trend to 
Istanbulization (Zilfi 1988, 66–70, 110). Given all these, it was not surprising at all 
that “all of the new medreses” built in this period “sprang up in Istanbul” (Zilfi 1988, 
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211). In short, increasingly from the start of the eighteenth century onwards, the 
bureaucrat-scholars located geographically in Istanbul and organizationally at the top 
of the hierarchy had exclusively dominated the control of the organization of the 
higher educational ecology, especially in terms of career regulation. 
A striking feature parallel to the aforementioned Istanbulization in the 
eighteenth century was the de facto aristocratization of the scholarly profession 
(Itzkowitz 1977, 18–20; Zilfi 1988, 43–81). There had never been an institutionally 
established aristocracy in the Ottoman Empire in general, or in the higher educational 
ecology in particular. There had indeed been life tenures and special prerogatives and 
honors attributed to particular scholars who had enormously served the Ottoman 
ideo-political project, such as Molla Fenarî and Ebussuûd Efendi, as well as to their 
descendants; but these were exceptional cases. “By the eighteenth century,” however, 
“an ulema aristocracy, its members strikingly similar in parentage, had settled into 
place” (Zilfi 1988, 46). Particular families of scholars established great control over 
much of the offices at the top hierarchy through kin patronage, patrilineal career, and 
hereditary recruitment. The top-ranking scholars went further and had their privileges 
institutionalized for themselves and their pedigrees. The prerogatives the top scholars 
and their families enjoyed at the expense of others consequently “made the official 
religious calling virtually a closed corporation” (Zilfi 1988, 47). Vertical mobility 
after a certain rank was thus possible for an increasingly narrower group of scholars 
affiliated in some way with the great families of scholars. For those who did not have 
the advantageous patrilineal descent, recruitment and promotion within higher 
educational ecology became more and more difficult through the eighteenth century 
when the increasing competition due to the constant growth in the number of 
scholars had already made things difficult.  
In short, competition for recruitment and promotion were more than previous 
in the eighteenth century based on patrilineal patronage based on descent instead of 
academic patronage based on scholarly merit (Zilfi 1983a). It goes without saying 
that all of these “aristocratic” families of scholars were located in the imperial 
capital. Finally, both the Istanbulization and the de facto aristocratization went 
together with a further elaboration and systematization of the ilmiye hierarchy in an 
unprecedented level (Zilfi 1983b, 313–6; Zilfi 1988, 24–6). The hierarchical 
organization of both higher educational and judicial ecologies, in terms of 
   
 
61 
 
educational trajectory as well as of professional career, “was more explicit and more 
elaborate than its antecedents” in the eighteenth century, thus “sorted out and routed 
greater numbers in a more systematic, more predictable, fashion” (Zilfi 1988, 231).  
The available scholarship points out no radical change in either the general 
organization of the madrasa curricula or the place of fiqh within the madrasa 
education. Fiqh as a discipline remains at the center of madrasa education. Madrasa 
curricula from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries do not contain significant 
changes in this aspect (Özyılmaz 2001; Fazlıoğlu 2005). Furthermore, Zilfi argues the 
expansion and hierarchical consolidation of the madrasa system had further 
conservative effect on the content of education and resulted in a more “narrow, 
unchanging curriculum” (1988, 233). The research on the period suggests, at the 
same time, there was a decrease in the scholarly interest and activity per se of 
especially the central scholars who had been to an unprecedented degree engaged in 
either courtly or career politics throughout the century (Itzkowitz 1977, 15–20). I 
mentioned above the emergence in the sixteenth century of the type of “scholar-
bureaucrat” who claimed, explicitly or implicitly, to embrace at once the Islamic 
ethos of scholarship and the Ottoman dynastic project (see also Hourani 1977, 267).  
As both Zilfi (1988) and Repp (1977) argue, the bureaucrat part of the ideal-
typic Ottoman “scholar-bureaucrat” gets more and more weight at the expense of the 
scholar part throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The elaborately 
established hierarchical career system on the one hand, and the increasing 
competition between both scholars as individual actors and families of scholars as 
collective actors seeking after the proportionally decreasing offices in the ecology on 
the other, made the Ottoman scholar’s scholarly activity more career-oriented than 
ever. Since the scholarly merit was not at the basis of the career regulation system, 
the dominant career-oriented culture of the ecology meant a general weakening in 
terms of scholarly interest and endeavor (Zilfi 1988, 82–6). The long established 
interdependency between the Ottoman dynasty and the ilmiye corps especially in the 
higher educational and judicial ecologies and the ensuing bureaucratization of the 
scholars further reinforced this weakening (Zilfi 1988, 208–10, 230–2). This process 
went together with a gradual but distinct change in the criteria of success and 
prestige among the Ottoman scholars in this period. In Repp’s words, “one might 
suggest that a fifteenth-century scholar’s chief concern, and the measure by which he 
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was judged, was the achievement of excellence in ilm (knowledge) through teaching 
and writing; whereas in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a scholar’s chief 
interest, and the measuring rod of his success, was the attainment of the high learned 
offices and the power, salary, and perquisites that went with them” (1977, 284). All 
these taken together, the official madrasa-affiliated scholars, especially those at the 
top parts of the hierarchy, seem to have adopted a conservative attitude aiming at the 
maintenance of the social and cultural status quo. This scholarly weakening and 
conservatism at the center, however, seems to be concurrent with a centrifugal 
movement in terms of religious scholarship that leads to a striking florescence in the 
peripheries and margins of the ecology, to which now we turn.32 
3.1.4. Renewal Movements and Scholarly Florescence in the Margins of the 
Islamicate Higher Educational Ecology 
So far, our analytical scope have been particularly limited to the parts of the 
Islamicate higher educational ecology that had been effectively controlled and 
structured by the Ottoman madrasa system, especially the core lands of the Empire 
such as the Anatolia and the Balkans, and we have purposefully ignored the 
remaining parts of the ecology. There were indeed parts of the ecology where higher 
educational institutions existed that had not been under effective political and 
educational control of the Ottoman center and preserved to great extent the structures 
of the classical, pre-Ottoman madrasa system. These parts I will refer to as the 
peripheral regions of the ecology. There was no significant process, however, in 
these peripheral regions to effectively challenge the functioning of the Ottoman 
madrasa system and the scholarship it produced in a way to have a global effect over 
the ecology. The conquest of the Arab lands and the attempts to incorporate the 
Mamluk higher educational ecology into the Ottoman one had indeed posed some 
challenge to the Ottoman madrasa system. Yet this challenge did not result in a 
significant alteration of the system. The Ottomans established their nominal control 
over the functioning of the higher educational institutions in Egypt and Arabia, yet 
the scholars there still enjoyed considerable autonomy in both social and cultural 
regulation of the parts of the ecology they are located at. Consequently social and 
cultural structures of the ecology as it had been configured in Egypt during the 
                                                 
32 This centrifugal movement was in parallel with the processes of decentralization in terms of 
political and economic power occurred during the eighteenth century (Voll 1994, 25–7). 
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centuries before the Ottoman conquest sustained their functioning with minimal 
subordination to, yet in interaction with, the Ottoman madrasa system.  
Apart from the peripheral regions of the Ottoman higher educational ecology, 
there were parts of the Islamicate higher educational ecology that had been neither 
under the control nor in significant interaction with the Ottoman madrasa system. To 
these parts I will refer to as margins of the ecology. From the eighteenth century 
onward, there emerged scholarly movements both in the peripheries and the margins 
of the Islamicate higher educational ecology. These movements constituted 
collective actors that located in both organizational and geographical margins of the 
Islamicate higher educational ecology and developed critical attitudes against the 
established ways of living Islam in general, and exercising scholarship in particular. 
Although their initial effects had been local, they had deep and lasting influences, 
albeit transformed in time, globally affecting the later configurations of both the 
higher educational ecology and the fiqh discipline. 
 These movements have generally been called “renewal and reform” 
movements in the literature (e.g. Levtzion and Voll 1987a). They had all formed 
around a charismatic scholar-leader and further developed under his and his 
successors’ leadership. The movements of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhâb (d. 1787) 
of Arabia, Shah Walî-Allah al-Dihlawî (d. 1762) of India, ‘Uthman İbn Fûdî (d. 
1817) of West Africa, Muhammad al-Shawkani (d. 1832) of Yemen, and 
Muhammad Ibn ‘Ali al-Sanûsî (d. 1859) of North Africa are among the most 
prominent. To what extent these movements may be treated under a common 
category is a matter of debate. According to Levtzion and Voll (1987b), there is a 
“characteristic pattern of renewal and reform” movements of the eighteenth century 
that makes possible, despite significant differences between them, to gather them 
under a common category. As Voll argues, their particular focus on and distinctive 
approach to the sciences of hadith and tasawwuf as well as their affiliation with a 
transregional network of scholars centered on Hijaz justify for accepting these 
geographically divergent movements as constitutive parts of a common Islamic 
renewal phenomenon (1975; 1980). Criticizing Voll and like-minded scholars with 
overrating the inter-scholar relations and overlooking the very intellectual content the 
renewalist scholars produce, Dallal argues there are considerable differences between 
the leaders of the renewal movements in terms of scholarly project, intellectual 
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activity, and moral-political vision (1993). Whatever the result of the debate is, 
however, a comparison of these scholars with those located in the core lands of the 
Empire reveals the former’s distinctive character.  
The scholars within the renewal movements had significant differences from 
those who had been located within the Ottoman madrasa system in terms of both 
social and cultural features of their scholarly activity. These differences are reflected 
both in the organizational forms these movements assumed and in the scholarly 
endeavor and production they undertook. Organizationally, it seems that neither the 
leaders of the movements nor most of the scholars involved therein assumed official 
positions within the Ottoman higher educational or judicial ecologies (Dallal 1993, 
343–58; Voll 1975, 34). The renewal movements are organizationally located either 
around networks of scholars engaging in scholarly activities mostly at non-madrasa 
institutions, generally masjids, or within tariqa organizations generally spatialized at 
zawiyas (Voll 1999; Levtzion and Voll 1987b, 7–10). These organizational forms are 
evidently disparate from the Ottoman madrasa system as they are neither officially 
regulated nor they involve a strictly hierarchical career regulation system, among 
other differences.  
In parallel with the organizational differences, there are also significant 
differences in terms of scholarly activity between the official madrasa-affiliated 
scholars and the scholars of the renewal movements. To deal in full range with these 
differences is beyond my endeavor, yet I will point out some that are more directly 
related to the general subject. First of all, as opposed to their official madrasa-
affiliated counterparts, the scholarly activities of the renewalist scholars’ are far from 
the aforementioned career-oriented or dynasty-affiliated concerns. Their scholarly 
activities are rather based on social and moral concerns pertaining to the perceived 
problems of the communities they are engaged with. These scholars were overtly 
concerned with and mostly spoke out about the established ways of living Islam and 
practicing scholarship they had confronted either in their communities or in general 
Islamic society. Their concern and dissent was far from passive; they rather engaged 
in direct action, albeit in diverse ways, to change the problems they saw in the 
Islamic community, both in social and cultural terms. Since “any changes in Muslim 
society were bound to lead to some attempt at reformulation of law,” as Hourani 
rightly puts it (1977, 269), attempts to the renewal of the Islamic sciences in general, 
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and of the fiqh discipline in particular were inevitably to accompany these scholars’ 
endeavour to renew the Islamic way of life as it is experienced in the Islamic 
community.  
Although the renewalist scholars worked hard in the sciences of hadith and 
tasawwuf as well, the discipline of fiqh had quite a central place in their scholarly 
project and activities, albeit in different degrees. Their vision of both how fiqh 
should actually be conceived and practiced and how a contemporaneous jurist should 
relate to disciplinary history when dealing with fiqh is quite different from the 
established, commonly adopted, and officially approved vision within the core 
regions of the Ottoman higher educational ecology.33 Finally, as opposed to the 
general conservative attitude of the contemporaneous dynasty-affiliated Ottoman 
scholars to maintain the cultural and disciplinary status quo in the Islamic sciences 
and education, the scholars affiliated with the renewal movements mostly had an 
attitude towards reformulation and renovating synthesis. Yet it is of central 
importance that this common attitude among the latter scholars towards 
renovation/renewal had not been triggered and oriented by the “external” (i.e. 
Western) socio-political and intellectual factors, as would be the case in the later 
centuries, but rather motivated by the indigenous “Islamic” factors (Voll 1999, 522).  
 According to what the available literature suggests, there was no significant 
relationship and scholarly exchange, neither institutionalized nor informal, between 
the scholars of the official center and the renewalist scholars. This may well be due 
to the aforementioned self-enclosed character of the former in this period. This self-
enclosure seems also to have prevented the central official scholars to engage in 
significant scholarly dialogue and exchange with the scholars located in the 
peripheral regions of the ecology, let alone the margins, such as Egypt and Arabia, 
with whom they had had a continuous relationship in the previous periods, as 
mentioned before. As opposed to the lack of relations between the center on the one 
hand, and the peripheries and margins on the other, there were intense and lively 
relations between the peripheries and the margins throughout the eighteenth century. 
Most of the renewalist scholars who were active in the margins got an important part 
of their education from the scholars in the peripheries. There were also scholars who 
                                                 
33 The debates on the ijtihad and taqlid constituted the central venue where the vision of fiqh is 
discussed and negotiated.  
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were raised in the margins and later settled and taught in the peripheries, Murtaza al-
Zabidi being a prominent example (Voll 1994, 52–3, 61).  
In short, there were informally organized yet active scholarly networks 
between the peripherical and the marginal regions of the ecology, which made 
possible a continuous and lively scholarly interaction between them during the 
eighteenth century and later (see Voll 1994, 41–79). This lively interaction through 
transregional scholarly networks gave way to the emergence of geographically and 
organizationally diverse yet motivationally similar renewalist movements. Both the 
critical and the positive dimensions of the renewalist scholarly projects had important 
implications for the Ottoman religious establishment in general, and the higher 
educational ecology in particular, although neither of them was among the expressed 
targets of the renewalist scholars. As disconnected from these networks and 
interactions, however, scholars of the Ottoman center seemed unaware from these 
scholarly movements or did not pay significant attention to them. Although the initial 
actual effects of the renewalist movements remained more local, the potential effects 
they triggered were to unfold throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and 
have a global effect over the Islamicate higher educational ecology, albeit as shaped 
and redefined by the pro and anti Westernizing/modernizing forces that were 
increasingly and effectively in operation during the period of concern (Voll 1994, 
83). To deal with these effects, however, requires another research project on its 
own. 
3.2. A Summative Epilogue  
If we assume a global retrospective look to the configurations of the Ottoman higher 
educational ecology34 from its early phase to the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
it is possible to discern two main structural trends that had constituted permanent 
characteristic features of the ecology. The first of these is the constant centrality of 
the fiqh discipline to the ecology. Three dimensions of this centrality may be 
discerned. First of all, the fiqh discipline had been central to the cultural space of the 
ecology as it was both the central and most studied subject of the madrasa curricula 
regardless of the period and a central discipline to the scholarly production. Second, 
                                                 
34 To reiterate, by the “Ottoman higher educational ecology” I mean the parts of the Islamicate higher 
educational ecology that had been controlled and structured by the Ottoman madrasa system, albeit to 
various degrees. 
   
 
67 
 
the fiqh had been central to the social structures of the madrasa system, as it had 
provided the legal framework within which the madrasa system operated, especially 
through the legal regulation of the endowments. Finally, the fiqh had been the 
foremost discipline to provide the madrasa graduate with the kind of knowledge he 
would need in his vocational career, either as a judge or mufti in the judicial ecology 
or as a professor in the higher educational ecology. These occupational links with 
other ecologies extended the importance and centrality of fiqh discipline beyond the 
higher educational ecology. The content and boundaries of the fiqh discipline had 
been indeed defined, produced, and negotiated above all within the higher 
educational ecology, yet the knowledge contained within the scientific turf of the 
fiqh discipline had been essentially applied within the judicial and bureaucratic 
ecologies. The cultural structures of the everyday prayers and daily interactions of 
the Muslims had been also infused with fiqh knowledge of course, yet I am not sure 
if we locate them wholesale in any ecology at the analytical level. Consequently, the 
social and cultural existence of the fiqh discipline had been central not only to the 
Ottoman higher educational ecology, but also to the Ottoman social and cultural 
spaces as a whole. This centrality had not been peculiar to the Ottoman higher 
education ecology, however, it had been a characteristic feature of the Islamicate 
higher educational ecology in general. It had been thus as equally valid in the center 
of the ecology as in its peripheries and margins. 
  Another characteristic feature of the Ottoman higher educational ecology had 
been the increasing symbiotic interdependency relationships between the higher 
educational structures and the dynastic government structures of the Empire, 
particularly from Mehmed II’s reign on. On the eve of the nineteenth century, the 
central Ottoman madrasa system had been highly interdependent with the dynastic 
government structures, both in economical and administrative terms, as I tried to 
show throughout this section. One may even argue the central Ottoman madrasa 
system constituted an integral part of the dynastic government structures as it 
provided for the latter both symbolic basis for legitimacy and human resource for 
recruitment.  
The scholars at the center of the higher educational ecology, who constituted 
the top part of the ilmiye hierarchy, had the greatest power in regulating the social 
and cultural space of the ecology. The symbolic power of the madrasa scholars was 
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not limited to the higher educational ecology, however. They exercised significant 
symbolic authority in larger society too. Yet these scholars were also officially paid 
members of the Ottoman ruling system and derived their administrative power within 
the ecology from the dynast. The dynastic center, through the top official scholars, 
ruled the appointment of the madrasa graduates and regulated their careers. 
Recruitment by the dynast had been increasingly the sole venue in order to be a 
professor within the Ottoman higher educational ecology. The scholars thus had been 
increasingly compelled to look upon the Ottoman madrasa system, thus upon the 
dynastic center, to ensure themselves livelihood, prestige, and a future prospect.  
This increasing financial and administrative dependency on the dynastic 
structures secured for the scholars considerable wealth, prestige and a widely 
established and firmly organized institutional network they would otherwise had 
probably not enjoyed. Yet at the same time it infused them with growing vocational, 
career-related concerns, bureaucratic tasks, and dynastic vision leaving increasingly 
lesser room for scholarly concerns and activity per se.35 Furthermore, the gradually 
established interdependency of the scholars with the dynastic structures handed over 
a significant part of their ability and autonomy to shape the social structural and 
cultural configuration of the higher educational ecology to the initiative of the 
dynastic center. The latter would make use of this opportunity in the tumultuous 
nineteenth century and initiate an increasingly radical transformation of the higher 
educational ecology. For the project of modernization of the Ottoman state, initiated 
by Mahmud II and carried on by his predecessors, required and aimed at the 
accumulation of symbolic power by emergent central collective bureaucratic actors 
in a way to enjoy its monopolistic use in higher educational ecology (as well as in 
other ecologies), which had been hitherto enjoyed almost exclusively by the ilmiye 
corps as a collective actor. The process of the gradual monopolization of symbolic 
power by the modernizing Ottoman state would constitute an increasingly greater 
challenge to both social status and symbolic power of the madrasa scholars and lead 
in turn to a disciplinary crisis of fiqh, which would gradually lose its centrality in 
both higher educational and judicial ecologies, and simultaneously to a disciplinary 
transformation of legal education.   
                                                 
35 The validity of what was said so far of the scholars’ dependency on the dynastic government 
structures gradually decreases as one proceeds from the center of the ecology to its peripheries and 
then to its margins, as I tried to show based on the relevant literature. 
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CHAPTER 4 
AN INTERACTIONAL FIELD OF MODERN STATE FORMATION AND 
DISCIPLINARY TRANSFORMATION OF THE OTTOMAN LEGAL 
EDUCATION (19th and Early 20th Centuries) 
The radical transformations occurred in the Ottoman social space during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries cannot be properly analyzed without taking 
into consideration an overarching process that had its multiple and lasting effects on 
the configurations of all ecologies: the process of modern state formation.36 Higher 
educational ecology is no exception to this. Since the formation of a modern state in 
the Ottoman social space is an extremely complex process, I will analyze it at a 
general level and as an interactional field37 that conditioned the transformation of the 
Ottoman higher educational ecology and of the Ottoman legal education. Since 
understanding the transformation of the Ottoman judicial ecology is indispensable 
for making sense of the transformation of the higher educational ecology, for the two 
are closely linked, an overall analysis of the former will also be in order when 
necessary.  
4.1. Formation of Modern State as Struggle over Monopolization of Symbolic 
Power: A Bourdieusian Vaccination to the Abbotian Theoretical Body 
At this point, I would like to introduce a Bourdieusian concept, namely symbolic 
power, as an explanatory tool into my Abbottian framework in order to better make 
sense of the process of modern state formation, as the latter directly conditioned what 
happened in the higher educational ecology during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. The concept of symbolic power holds a central place in Bourdieu’s 
                                                 
36 The expansion of European colonial imperialism into the Ottoman lands, or the integration of the 
Ottoman Empire into the World system (the naming may change according to ideological position) 
was another overarching process that affected all aspects of the transformations of the Ottoman social 
space during the 19th and 20th centuries. Yet I will not undertake an explicit elaboration of this 
dimension in my analysis here due to the concerns of scope and feasibility. 
37 I would like to remind my reader here that the concept of interactional field denotes not only space, 
contrary to what the word field implies, but also time. Interactional field implies at once social space 
and social process, as I elaborated in the first chapter. On this point, see particularly Abbott (1997, 
1153–9). 
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sociological theory in general, and in his analysis of modern state in particular. 
Borrowing from Thompson, we can define symbolic power basically as the “capacity 
to intervene in the course of events, to influence the actions of others and indeed to 
create events, by means of the production and transmission of symbolic forms” 
(1995, 17). This capacity is actualized through generation, via symbolic forms, of 
“mental structures” molded with “common principles of vision and division” and 
“forms of thinking” in those exposed to the symbolic power at work (Bourdieu 1994, 
7). The accumulation of this capacity in order to be in a position to determine the 
social definition and construction of reality is subject to constant struggle within 
social space. In its highly concentrated and quasi-monopolized forms, however, the 
holders of symbolic power establish a structured domination over those who are 
subject to it in a way to inculcate them with “the legitimate vision of the world” 
(Bourdieu 1989, 20).  
The genesis of the modern state marks, according to Bourdieu, “the 
culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital,” among 
which symbolic capital occupies a central place (1994, 4). The gist of Bourdieu’s 
contribution to the analysis of the modern state is that he adds symbolic power 
exercised by the state as a crucial dimension of the state power and as a sine qua non 
for the legitimate existence of a modern state. The modern state is characterized not 
only by the successful claim of the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
violence over a definite territory, as the famous Weberian definition asserts, but also 
by that of symbolic violence over the totality of the corresponding population 
(Bourdieu 1994, 3–4).  
Relying on Bourdieu’s concept and argument, Loveman engages with the 
scholarship on modern state formation in Western Europe (2005). Criticizing the 
scholarship with overemphasizing “the political-military dimensions of the state 
formation” while ignoring its symbolic dimensions, Loveman sets out to lay “a 
foundation for systematic inquiry into the primitive accumulation of symbolic power 
by modernizing states” (2005, 1651–4). The main strategy modernizing states follow 
to accumulate symbolic power is to develop and extend their means and capacity of 
administration in a way to “gain control over the production, unification, 
codification, and dissemination of knowledge” (Loveman 2005, 1660). Bureaucracy 
as the organizational form that enables modernizing states to extend their 
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administrative reach lies at the heart of their ability to exercise symbolic power. One 
should not conceive, however, the extension of modernizing states’ bureaucratic 
administration neither as an inevitable outcome of necessary historical processes nor 
as the result of conscious and steadfast actions of state as a transcendent subject. 
Instead, “administrative development (or the lack thereof) is better conceived as the 
cumulative product of concrete historical struggles, of varying types and intensity, 
over the boundaries of legitimate state practice – and thus, over the practical 
definition of the state itself” (Loveman 2005, 1661). For the extension of 
modernizing states’ administrative reach does not take place within social vacuum 
but within already structured ecologies located by different actors holding different 
amounts of power.  
Based on the available research, Loveman identifies four ways in which 
modernizing states extend their administrative reach, and thereby accumulate 
symbolic power: 
 
First, agents of the state could innovate, inventing new administrative 
practices and carving out new domains of social life to administer. Second, 
agents of the state could imitate the existing administrative practices of 
nonstate actors, possibly (but not necessarily) rendering such practices 
redundant or superfluous. Third, agents of the state could co-opt the 
traditional administrative practices of local or religious authorities, 
incorporating them into the state’s administrative apparatus. Finally, agents of 
the state could usurp the administrative practices of nonstate actors, stripping 
them of the means and/or authority to continue their traditional practices and 
taking over these practices themselves, imbuing them with new meanings in 
the process (2005, 1661).  
 
Loveman’s criticism asserting that formation of the modern state is generally 
studied in its military-political dimensions to the neglect of its symbolic dimensions 
applies well to the Ottoman-Turkish case. Most of the studies on modern state 
formation in the Ottoman-Turkish case focus on the military-political and economic 
organization of the state overlooking the organization of its symbolic dimensions 
(e.g. Davison 1973; Findley 1980; Zürcher 1999; Özbek 2002; Ergut 2004; Mundy 
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and Smith 2007). Since the higher educational ecology implies a social space where 
the effective use of symbolic power is at stake, I argue the transformation of the 
Ottoman higher educational ecology in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
cannot be adequately understood without taking into consideration the modernizing 
Ottoman state’s efforts to accumulate/monopolize symbolic power as well as the 
counter efforts of the former holders of symbolic power to retain theirs.  
Yet isolating symbolic power as the sole determining force in the higher 
educational ecology is also misleading. A more holistic perspective is required 
indeed, as offered by both Abbott and Bourdieu. We should thus state at analytical 
level that the transformation of higher educational ecology is result of a twofold 
struggle: the struggle over political and economic power to configure the social 
organization of ecology on the one hand, and the struggle over symbolic power to 
configure cultural organization of ecology on the other. As we will see, one can attest 
in the case of the transformation of the Ottoman higher educational ecology, where 
agents of the modernizing Ottoman-Turkish state steadily seek to accumulate (and 
ultimately monopolize) symbolic power through extension of their administrative 
capacity over higher education, three of the aforementioned four ways, occurring at 
different times and contexts, isolated or altogether.  
 Transformation of the Ottoman higher educational ecology in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries had not occurred as an abrupt transition from the madrasa 
system to the university system. If one looks only to the beginning and the end of the 
process, one can speak in the last analysis of a transition from an ecology primarily 
structured by madrasa system to an ecology primarily structured by university 
system. Yet between the beginning and the end there was a complex set of processes 
understanding which accounts for how and why the transformation unfolded as such. 
The transformation process unfolded mainly in three stages. These stages can be 
roughly impaired with the aforementioned ways of modernizing states’ extension of 
administrative reach and symbolic power. Although each way was in operation at 
every stage to different degrees, we can distinguish between different stages 
according to which way was dominant in that period. In the first stage, which 
comprises roughly the latter part of Mahmud II’s reign and the early Tanzimat 
period, there emerged gradually a social and cultural logic different from (alternative 
to?) the logic that constituted and underpinned the madrasa system throughout the 
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centuries. This “new logic” gradually expanded and established itself to some degree 
in social and cultural structures without directly opposing or manifestly challenging 
the established logic of the madrasa system.  
The most striking/noticeable feature of this first stage is that the modernizing 
Ottoman state innovated in the higher educational ecology, as in the first way 
Loveman identifies, invented “new administrative practices,” even a new 
administrative logic, “and “new domains of social life to administer” (Loveman 
2005, 1661). A new concept of education termed as maarif, and the corresponding 
institutions and regulations that establish this new concept as a “new domain of 
social life” within the higher educational ecology gradually emerged within this 
stage. The second stage, comprising roughly the late Tanzimat and the Meşrutiyet 
periods, had been dominated by continuous struggles and cooperations between 
emergent and rooted collective actors over that which logic should dominate the 
configuration of higher educational ecology. In this stage, the dominant way the 
modernizing Ottoman state adopts is the third one, that of co-optation rather than 
direct conflict with the former holders of symbolic power in those social spaces 
where state’s administrative reach increasingly extends to. Finally in the last stage, 
from the First World War years to the early years of the Turkish Republic, the new 
logic, now quite established in new social and cultural structures, remained the sole 
force determining the matrix upon which the higher educational ecology is 
configured. This last stage was dominated by the fourth way in Loveman’s 
categorization: the modernizing Ottoman-Turkish state usurped “the administrative 
practices of nonstate actors, stripping them of the means and/or authority to continue 
their traditional practices and taking over these practices themselves, imbuing them 
with new meanings in the process” (Loveman 2005, 1661). 
As Bourdieu succinctly formulates, “the construction of the state monopoly 
over physical and symbolic violence is inseparable from the construction of the field 
of struggles for the monopoly over the advantages attached to this monopoly” 
(Bourdieu 1994, 16). To formulate in Abbottian terms, the control of locations within 
bureaucratic ecology, where and through which state’s use of symbolic power 
becomes possible, is itself subject to competition between actors. Thus, the state is 
not equal to an actor that enters into relations of competition or coordination with 
other social actors. State is rather an aggregate of social locations that bestow upon 
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its holders, i.e. those who control them, a structural capacity to exercise legitimate 
power (physical or/and symbolic) over a de jure defined yet de facto constantly 
negotiated jurisdiction. To give an example from the nineteenth century, the Adliye 
Nezareti and the Şeyhülislamlık constitute two collective actors that compete over 
those locations in bureaucratic ecology that would bestow upon them structural 
capacity to exercise symbolic power within a certain jurisdiction in judicial ecology 
in order to define and carry out the implementation of judicial mechanisms for 
fulfilling the state’s task of dispensing justice. Although their respective domains of 
jurisdiction were legally defined, both the legal definition and its practical 
application were subject to constant negotiation until the abolition of the latter. 
Throughout my following analysis, I will treat institutions, such as the 
Meşihat or the Maarif Nezareti, as collective actors competing within an 
interactional field located at the intersection of different ecologies. When defining 
the legitimate legal education is the stake of competition, these ecologies are mainly 
bureaucratic, higher educational, and judicial ecologies. When I treat institutions as 
collective actors, however, I do not conceive them in substantialist terms as reified 
homogenous entities having a monolithic volition and interest. Indeed, each 
institution is itself an interactional field at a smaller scale, where a plethora of actors 
compete over locations within the institution. When analyzing a particular 
interactional field involving several competing institutions, in my case the 
interactional field where legitimate legal education is defined, however, one must 
treat institutions within that interactional field, for the sake of feasibility, not as 
micro interactional fields but as actors pursuing their interests and acting 
accordingly. Yet one should not cease to be aware theoretically that the volition and 
the interests of the institution as a collective actor are themselves results of the 
competition within that institution as an interactional field. 
Finally, before engaging in the historical sociological analysis of the 
disciplinary transformation of the late Ottoman legal education, let me briefly 
describe the general analytical matrix that underlies my understanding of the process 
of modern state formation in the late Ottoman period within the analytical framework 
I elaborated so far. This analytical matrix is constituted of two main axes, which 
correspond to two levels of historical struggle over modern state formation. The first 
axis correspond to the historical struggles between diverse actors over the 
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constitution or not of an extensive bureaucratic ecology, which may also be 
formulated as transition from a more limited dynastic bureaucratic ecology to a more 
extensive modern bureaucratic ecology, that would make possible the state 
monopolization of physical and symbolic violence, i.e. the formation of the modern 
state. The second axis corresponds to the historical struggles between actors over 
locations within the emerging modern bureaucratic ecology in order to have control 
of state power to configure other ecologies constituting the Ottoman social space, on 
the one hand, and within each of these ecologies on the other.  
The first struggle was initiated by the dynastic center when it set out to 
acquire monopoly over physical violence by eliminating its main shareholders on this 
title, both the Janissary corps and the provincial power holders. Although the 
emergence of these rivals of the dynastic center over the use of physical violence 
goes back to the seventeenth century, the dynastic center’s intention to eliminate 
them began with Selim III and turned into a firmer resolution in the reign of Mahmud 
II. The latter oversaw, throughout his reign, the quite effective elimination of its 
aforementioned rivals over physical violence and thus paved the way for the 
extension and centralization of state’s administrative capacity that constituted 
thereafter a constant article of the central political agenda. The extension and 
centralization of administrative capacity was also indispensable for the accumulation 
and monopolistic use of symbolic power, which constituted another essential 
dimension of the modern state formation. The achievement of this would extend over 
a much larger period of time.  
Yet it was again Mahmud II who triggered the process of state 
monopolization of symbolic power by significantly undermining the capacity of the 
ilmiye corps as a collective actor organized around classical madrasa and court 
system to exercise symbolic power in a way to control higher educational and 
judicial ecologies, and at the same time by founding the embryo-versions of what 
would later be Maarif Nezareti and Adliye Nezareti, i.e. emergent collective 
bureaucratic actors dealing with configuration of higher educational and judicial 
ecologies independently from the control of the ilmiye corps as a collective actor. 
Thus, part of the Ottoman history after Mahmud II may be explained as the history of 
competitions over who and how would use the stock of symbolic power accumulated 
by the state in order to configure different ecologies. These competitions would take 
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place between emergent and rooted collective actors within an interactional field at 
the intersection of several ecologies, which one may call the interactional field of 
modern state formation. The disciplinary transformation of the Ottoman legal 
education would also take place as a result of several competitions between emergent 
and rooted collective actors within this interactional field, particularly at the 
intersection of bureaucratic, higher educational, and judicial ecologies. I will dwell 
more on the historical ramifications of these processes in the following. 
4.2. The Reign of Mahmud II: Paving the Way for the Transformation of 
Higher Educational Ecology 
Having not initiated a general educational reform program, Selim III and Mahmud II 
established military schools mainly in the fields of engineering and medicine: 
Mühendishane-i Bahrî-i Hümayûn (1776), Mühendishâne-i Berrî-i Hümayûn (1795), 
Tıphâne-i Âmire (1827, later Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Şahane in 1839), and Mekteb-i 
Fünûn-ı Harbiye (1834). Although the establishment of these schools is seldom 
interpreted retrospectively as the beginning of “secularization” or “modernization” of 
education in the Ottoman Empire, Selim III’s and Mahmud II’s educational 
undertakings had not attempted “neither towards secularization nor for instructing 
the population at large” (Karpat 1972, 256). The main objective of these schools 
being “educating arts of war” and “raising military officers educated in positive 
sciences” (İhsanoğlu 2010a, 1:82), they were initiated neither to institute a new 
institutional logic aimed at transforming the higher educational ecology in its entirety 
nor for the state’s use of symbolic power to raise students/subjects inculcated with a 
new vision of the world. These schools were established essentially for military 
purposes as part of the sweeping military reforms undertaken in the period (Berkes 
1998, 100; Kazamias 1966, 52). Whatever the purposes in establishing these schools 
had been, however, they constituted a channel, though limited in initial effect, 
through which a new concept of education began to be institutionalized. 
Arguably the most important development in the ecology during this period 
was burgeoning of what Berkes calls “a new concept of education”: namely the idea 
of maârif (1998, 99). Although the word maârif was first used in 1838 in the name of 
a new school founded to raise government personnel, Mekteb-i Maârif-i Adliye, the 
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idea can be traced back to the aforementioned military schools.38 Etymologically, 
“maârif is the plural of marifet, which originally meant ‘knowledge, cognition, 
cognizance, or acquaintance’” (Findley 1989, 138). In this historical context, 
however, maârif meant mainly the knowledge produced in and came from the 
Western world, particularly the technical-practical knowledge that was believed to 
underlie the Western military, technological and industrial advancement. Thus it was 
significantly different from the domain of knowledge that had been produced and 
transmitted in madrasas, which was gathered under Islamic sciences and essentially 
pertained to God, to man’s duties in their relations with God and among themselves, 
thus had not any immediate relevance for technological and industrial advancement 
necessary for military reform.  
The terms preferred to denote the new domain of knowledge reflected the 
awareness of this fundamental difference (Findley 1989, 137–8). As Berkes states, 
“when the new learning came in the eighteenth century, it had not been called ‘ilm. It 
was called fen, which meant “art” or “practical skill”; and the scientist was never 
called an âlim or “learned man”, but a mütefennin, a “jack-of-all-trades”” (1998, 
100). It was mainly because “so strong were the associations of the Arabic term that 
properly refers to rational knowledge, ilm, with the religious studies of the ulema (the 
men of ilm) that the term could not ordinarily be used to refer to any branch of the 
new learning without special qualification” (Findley 1989, 137). The term maârif 
thus “became the general term for the new education” (Findley 1989, 138). 
The emergence and the gradual development of the idea of maârif, therefore, 
went along with the Ottoman state’s efforts to carve out a new type of knowledge, 
and a new domain of education to produce, transmit, and administer this knowledge. 
Although the institutionalization of the idea of maârif was exclusive to some military 
schools in a limited extent during this period, it was to develop and extend in the 
decades to come, becoming embodied in the central institutions such as Maârif-i 
Umûmiye Nezâreti and Darülfünûn, as we will see. It is important to notice, however, 
that from the very beginning the emergence and the institutionalization of the idea of 
maârif was an initiative of the state for the needs of the state. The most urgent need 
of the emergent modernizing state was casted as military reform in this period, and 
                                                 
38 Although maârif is a general word implying all levels of education, I will deal with it as it is related 
to higher education, to which my scope is limited, and ignore the developments in maârif at primary 
and secondary levels.  
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the objective of maârif, as implemented in a limited scope, was to contribute to the 
successful achievement of military reform. This by-the-state-for-the-state character 
of the educational reform resulted in a chronic lack of social support and of 
widespread understanding of both the very idea of maârif and its institutional 
ramifications, which constituted a constant acute problem for the reformers 
throughout the century (Findley 1989, 136–9).  
The limited educational reforms implemented under the reign of Selim III and 
Mahmud II was neither irreversible nor comprehensible enough to transform higher 
educational ecology. The essential importance of the period for the transformation of 
higher educational ecology lies in the radical rearrangement of the distribution of 
power between the collective actors shaping the Ottoman higher educational ecology. 
As we have seen in the second chapter, although the ilmiye corps had been integrated 
into the Ottoman dynastic structures from the late 15th century onwards and gradually 
lost their autonomy from the ruling apparatus, they had nevertheless preserved a 
significant autonomy within the ruling apparatus both in economic and 
administrative terms.  
Two important and quite radical political moves by Mahmud II in this period 
abolished the autonomy of the ilmiye corps vis-à-vis the modernizing state and 
significantly undermined their power as a collective actor in higher educational 
ecology while reinforcing that of the state. The first move was the centralization of 
the administration of endowments under the state’s direct authority through the 
foundation of Evkâf-ı Hümâyûn Nezâreti (Ministry of Imperial Endowments) in 1826 
(Öztürk 1995, 68–69). The Ottoman state thereby monopolized the supervision and 
control of the incomes of endowments hitherto generally enjoyed by religious 
scholars. Had the ministry administered the endowment incomes in a way to 
effectively serve religious scholars and institutions, which constituted the great 
majority of the beneficiaries of endowments, the loss of the latter may have been 
limited to the deprivation from economic autonomy. Yet from its very beginning, the 
ministry constituted a channel to transfer the incomes of endowments to the state 
treasury and significant amounts of the incomes had been used to compensate for 
state expenditures in fields other than what endowment deeds stipulate, especially for 
military and industrial reforms (Öztürk 1995, 72–75). Thus the ilmiye corps as a 
collective actor not only lost their de jure administrative autonomy over the 
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economic resources they had enjoyed, they also de facto lost a significant amount of 
these resources. The second move of Mahmud II to undermine the power and 
autonomy of the ilmiye corps was to break the administrative autonomy of the 
Meşihat, the head of the religious organization, by relegating it to a government 
office among others within the new bureaucratic system (Yakut 2005, 55-82; 
Yurdakul 2008). This was part of the general centralizing reform Mahmud II 
undertook in the organization of state apparatus (Berkes 1998, 97–9). Consequently, 
the ilmiye corps as a collective actor gradually lost a significant part of their power 
and autonomy against the modernizing state and ceased to be as effective as they 
were in the organization of higher educational ecology. This was to have huge effects 
in the following transformation of higher educational ecology, since it changed the 
very conditions in which the competition over locations and organization of ecology 
had been made. Yet the ilmiye corps continued to exercise a significant power within 
higher educational ecology by the simple fact that they were still in control of the 
madrasa system, which continued to structure most of the higher educational ecology 
until the second quarter of the 20th century, though increasingly lost effectiveness 
and challenged in power and authority (Findley 1989, 132–3). 
As one more challenge to the ilmiye corps as a collective actor, of which the 
bureaucratic embodiment was the office of Meşihat, Mahmud II founded two 
bureaucratic institutions, namely Meclis-i Umûr-ı Nâfia (Council of Useful Affairs) 
and Meclis-i Vâlâ-yı Ahkâm-ı Adliye (High Council of Judicial Ordinances) (Berkes 
1998, 97–99). Founded in the last years of Mahmud II’s reign, these councils were 
not but the embryo-versions of the later bureaucratic institutions founded in the Long 
Tanzimat period, which would be increasingly specialized in configuring higher 
educational and judicial ecologies and ultimately morphed into Maarif Nezareti and 
Adliye Nezareti, respectively. These new bureaucratic institutions would assume in 
time increasingly more symbolic power and extend their jurisdiction to the detriment 
of the Meşihat in bureaucratic, higher educational, and judicial ecologies. 
4.3. The Long Tanzimat Period: Initial Transformations of Higher Educational 
Ecology and the Emergence of Competing Types for Legal Education 
Although the historiographical strategy of contrasting the Tanzimat period (1839-
1876) with the Hamidian era (1876-1908), labeling the first as progressive and 
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modernizing and the latter as obscurantist and reactionary, had been also seldom 
encountered in the history of education in the Ottoman Empire (e.g. Antel 1940), 
many recent studies strongly invalidated this strategy and the arguments it implied 
(e.g. Fortna 2003; Findley 1989). Especially in terms of institutional development of 
maârif, there is far more continuity than rupture between the two periods. Roughly 
formulated, the former is more of a period of plan and design while the latter is more 
that of application. Thus it is appropriate to treat these two periods as a single period, 
which I will call as the Long Tanzimat, while dealing with the developments in the 
higher educational ecology.  
The decisive development of the Long Tanzimat period (1839-1908) was the 
gradual emergence and establishment of a centralized reason, resolution and 
corresponding governmental institutions that aim to structure higher educational 
ecology in line with the idea of maârif. As Findley succinctly puts it, “the most 
important single step in educational reform was the transition from founding unique 
institutions to founding a generalized system of schools” (1989, 134). As opposed to 
Mahmud II’s reign, when no specific bureaucratic institution dealing exclusively 
with education existed, the first years of the Tanzimat saw the emergence of the first 
centralized bureaucratic institutions founded for the planning and organization of 
maârif in a holistic perspective at all levels of education. Shortly after its foundation 
in 1845, Meclis-i Maârif-i Muvakkat (Transitory Council of Education) turned into 
Meclis-i Maarif-i Umûmiye (General Council of Education) in 1846, and became the 
first centralized decision-making body founded exclusively for educational purposes. 
In the same vein, Mekâtib-i Umumiye Nezâreti (Ministry of General Schools) was 
founded in 1847, and then morphed into Maârif-i Umûmiye Nezâreti (Ministry of 
General Education) in 1857. This ministry became thereafter the main executive 
organ of the mâarif (Kodaman 1988, 10–14). Thus from the middle of the Tanzimat 
period onwards, the maârif began to be planned and executed in a holistic 
perspective and under the direct control of central government. 
 Although there were partial attempts to plan the development of maârif 
before, the first master plan for the development of the Ottoman maârif system, a 
regulation called Maârif-i Umûmiye Nizâmnamesi (Regulation for General 
Education), was promulgated in 1869. It was the first time a clear concept and a 
relatively detailed planning of a central higher educational institution, envisaged as 
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university and called as Darülfünûn, had been set forth. Consisted of five main 
sections, Maârif-i Umûmiye Nizâmnamesi regulated respectively the general system 
of schools, the administrative organization of maârif, terms of examination and 
graduation, qualifications of the professors, and financial issues. According to the 
regulation, Darülfünûn was to constitute the top institution within a five-tiered 
hierarchical system of schools, where education began in sıbyan mektebi (Qur’anic 
elementary school), continued respectively in rüşdiye (secondary school), idâdiye 
(middle school), sultâniye (lycée), and culminated in higher schools, such as 
Darülmuallimîn, Darülmuallimât, or schools of “different arts and industries,” 
among which Darülfünûn held the higher place (Dölen 2009, 79; Findley 1989, 134). 
The part of this regulation dealing with Darülfünûn remained in force until 1900, 
when a new regulation for the newly founded Darülfünûn-ı Şahâne entered in force 
and suspended the former. 
 Although there had been several attempts to institute a Darülfünûn prior to 
1900, all ultimately failed to institute a permanent institution. The first attempt 
initiated in 1862 and lasted until 1865 did not go beyond giving public lectures of 
introductory level by some intellectuals and bureaucrats learned in positive sciences 
to whoever wanted to listen (İhsanoğlu 2010a, 1:89–111; Dölen 2009, 64–77). The 
second attempt, called as Darülfünûn-i Osmânî and initiated after the promulgation 
of Maârif-i Umûmiye Nizâmnamesi, had begun again with public lectures in 1870 
and continued with regular courses until 1873. Unlike the first attempt, this time 
there was a permanent staff, an academic program, at least on paper, and enrolled 
students, of which the majority were from among the madrasa students. When the 
education ceased to continue in Darülfünûn-i Osmânî after 1873, no students had 
graduated yet. The exact reason why the Darülfünûn-i Osmânî had been closed is 
still ambiguous (İhsanoğlu 2010a, 1:111–135; Dölen 2009, 77–127). The third 
attempt was Darülfünûn-i Sultânî. Rather than being a separate university, 
Darülfünûn-i Sultânî consisted of three higher schools called as Mekâtib-i Âliye-i 
Sultâniye (Imperial Higher Schools) and attached to the Galatasaray Mekteb-i 
Sultânîsi (Imperial School of Galatasaray).  
Although the Darülfünûn had been envisioned after the French university 
model, which was consisted of five faculties, Darülfünûn-i Sultânî comprised three 
divisions: law, mathematical and natural sciences, and literature. The reason for the 
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absence of faculties of theology and medicine, as stated by Sava Paşa, the head of 
Darülfünûn-i Sultânî, was that the existing madrasas and schools of medicine had 
been already fulfilling the function of these faculties. So there was no need to 
institute neither a faculty of theology nor a faculty of medicine within the newly 
founded Darülfünûn. Darülfünûn-i Sultânî was the longest-lived of the three 
attempts. It offered education from 1874 to 1881. Although Darülfünûn-i Sultânî was 
closed in 1881, its two faculties, faculty of law and faculty of engineering, survived 
as two independent higher schools until they constituted two faculties of Darülfünûn-
i Şâhâne when it was founded in 1900. At the end of the century, in short, although 
the modernizing Ottoman state had established a central institution as well as a 
macro plan for regulating higher education, it had ultimately failed to permanently 
establish a proper institution for providing higher education, despite several attempts 
and founding unique institutions that are not connected within a general frame of 
higher education. 
 The Ottoman judicial ecology had undergone a homological transformation 
during the nineteenth century. Until the nineteenth century, the classical judicial 
institution in the Ottoman judicial ecology had been the sharia court. These courts 
were found in each judicial district and presided by a single judge, who heard and 
ruled the cases. If we set aside some exceptional institutions, such as Divân-ı 
Hümâyûn or cuma divanı, the sharia court was the main and standard institution 
where the judicial implementation took place. Correspondingly both classical fiqh 
texts and fatwa collections that constituted part of the Ottoman Hanafi canon,39 such 
as Dürerü’l-Ahkâm or Mültekâ’l-Ebhur, and sultans’ rulings such as kanunnâmes 
were the main written legal sources that judges consulted (Aydın 2003). In any case, 
fiqh and dynastic law did not constitute two separate legal systems, and they had 
been implemented within a single judicial organization, the backbone of which was 
the sharia court.40 
From 1839 onwards however, the Ottoman judicial ecology began to undergo 
a significant transformation. The main line of transformation was the codification of 
                                                 
39 For what I mean by “the Ottoman Hanafi canon,” see pages 52-4 of the second chapter. 
40 There were also cemaat mahkemeleri (community courts) that were organized in accordance with 
the millet system and implemented each millet’s religious law in the cases between the members of a 
millet. Another type of court that had operated within the Ottoman lands was the consular court. 
Consular courts operated thanks to the capitulations granted to the European states and had dealt with 
all type of cases between the foreigners in the Ottoman lands (Bozkurt 1996, 116). 
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a body of laws that was to constitute a holistic Ottoman law to be universally applied 
in the Ottoman lands. These new laws were to be codified either through gradual 
reception and adaptation of the Western laws or through codification of the classical 
Islamic-Ottoman law. Between 1840 and 1900, a significant amount of new laws 
were codified (Veldet 1940; Bozkurt 1996, 48–175). The years 1840 and 1851 saw 
two separate yet very similar penal codes that were to great extent codified versions 
of the traditional Ottoman penal law. These codes apparently having been deemed as 
insufficient, a new penal code was codified in 1858. This new penal code was to 
great extent an adaptation of the French Penal Code of 1810, yet it was amended 
many times later (Miller 2005). Three codes concerning commerce were also 
promulgated, respectively in 1850, 1861, and 1863. They were all codifications of 
the corresponding French codes with little adaptations, the latter having been also 
benefited from some other European codes. There were also two other important 
codes that systematized and codified the classical body of the Islamic Ottoman law in 
line with the formal requirements of the Western concept of law in the fields of land 
law and civil law: the Land Law of 1858 and the Mecelle, codified between 1869 and 
1874 (Şentop 2005, 652–59; Gayretli 2008, 87–241). At the end of the century, thus, 
a new body of codified laws that were significantly different, either in content or in 
form, from the classical Islamic-Ottoman law had emerged. This body of laws was 
neither integrated into the curriculum of madrasas, nor was it implemented in the 
classical sharia courts, except for Mecelle. Consequently, together with this line of 
transformation that gave birth to a new emerging body of laws, the foundation of 
new judicial and educational institutions that would make possible the 
implementation of the newly codified laws was inevitable.  
The classical judicial system did not cease to operate after 1839, of course, 
but it did not continue to operate as it had been operating neither. The sharia 
judiciary underwent an extensive reorganization during the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. Although the İlmiye Penal Code of 1838 or the regulations for 
naiblik in 1855 were among the earlier attempts to regulate and discipline sharia 
judiciary, its essential reorganization occurred with the implementation of the Vilayet 
Nizamnamesi (the Provincial Reform Law) from 1864 onwards. The latter “was 
intended to lay a centralized and uniform administrative system over the Empire,” 
reorganizing provincial units in a new hierarchical system (Akiba 2005, 52). Before 
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the Vilayet Nizamnamesi, the hierarchy of the sharia judiciary was different from that 
of local administration. “The law integrated the judicial institution into the provincial 
administrative system” by stipulating that “each of the administrative units would 
have one sharia court with a sharia judge appointed by the centre” (Akiba 2005, 53). 
Among other innovations the law brought about were the abolishment of the 
appointment of naibs by the judges, the introduction of the salary system to the sharia 
judiciary, and most importantly, the appointment of müffetiş-i hükkâm (inspectors of 
judges) to the center of each vilayet. “The inspector of judges would check the 
decisions of the sharia courts in the vilayet, supervise the conduct of naibs under his 
jurisdiction and at the same time hear cases at the sharia court of the provincial 
center” (Akiba 2005, 53). With all these regulations, the sharia judiciary was 
reorganized along more systematic lines and became subjected to a more strict and 
direct supervision of the central authority. Yet the absence of a strict 
proceduralization and standardization, which we attest in the Nizamiye court system 
of the period, as I will show below, still left a considerable leeway for the judges in 
the implementation of law. The scope of the provincial reform was not limited to the 
reorganization of the sharia judiciary, however. It rather envisaged a total 
transformation of the Ottoman judicial system. The establishment of the Nizamiye 
courts was at the very heart of this transformation. 
  The latter half of the nineteenth century saw also the emergence and 
expansion of new judicial institutions and unprecedented types of courts along with 
the reorganization of sharia courts. The foundation of new types of courts, which 
would culminate in the establishment of the Nizamiye court system, followed a 
roughly parallel course to the codification of the new laws, and were overseen by the 
following bureaucratic institutions: first Meclis-i Vâlâ-yı Ahkâm-ı Adliye (High 
Council of Judicial Ordinances) from 1838 on, then Divan-ı Ahkâm-ı Adliyye 
(Council of Judicial Ordinances) from 1868 on, and finally Adliye Nezareti (Ministry 
of Justice) from 1876 on. Together with the penal codes promulgated in 1840s and 
1850s, several types of judicial councils meant to deal with criminal cases, such as 
Zaptiye Meclisi (Gendarmerie Council), Divan-ı Zaptiye (High-Council of the 
Gendarmerie), and Meclis-i Tahkikat (Council of Investigations) were founded in 
Istanbul in order to implement the aforementioned penal codes (Rubin 2011, 24–5). 
New types of courts dealing with criminal cases spread all over the country in a short 
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span of time. With the foundation of these new types of courts, criminal cases were 
excluded from the jurisdiction of the sharia courts. From 1847 onwards, muhtelit 
mahkemes (mixed courts) were founded in order to address commercial cases 
between Ottoman citizens and foreigners. This was soon followed by the exclusion 
of commercial cases from the jurisdiction of the sharia courts with the Islahat 
Fermanı (Reform Edict) of 1856, short after the promulgation of a commercial code 
in 1850 (Bozkurt 1996, 116–7).  
The emergence and establishment of the Nizamiye court system is result of a 
decades-long process of institutional experimentation and innovation. Although there 
were previous developments that led to the emergence of the Nizamiye courts, as I 
highlighted some above, for the first time in 1864, the aforementioned Vilayet 
Nizamnâmesi (Provincial Reform Law) formally established a court system called 
Nizamiye in a holistic manner by delineating “a clearer judicial hierarchy with a clear 
division of labor between various judicial bodies” already established in the 
provinces (Rubin 2006, 45). Based on the institutional infrastructure provided by the 
expansion of the aforementioned councils and courts, Nizamiye courts expanded very 
rapidly. They were instituted all over the empire only three years after the 
promulgation of Vilayet Nizamnâmesi in 1864. Yet the inner organization and 
jurisdictional division of labor of the existing Nizamiye courts was still quite 
ambiguous and weakly elaborated.  
The foundation of Adliye Nezareti from 1876 onwards as the central 
institution to oversee Nizamiye courts and the promulgation of Mehâkim-i 
Nizâmiyenin Teşkilât Kanunu (Law of the Nizamiye Judicial Organization) in 1879 
constituted together the final milestone in the organizational history of the Nizamiye 
courts (Demirel 2008, 29–33). This law “divided the Nizamiye courts in Istanbul and 
the provinces into criminal, civil, and commercial jurisdictions in the most 
systematic fashion so far” and also delineated clearly different levels of judicial 
instances (Rubin 2006, 51). Subjugated to the Adliye Nezareti and consolidated with 
the law of 1879, Nizamiye courts continued to operate mainly within the framework 
constituted by this law until the end of the Ottoman Empire.41 Throughout the 
aforementioned process of establishment, in short, the Nizamiye courts gradually 
                                                 
41 For detailed information on the general structure of the functioning of the Nizamiye courts after 
1879, see Rubin 2011, 32-38. 
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expanded their jurisdiction within judicial ecology to the detriment of the sharia 
courts (Aydın 2010, 425-7). Although the necessity of improvement and reform both 
in the court system and in the legal codes had been a constant issue within the 
political agenda after 1879, no overall change of legal and judicial system occurred 
before the foundation of the Turkish Republic (Bozkurt 1996, 128–34).  
The above-described transformation in judicial ecology had its counterpart in 
higher educational ecology with the emergence and institutionalization of a new type 
of systematized body of knowledge concerning both legal content and judicial 
application, i.e. a new legal discipline, which is called Law, on the one hand, and the 
reorganization and transformation of the classical fiqh education on the other. 
Especially the latter half of the nineteenth century attested ceaseless organizational 
and intellectual competitions between these two disciplines over the turf of legal 
knowledge. They struggled both over who would define what is just/unjust as well as 
how justice should be applied and over who would dispense justice on the ground. In 
the following, I will focus on the institutional competition over providing legitimate 
legal education, of which the disciplinary competition between fiqh and law was a 
dimension. 
 The madrasa had preserved its quasi-monopoly over defining and providing 
legal education until the mid-nineteenth century. The institutional innovations from 
the mid-century onwards, which led to the emergence of new higher educational 
institutions that would rival madrasas, was directly related to the developments in the 
judicial ecology. The reorganization of sharia judiciary from 1855 onwards led to the 
foundation of Muallimhane-i Nüvvab (Training School of Judges). Muallimhane-i 
Nüvvab was the first version of a new type of higher educational institution providing 
legal education. Another type of higher educational institution for legal education 
began to be formed with the establishment of Kavanin ve Nizamat Dershanesi 
(Schoolroom for Laws and Regulations) within the Divan-ı Ahkâm-ı Adliye in order 
to raise civil servants acquainted with the knowledge of the new codes. These two 
new types of higher educational institutions, that would later transform into different 
organizational forms, along with the madrasa that had never ceased to provide legal 
education, would compete over providing legal education until 1924. Their relations 
of competition had never lacked varying degrees of coordination and communality, 
however, as we will see.  
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 The new institutional forms of legal education that emerged in the nineteenth 
century were above all vocationally oriented, in line with the general trend of 
educational reform in the period (Findley 1989, 136–7). There were mainly two 
types of new higher educational institutions providing vocational legal education. 
The first type is found in the institutional lineage from Muallimhane-i Nüvvâb to 
Medresetü’l-Kuzât whereas the institutional line from Kavanin ve Nizamat 
Dershanesi and Mekteb-i Hukuk to Darülfünun Hukuk Fakültesi constituted the 
second type. The raison d’être of both institutions was to provide the new court 
systems with qualified personnel. Thus the technical and practical side of legal 
education overshadowed the theoretical part in both types of schools. Apart from 
these similarities, however, there were significant differences between them. Their 
positions with regard to bureaucratic ecology (the former was subsidiary to the 
Meşihat whereas the latter to either the Adliye Nezareti or the Maarif Nezareti), their 
linkages to judicial ecology (the former was raising personnel for both the sharia and 
the Nizamiye courts whereas the latter exclusively for the Nizamiye courts), and the 
kind of legal discipline they grounded their legal education on (fiqh in the former and 
law in the latter) constitute the main axes of differentiation. The content of legal 
education in the madrasa had been less vocationally oriented, however.  
Although the graduates of the madrasa constituted the main human resource 
for staffing both judicial and higher educational ecologies until the mid-nineteenth 
century, the content of legal education was not designed with directly vocational 
concerns. The know-how of the profession was to be learned on the spot: although a 
madrasa graduate had learned theoretical knowledge about how to hear and judge a 
case in the court, he was to learn the practical application in a process of 
apprenticeship in the court after the graduation (Akiba 2003, 134–5). The madrasa as 
such did not constitute the appropriate type of higher educational institution for the 
bureaucratic mind of the nineteenth century that deemed the vocationally oriented 
education as the most urgent need. Thus the madrasa institution would be excluded 
from the scope of reform projects until the early twentieth century. The ultimate 
failure of Darülfünun attempts throughout the nineteenth century, especially in the 
less vocationally oriented fields such as literature or natural sciences, may also be 
due to their incongruity with this bureaucratic mentality concerning the value and 
objective of higher education. 
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 Muallimhane-i Nüvvab was opened in 1855 as part of the reforms the Meşihat 
initiated in order to centrally control and regulate the appointment and qualification 
of naibs, who had since long de facto presided over the courts as the deputies of the 
nominally appointed judges. The inability to control the appointment and the 
qualifications of naibs constituted one of the central problems the ilmiye institution 
faced throughout the eighteenth century (Akiba 2005, 44–47). Intended as part of the 
solution to this problem, the Muallimhane was founded to raise competent naibs (i.e. 
de facto judges) for the reorganized sharia courts. Thus both the content and the 
method of education were designed accordingly.  
The fiqh discipline held the central place in education, yet in a different way 
from the madrasa curriculum. As different from the latter where fiqh was taught in its 
entirety, only those parts of fiqh that were directly related to the judicial application, 
such as feraiz (inheritance law) or sakk (formulation of court documents) among 
others, constituted the content of education in the Muallimhane. Furthermore, fiqh 
was the sole core Islamic discipline that filled the curriculum of the Mualimhane, 
thus was isolated from the complementary education of other core Islamic disciplines 
such as hadith and kalam, differently from the madrasa where fiqh was taught along 
and in relation with other core Islamic disciplines.  
The method of education also constituted a novelty with regard to the 
madrasa education. The latter was essentially based on the methods of rote 
memorization, recitation, and disputation. In the Muallimhane, however, the method 
of practical training was at the center. After instructing the students with necessary 
theoretical knowledge, the teacher “would give exercises by providing students with 
legal cases, following which students would prepare the required legal documents by 
applying” the theoretical knowledge they had learned (Akiba 2003, 134). Overall, as 
Akiba succinctly formulates, “the education program followed at the Naibs’ college 
can be considered to have been a combination of the higher level medrese education 
with the practical training of the courts” (Akiba 2003, 135).  
Founded in a period when the challenges brought about by the codification of 
the new laws as well as by the foundation of a new court system were yet to be 
seriously faced and the parallel constriction of the jurisdiction of the Meşihat in favor 
of the Meclis-i Vâlâ-yı Ahkâm-ı Adliyye (later Divan-ı Ahkam-ı Adliyye, and then 
Adliye Nezareti) in higher educational and judicial ecologies had not yet significantly 
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advanced, the Muallimhane was an institution founded to deal with the internal needs 
and problems of the classical educational and judicial systems, which the ilmiye 
corps had failed to solve until then. Thus it was basically rooted in the tradition of the 
classical madrasa and court system. The novelties it brought about were basically due 
to its vocationally oriented character in order to meet the increasingly centralizing 
thrust of the Meşihat, which it shared with other bureaucratic institutions of the 
period, in organizing the judicial system and raising its personnel. As the century 
pass by, however, the challenges and pressures posed by the increasing jurisdiction 
of the rival bureaucratic institutions in higher educational and judicial ecologies 
would constitute the main factors that condition the later formations of the 
Muallimhane. 
 Until 1870, the Muallimhane remained unchallenged as a higher educational 
institution providing vocational legal education in order to raise personnel for the 
court system. Following the codification of new laws and the proliferation of new 
councils that had served as proto-courts dealing with judicial cases from the 1850s 
on, Kavanin ve Nizamat Dershanesi (Classroom for Laws and Regulations) was 
founded in 1870 in order to raise officials acquainted with the new codes (kanun-
âşina) (Yörük 2008, 19). With the foundation of the Dershane, a new type of higher 
educational institution for legal education began to emerge. The Dershane was not a 
higher educational institution proper; it was rather a chamber constituted within the 
Divan-ı Ahkam-ı Adliyye. What makes it the embryo of the later law schools is the 
unprecedented type of legal education it aimed to convey. The content of this legal 
education consisted of the knowledge of the new laws, which were codified 
according to the legal methodology adopted from the Continental law. Usûl-i 
kavânîn (methodology of laws), kavânîn (laws), and nizâmât (regulations) were the 
main topics that were to be taught according to the first draft of the project. Fiqh was 
introduced in the program insofar as it was codified: Mecelle, the Penal Law, and the 
Land Law were among the subjects (Yörük 2008, 20).  
Deeming necessary the foundation of a proper school for serious vocational 
legal education based on law, the Divan-ı Ahkam-ı Adliyye thought of the Dershane 
as a provisory solution (Yörük 2008, 19). As a matter of fact, the foundation of a 
higher law school did not take long. Mekteb-i Hukuk-i Sultanî (Imperial Law School) 
was founded in 1874 as part of the Darülfünun-i Sultani, which had consisted of 
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three higher schools (mekâtib-i âliye) affiliated with the Mekteb-i Sultanî (see pages 
79-80 above). As different from the Dershane, the education in the Mekteb-i Hukuk-i 
Sultani was not exclusive to the officials and the scope of education was more 
expanded. The subjects in Roman and European laws were introduced in the 
curriculum along with the new Ottoman codes. As for the fiqh, the only difference 
from the curriculum of the Dershane was the introduction of a subject on usûl-i fıkıh 
(methodology of fiqh), thanks to the personal initiative of Sava Paşa, the head of the 
Darülfünûn-i Sultanî. The most salient characteristics of the Mekteb-i Hukuk-i 
Sultani were the dominance of French as the language of education and the 
dominance of the foreigner and non-Muslim professors in the academic staff as well 
as among the students (İhsanoğlu 2010a, 1:147–52). Although the main objective of 
the school was to raise informed jurists necessary for the judicial organization, as 
stated in the regulation, Mekteb-i Hukuk-i Sultani had not produced much of 
graduates until its final year of education in 1881 (Yörük 2008, 25; İhsanoğlu 2010a, 
1:152–3). The total number of thirteen students it graduated did not ultimately pose 
an actual challenge for the Muallimhane, which “produced about ten to eleven 
graduates every year between 1857 and 1873,” in terms of neither student admission 
nor job placement within judicial organization.  
Nevertheless, the Meşihat met the challenge posed by these initial attempts to 
institutionalize another type of legal education outside of the Meşihat’s jurisdiction 
with a reorganization of the Muallimhane through new regulations in 1873. The 
regulations stipulated the establishment of a new curriculum as well as a system of 
grades and of promotion through examinations, which constituted significant 
novelties with regard to the madrasa tradition (Akiba 2003, 138–40). The most 
salient change in the curriculum was the introduction of the Mecelle along with the 
two main textbooks by then used in the Muallimhane, namely Mülteka and Dürer, 
two classical fiqh books that had been widely read in the Ottoman madrasas (Akiba 
2003, 143–6). As different from the Mülteka and Dürer, which constituted strong 
linkages between the education in Muallimhane and the madrasa tradition, the 
Mecelle linked the legal education in the Muallimhane with the judicial practice in 
the Nizamiye courts as the Mecelle was compiled “to be applied not only in the 
Sharia courts, but especially in the Nizamiye courts, which had been active since 
1864” (Akiba 2003, 146). The aforementioned attempts to institutionalize another 
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type of legal education, which would constitute an alternative, if not a threat at this 
point, for the Muallimhane, were the main impetus behind the Meşihat’s decision to 
reorganize the Muallimhane. Further reorganization of the Muallimhane would be in 
order as concerted attempts by the Adliye Nezareti and Maarif Nezareti to institute an 
alternative legal education would continue.  
 The opening of Mekteb-i Hukuk under the Adliye Nezareti in 1880 marked 
both the end of the aforementioned earlier experiments and the beginning of a stable 
higher educational institution for providing vocational legal education outside of the 
jurisdiction of the Meşihat. Mekteb-i Hukuk had been envisaged as the law faculty of 
the future Darülfünûn-i Şahane and would be incorporated into the latter after it was 
founded in 1900 (İhsanoğlu 2010a, 1:153). Although the statements of Ahmed 
Cevdet Paşa, then the Minister of Justice, foresaw that the fiqh would be central to 
the education program in the Mekteb-i Hukuk, as different from the Mekteb-i Hukuk-i 
Sultani, the actual configuration of the curriculum was more in line with the vision of 
the Grand Vizier Said Paşa who foresaw that the curriculum of the school would be 
accorded with the European counterparts (Yörük 2008, 36, 42).  
The knowledge of law, i.e. the new codes of the Empire as well as parts of the 
Continental Law, was definitely central to the program. As different from the 
Mekteb-i Hukuk-i Sultani, subjects more in line with “the European counterparts” 
such as hikmet-i hukuk (legal philosophy) and medhal-i ilm-i hukuk (introduction to 
law) were introduced whereas usûl-i fıkıh was excluded. The education of fiqh 
knowledge was mainly restricted to its codified versions: Mecelle, the Penal Law, 
and the Land Law (Yörük 2008, 73). Providing a legal education essentially based on 
the knowledge of law and aimed at raising judicial personnel (judges, prosecutors, 
attorneys, and so on) for the Nizamiye courts, the Mekteb-i Hukuk remained the 
central institution of this type until it would be incorporated into the Darülfünun in 
1909 as its faculty of law (İhsanoğlu 2010b, 2:650).  
 Two developments that accompanied the foundation of the Mekteb-i Hukuk 
made the latter a serious rival for the Muallimhane: The ultimate establishment of the 
Nizamiye courts in the 1879 and the stipulation in the regulation of the Mekteb-i 
Hukuk that the employment in the Nizamiye courts as well as the right to the 
attorneyship would be exclusive to the Mekteb-i Hukuk graduates (Yörük 2008, 208–
9). Since the Nizamiye courts significantly restricted the jurisdiction of the sharia 
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courts within the judicial system on the one hand, and functioned according to the 
new codified laws on the other, their establishment threatened the Muallimhane with 
becoming partly dysfunctional within the new judicial system as the legal education 
it provided would be no more adequate for the employment in the Nizamiye courts, 
which would henceforth constitute the large part of the judicial system. Although the 
stipulation that excluded all but the Mekteb-i Hukuk gradutes from assuming office in 
the Nizamiye courts had never been fully implemented, its very existence in the 
regulation was enough of a threat for the Muallimhane (Yörük 2008, 164). In 
addition to these challenges, the fact that “the Sharia judge was at the same time 
presiding over the Nizamiye court” made it indispensable for the students of the 
Muallimhane, who were the prospective Sharia judges, “to have knowledge of the 
new law and court procedure in order to keep hold of their positions in the Nizamiye 
courts” (Akiba 2003, 146). Aware of the challenges the Adliye Nezareti had posed 
for its jurisdiction by expanding its control over locations in both the judicial system 
and the legal education, the Meşihat counteracted with promulgation of new 
regulations for the Muallimhane in 1883. 
 The most striking novelty in the regulations of 1883 was the name change. 
The Muallimhane-i Nüvvab was renamed as Mekteb-i Nüvvab, seemingly to rank it 
with the post-Tanzimat higher schools such as Mekteb-i Mülkiye, Mekteb-i Tıbbiye, 
and especially Mekteb-i Hukuk, which came to receive a share from both the 
organizational and intellectual turfs the Muallimhane had hitherto controlled (Akiba 
2003, 140–41). The name change also implied a self-differentiation from the 
madrasa, which was further undergirded by the organizational and curricular changes 
introduced with the same regulations. A more systematic and modern grade system 
was introduced along with the expansion of the student quota and the enlargement of 
the school building, which were meant to increase the competitiveness of the school 
with the Mekteb-i Hukuk that seemed to assume increasingly more symbolic power 
in defining legitimate legal education (Akiba 2003, 142). Although the curricular 
change was redesigned to convey to the students the knowledge they would be in 
need of upon assuming a judgeship position both in the Sharia and Nizamiye courts, 
the school did not gave up from its fiqh-centred curriculum. “While the 1874 
regulations only mentioned the Mecelle as one of the subjects with no further detail, 
the curriculum introduced with the 1883 regulations” was more precise in 
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determining the amount of time and the method with which the Mecelle should be 
taught (Akiba 2003, 146–7). The lessons on fatwa collections, composition, 
orthography, and calligraphy, which were directly related to the judicial practice in 
the courts, strengthened further the vocational character of the school. All these 
changes the Muallimhane (henceforth Mekteb) underwent notwithstanding, it is 
important to notice that the Mekteb-i Nüvvab still stood firm in excluding from its 
curriculum any legal knowledge outside the realm of fiqh.  
 The final institutional achievement of importance concerning legal education 
in the Long Tanzimat period was the establishment of Darülfünûn-ı Şahane in 1900, 
this time as a permanent higher educational institution. Following the French 
university model, the new Darülfünûn was designed to consist of five faculties. The 
already established Mekteb-i Hukuk and Mekteb-i Tıbbiye were to constitute faculties 
of law and of medicine of the new Darülfünûn. The other three faculties were the 
faculties of literature, of mathematical and natural sciences, and of religious sciences. 
The striking novelty here with regard to the earlier Darülfünûn attempts was the 
introduction of a faculty for religious sciences within the body of the Darülfünun 
(İhsanoğlu 2010a, 1:189–96). Both the fiqh and the methodology of fiqh were among 
the subjects taught in the faculty of religious sciences along with the other Islamic 
sciences such as tafseer, hadith, and kalam. The curriculum was mainly modeled 
after that of the madrasa, except for the subject on tarih-i din-i İslam (history of the 
religion of Islam), and the professors were from among the madrasa scholars 
(İhsanoğlu 2010b, 2:613–5). As I have mentioned before, the initiators of the earlier 
attempts of Darülfünun had abstained from establishing a faculty of religious 
sciences for the expressed reason that the madrasas had been already fulfilling the 
function a faculty of religious sciences would serve.  
Given that the madrasas were not abolished in 1900, the decision of the 
Maarif Nezareti to establish a faculty of religious sciences within the Darülfünun 
implied at least two things. First, it implicitly argued that the madrasas were no 
longer fulfilling the function of instructing and producing the knowledge of religious 
sciences, thus a new institution to fulfill this function was required. Second, the 
Maarif Nezareti had the intention to expand its jurisdiction within the higher 
educational ecology in a way to control the education of religious sciences too. This 
move was in parallel with the Adliye Nezareti’s earlier expansion of its jurisdiction in 
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the judicial ecology to the detriment of the Meşihat. Consequently, with the 
foundation of a faculty of religious sciences within the Darülfünûn, the madrasa 
institution faced the challenge of losing its only remaining monopoly within the 
higher educational ecology, namely higher education of religious sciences. The 
education of the fiqh discipline in its entirety in a scholarly rather than vocational 
way was part of this monopoly.  
Although there were several attempts by the Maarif Nezareti to institute a 
Darülfünûn during the Long Tanzimat period, no corresponding attempt to reform or 
reorganize the madrasa institution was initiated by the Meşihat (Sarıkaya 1997, 79–
81, 86–88). It was mainly due to the fact that the earlier attempts of Darülfünun had 
not included a faculty of religious sciences, thus had not posed a direct challenge to 
the monopoly of the madrasa on this subject. The Meşihat had directed all of its 
effort and energy to face the challenges posed to its jurisdiction in the fields of 
judicial practice and vocational legal education. The foundation of the Darülfünun-ı 
Şahane in 1900 with a faculty of religious sciences within its body, however, posed a 
direct challenge for the monopoly of the madrasa over higher education of the 
religious sciences and triggered serious attempts of reform and reorganization that 
would follow. The years between 1908 and 1924 would witness a fierce competition 
between the two institutions and corresponding positions over defining and providing 
the legitimate education of the religious sciences, among which the fiqh occupied a 
central place. 
4.4. The Meşrutiyet Period: The Acceleration of Competition in Higher 
Educational Ecology and of the Disciplinary Transformation of the Ottoman 
Legal Education 
To clarify the scene at the eve of the Meşrutiyet period, we should reemphasize first 
the distinction between two main types of legal education practiced in the 
aforementioned higher educational institutions. The first type was vocational legal 
education. The main objective of this type of legal education was to train well-
informed and qualified personnel for the judicial system. The main efforts of reform 
and much of the competition pertaining to the legal education throughout the Long 
Tanzimat period were made over this type of legal education, in line with the general 
vocational character of the reforms pertaining to higher education in the period. The 
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vocational legal education had two main institutional ramifications: the 
Muallimhane-i Nüvvab/Mekteb-i Nüvvab and the Mekteb-i Hukuk. The main 
difference between the two, as mentioned above, was that the education in the former 
was mainly based on the fiqh discipline whereas in the latter it was mainly based on 
the law discipline. There was another type of legal education, however, which did 
not attract significant neither attention nor effort of reform, at least overtly, during 
the Long Tanzimat period. We may call this type scholarly legal education. Scholarly 
legal education is different from vocational legal education as it is designed to teach 
a legal discipline in its entirety without a dominant concern oriented to the judicial 
practice and within its relations with other core disciplines of a knowledge system, in 
which the legal discipline of concern were formed and developed. The classical place 
of scholarly legal education in the Ottoman higher educational ecology was within 
the cultural space of madrasa system. The legal education that had been provided in 
the madrasa was of scholarly type. Although the graduates of the madrasa were 
employed in the judicial ecology, the content of legal education in the madrasa was 
not specifically designed for vocational needs of the judicial ecology. The essentials 
of vocational know-how were to be acquired in a process of apprenticeship training 
within the judicial ecology itself. Neither the type nor the content of the madrasa’s 
legal education were significantly changed during the Long Tanzimat period. With 
the foundation of the faculty of religious sciences within the Darülfünun, a rival 
institution for the madrasa in providing scholarly legal education emerged. While the 
competition over vocational legal education would continue in the Meşrutiyet period, 
scholarly legal education would also be subject to increasing competition and efforts 
of reform. 
 The legal education in the Mekteb-i Nüvvab had remained essentially based 
on fiqh until 1908, when the Meşihat had decided to undertake a serious 
reorganization of the curriculum. The judicial reforms the Ottoman government was 
undertaking in the Macedonian provinces in 1907, among which was “the 
establishment of a law school in Salonica, so that only its graduates could fill the 
judicial posts (in the Nizamiye courts) in the region” (Akiba 2003, 149), and the 
establishment of two other law schools in Bagdad and Konya alarmed the Meşihat of 
the expansion of the legal education à la Mekteb-i Hukuk and provided the necessary 
impetus to undertake an overall curricular change (Yörük 2014, 108). Following two 
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reports by a committee within the Meşihat that had “openly admitted the inadequacy 
of the college’s education” for the implementation of law in the Nizamiye courts and 
“advocated the addition to its curriculum of the subjects taught in the Law School in 
Istanbul”, a wide-ranging revision of the Mekteb-i Nüvvab’s curriculum took place 
(Akiba 2003, 149).  
A significant majority of the subjects taught in the Mekteb-i Hukuk were 
added to the curriculum: kanun-ı arazi (land law), teşkil-i mehâkim ve usûl-i 
muhakeme-i hukukiye (court system and civil legal procedure), icra kanunu 
(enforcement law), teşkil-i mehâkim ve usûl-i muhakeme-i cezaiye (court system and 
criminal legal procedure), kanun-ı ceza (penal law), ticaret-i berriye (commercial 
law), ticaret-i bahriye (maritime commercial law), tanzim-i ilamât-ı hukukiye 
(judicial decree of the civil court), tanzim-i ilamât-ı cezaiye (judicial decree of the 
criminal court), and hukuk-ı düvel (international law) (Akiba 2003, 150; Yörük 2014, 
109).  
This curricular change was oriented to the vocational goal expressed in the 
first two articles of a regulation draft prepared by the Meşihat in 1909. This draft 
would be enacted with important changes in 1914 as the Medresetü’l-Kuzât 
Nizamnamesi (Regulation for the Madrasa of Judges). The second article of the draft 
stipulated that as the graduates of the Mekteb-i Kuzât42 would acquire necessary 
knowledge of both the fiqh and the law (malumat-ı mukteziye-i şer’iye ve hukukiye) 
with the new curriculum, they should enjoy all prerogatives that the graduates of the 
Mekteb-i Hukuk enjoyed, thus implicitly demanded for the equality of opportunity in 
legal terms between the aforementioned groups for employment in the Nizamiye 
courts. Negotiated at length between the main collective bureaucratic actors related 
with the higher educational and judicial ecologies, i.e. Adliye Nezareti, the Maarif 
Nezareti as well as the Mekteb-i Hukuk, the proposal of the Meşihat was denied and 
the aforementioned stipulations did not enter into the final regulation of 1914 in spite 
of the favorable opinion expressed by the Committee of Professors of the Mekteb-i 
Hukuk (Yörük 2014, 111–16).  
The fact that the professors and officials of the Mekteb-i Hukuk were of one 
mind with the Meşihat on this matter, thus implicitly on the legitimate legal 
                                                 
42 The school had been named as Mekteb-i Kuzât in official documents from 1908 to 1913, when it 
was first called Medresetü’l-Kuzât (Akiba 2003, 153). 
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education one should have acquired in order to be employed in the Nizamiye courts, 
implies that the decision was made less with educational concerns than bureaucratic-
political concerns reflecting the competition between the Meşihat on one hand, and 
the Adliye Nezareti and Maarif Nezareti on the other, over the control of employment 
in the Nizamiye courts. Although the regulation of 1914 was ineffective in achieving 
the aforementioned prerogatives for the graduates of the Medresetü’l-Kuzât (now the 
new name of the Mekteb-i Nüvvab/Kuzât), it introduced further subjects in the 
curriculum that were mainly related to the judicial implementation both in the sharia 
and the Nizamiye courts. No significant change had occurred either in the curriculum 
or in the general organization of the school until its final abolition with the Tevhid-i 
Tedrisat Kanunu (the Law of the Unification of Education) in 1924. 
 As of 1914, the significant convergence that had been achieved between the 
two types of vocational legal education was reflected in the Medresetü’l-Kudât’s and 
the Mekteb-i Hukuk’s respective curricula. The overall structure of the Mekteb-i 
Hukuk’s curriculum had already achieved a pretty stable character at the eve of the 
twentieth century (Yörük 2008, 87–92). Once the Mekteb-i Hukuk achieved a firmer 
institutional existence by officially becoming the law faculty of the Darülfünun in 
1909, its curriculum achieved its general disciplinary structure that would remain 
without major changes until the abolition of the Medresetü’l-Kuzât (İhsanoğlu 2010b, 
2:650–52, 673–76).  
Along with the subjects on all main aspects of the law discipline, in 
parallelity with the judicial implementation of course, fiqh also had a significant 
presence in the curriculum, as it had constituted a part of the law implemented in the 
Nizamiye courts, especially in its civil sections. After the major changes in 1908 and 
1914, the disciplinary structure of the Medresetü’l-Kuzât’s curriculum got 
increasingly closer to that of the faculty of law in providing legal education 
pertaining to the law discipline. All of the core subjects of both the fiqh discipline 
and the law discipline were included in the curriculum. The Darülfünun law faculty’s 
1913 curriculum and the Medresetü’l-Kuzât’s 1914 curriculum included common 
subjects in the following fields: Mecelle, sakk, ferâiz (fiqh of inheritance), kanun-ı 
ceza, subjects on hukuk-ı düvel, kanun-ı arazi, subjects on us’ul-i muhakemât, 
ticaret-i berriye ve bahriye, hukuk-ı idare (administrative law), and iktisad 
(economy) (İhsanoğlu 2010b, 2:650; Yörük 2014, 117–19).  
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Of the twenty subjects included in the Darülfünun law faculty’s curriculum of 
1913, only four did not have a counterpart in the Medresetü’l-Kuzât’s: İcra 
(enforcement law), uhûd-ı atîka (history of international law43), hukuk-ı esasiye 
(constutional law), and usûl-i fıkıh. All other subjects had direct or close equivalents. 
The presence of usûl-i fıkıh seems contradictory with the vocational and law-centred 
character of the Darülfünun law faculty. Yet the main objective in teaching usûl-i 
fıkıh was not gaining excellence in this subdiscipline of fiqh, but to ease the 
understanding of the Mecelle by the students, who were expected to master the 
Mecelle as the prospective judges, prosecutors, or attorneys in the Nizamiye courts. 
Thus, the introduction of usûl-i fıkıh in the Darülfünun law faculty’s curriculum was, 
in the last analysis, vocationally oriented.  
Since the Medresetü’l-Kuzât’s students had already gained a certain level of 
achievement in usûl-i fıkıh in their madrasa education, its introduction into the 
curriculum may had been considered unnecessary. On the other side, ten of the 
twenty-two subjects that were included in the Medresetü’l-Kuzât’s curriculum had 
not a counterpart in the Darülfünun law faculty’s curriculum. Much of these subjects 
were related to fiqh and its judicial application, such as Dürer, ahkâm ve nizâmât-ı 
evkâf (fiqh of foundations), tatbikat-ı şer’iyye (judicial applications of sharia), defter-
i kassâm, hüsn-i hatt-ı talik (calligraphy of talik), and so on. There were also four 
courses related to the law and its judicial practice: medhal-i ilm-i hukuk (introduction 
to the discipline of law), tatbikat-ı hukukiye (judicial applications of law), tanzim-i 
ilâmât-ı hukukiye (judicial decree of the civil court), and tanzim-i ilâmât-ı cezaiye 
(judicial decree of the criminal court). The most decisive difference from the 
Darülfünun law faculty was the presence of the Dürer. Dürer is a classical fiqh text 
that had been taught in the Ottoman madrasas for centuries and covered almost all 
aspects of the fiqh discipline. Only the part of nikah from the classical fiqh, which is 
related to the fiqh of marriage, was taught in the Darülfünun law faculty.  
These differences notwithstanding, the congruence between the disciplinary 
structures of the two types of vocational legal education, especially with regard to the 
knowledge of law and its application had achieved an unprecedented level as of 1914 
and remained as such until the abolition of the Medresetü’l-Kudât. The fact that the 
students of the Medresetü’l-Kuzât were transferred to the Darülfünun law faculty, 
                                                 
43 Uhûd-ı atîka literally means ancient periods. As this subject is included within the set of subjects on 
hukuk-ı düvel, I translated it as “history of international law”. 
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when the former was abolished in 1924, and they completed their education without 
facing significant difficulty or curricular conflict, well reflects the aforementioned 
convergence between the two types of vocational legal education (Yörük 2014, 121–
22).44 The convergence between the two institutions was not limited to the 
curriculum, however. The physical settings of the Mekteb-i Nüvvab were also to be 
rearranged from 1908 onwards in a way to “acquire the physical appearance similar 
to other new-style schools” (Akiba 2003, 150). Thus, the Medresetü’l-Kuzât had 
been reshaped not only in curricular terms but also in physical terms in a way to be 
more similar than ever to the institutional line of Mekteb-i Hukuk-Darülfünun law 
faculty. The main difference the Medresetü’l-Kuzât maintained with regard to the 
latter was the vocational education it provided for the judicial application in the 
sharia courts as well as the name it preferred.45 
 There had been no significant development during the Long Tanzimat period 
to reorganize or reform the scholarly type of legal education. As the sole institution 
that had been providing scholarly legal education in the Ottoman higher educational 
ecology, the madrasa had been long neglected and excluded from the scope of 
comprehensive educational reforms (Sarıkaya 1997, 79–81, 86–88). Any scholarly 
legal education that aimed at teaching the law discipline independently from 
vocational concerns had also not been initiated. This neglect of scholarly legal 
education was congruent with the general vocational character of the educational 
reforms in the Long Tanzimat period as well as with the conception of maarif that 
had valued the practically oriented knowledge, which was more convenient to satisfy 
the perceived immediate needs of the state, over theoretical/scholarly knowledge. It 
was first with the foundation of the faculty of religious sciences within the 
Darülfünun that a scholarly type of legal education was envisaged within the 
jurisdiction of the Maarif Nezareti. This development would trigger a serious 
reorganization of the scholarly legal education that had been provided in the madrasa 
system. 
 The permanent institution of the Darülfünun in 1900 may have been a less 
serious threat for the madrasa had it not included a faculty of religious sciences 
                                                 
44 The case of Rizeli Kasım Efendi is exceptionally well-documented and studied (Yörük 2014, 121–
30). 
45 According to Akiba, the rechoice of the term medrese after mekteb in the school’s name was related 
to the context of madrasa reform and rise of Islamism as an ideopolitical position (2003, 153–5). 
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(ulûm-ı diniyye şubesi), which had been absent in the previous attempts by virtue of 
the fact that the madrasa was considered for the Ottoman Darülfünun as the 
counterpart of the faculty of theology in the French university system, after which 
the Darülfünun was modeled. Although the introduction of the education of religious 
sciences into a new institutional model of higher education quite different from that 
of the madrasa was brand new for the Ottoman higher educational ecology, the 
organization of the first curriculum of the faculty of religious sciences was almost a 
copy of the madrasa curriculum.  
The only subject different from the madrasa program was tarih-i din-i İslam 
(History of the religion of Islam); the other subjects were the core disciplines of 
Islamic sciences that had been taught in the madrasa system: fiqh, hadith, tafseer, and 
kalam (İhsanoğlu 2010b, 2:614; Dölen 2009, 276, 283). The revised curriculum in 
1908 included only two additional subjects: tarih-i umumî (general history) and usûl-
i tedris (methodology of teaching) (İhsanoğlu 2010b, 2:616). Although these changes 
were minor, they signaled the future more reformist changes in the curriculum. The 
regulation on the academic organization of the İstanbul Darülfünûnu, now new name 
of the Darülfünûn, promulgated in 1913, changed the name of the faculty of religious 
sciences from ulûm-ı diniyye şubesi to ulûm-ı şer’iyye şubesi (İhsanoğlu 2010b, 
2:617).  
Although this name change prima facie implied a narrowing of the 
curriculum, the reality was the opposite. More innovative from its precedents, the 
1913 curriculum consisted of five sets of subjects. Most of the subjects included in 
the sets of tafseer and hadith, of fiqh, and of kalam had their counterparts in the 
madrasa curriculum, yet there were new subjects too. Much of the subjects in the sets 
of philosophy and of ilm-i ahlak-ı şer’iyye (moral science of sharia) and siyer (life 
story of the prophet of Islam) were new with regard to the classical curriculum. If we 
look closer to the set of fiqh, as it directly concerns us here, the subject of tarih-i ilm-
i fıkh (history of the fiqh discipline) shines out as the most distinct subject from the 
madrasa curriculum. With this new subject, a new subdiscipline within the fiqh 
discipline that takes the fiqh itself as an object of investigation with the perspective 
of a different discipline (that of history) emerged, most probably for the first time in 
the history of the fiqh discipline (Erdem 2005; Erdem 2003, 17–39; Furat 2009).  
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There were two other subjects within the set of fiqh that had been absent, at 
least as distinct subjects, in the previous curricula: ilm-i hilaf (science of 
disagreement in fiqh) and hikmet-i teşri (philosophy of legislation). These subjects 
were emphasized in the curriculum, as they were put as distinct subjects from the 
subjects of fiqh and methodology of fiqh, differently from the previous curricula. 
The common point of the two subjects was that they were related more to the 
intellectual mentality behind the body of ahkâm (ordinances) that the fiqh discipline 
produces than to the body of ahkâm themselves.  
Overall, the 1913 curriculum reflected two new and quite radical judgments 
by the bureaucratic mind that designed it, ultimately embodied in the Maarif 
Nezareti. The first judgment was related to the education of religious sciences in 
general. The introduction of a plethora of subjects both on philosophy and on history 
implied that the education of religious sciences could no longer be exclusive to the 
core disciplines of the Islamic sciences; the latter should be supported by other 
disciplines, mainly philosophy and history. This vision would be reflected in all later 
curricula of religious sciences, whether in the Darülfünun or in the madrasa. The 
second judgment was related to the fiqh discipline in particular. Three new subjects 
that were introduced distinctly from the subjects of fiqh and methodology of fiqh 
implied that the classical body of knowledge that constituted the content of the fiqh 
discipline as it had been taught in the madrasa should be revised through re-
examining the discipline’s history, its marginalized subjects and disputed areas, and 
the intellectual mentality that underlay it. Both of the two judgments, and the visions 
of education they imply, had been among the hot topics debated by the scholars and 
intellectuals during the Meşrutiyet period and increasingly became truisms for most 
of the parties (Bein 2011, 35–76). 
 The curricular reforms in Darülfünûn’s faculty of religious sciences were 
spontaneous with the fervent debates about the necessity of institutional and 
curricular reorganization of madrasas, which had considerably increased in density 
after 1908 (Bein 2011, 51–6). Both the debates and the resulting regulations were 
accelerated by the foundation of the faculty of religious sciences within the 
Darülfünûn and by the curricular revisions undertaken there. Islah-ı Medaris 
Nizamnamesi (Regulation for the Reform of the Madrasas), promulgated by the 
Meşihat in 1914 after long debates, marked a watershed in the history of the 
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madrasas. Including an ambitious reform program, the regulation reorganized the 
madrasas under a more strictly centralized system than ever. All of the madrasas in 
Istanbul were reorganized “into a unified three-tiered system named the Abode of the 
Caliphate (Dâr’ül-Hilafet’il-Aliyye Medresesi)” (Bein 2011, 61). Accepting the 
graduates of the primary schools, the reformed system consisted mainly of two parts: 
Medrese-i Tâliye (the Secondary Madrasa), which was again divided into two 
periods of study of four years, and Medrese-i Âliye (the Higher Madrasa). Finally, 
Medresetü’l-Mütehassısîn (the Madrasa of Specialists) was conceived as the top 
institution of higher education for the religious sciences (Sarıkaya 1997, 147–52). As 
Bein rightly points out, “the new system was modeled on the state school system, 
which was divided into primary and secondary schools, higher schools of learning, 
and a university at the top” (Bein 2011, 61). As in the case of the Medresetü’l-Kuzât, 
the madrasa reform also aimed at rearrangement of the physical structures of the 
madrasas in line with the new schools as well (Bein 2011, 62).  
 The curriculum that the regulation of 1914 designed for the higher part of the 
madrasa education (kısm-ı âlî) was equally innovative with, if not more than, the 
faculty of religious sciences of Darülfünun. It introduced tarih-i ilm-i kelam (history 
of the kalam discipline), Arabic literature and philosophy along with the core 
disciplines of Islamic sciences. As for legal education, it introduced tarih-i ilm-i fıkh, 
hilâfiyât (disagreements in fiqh), and most importantly a subject on law and 
regulations (hukuk/kavânin) along with the classical subjects of fiqh and 
methodology of fiqh (Sarıkaya 1997, 151). Given that the madrasa had not aimed at 
raising personnel for the judicial system, the introduction of a subject on the law 
discipline, which was absent even in the faculty of religious sciences, is quite 
interesting. The curriculum designed for higher madrasas implied that the Meşihat 
implicitly shared the aforementioned judgment with the Maarif Nezareti that the 
education of religious sciences could no longer be exclusive to the core disciplines of 
the Islamic sciences.  
The curriculum designed for the fiqh section of the Medresetü’l-Mütehassısîn 
constituted a further step in applying the revisionist vision of fiqh education, which 
was first reflected in the aforementioned 1913 curriculum of the faculty of religious 
sciences. The most salient change was that the subjects on Maliki, Shafi’i, and 
Hanbali fiqh were introduced into the curriculum along with the Hanafi fiqh. As we 
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have mentioned in the second chapter, the Hanafi madhhab had dominated both fiqh 
education and practice throughout the Ottoman history. Thus with this curriculum, 
three major madhhabs of fiqh other than the Hanafi madhhab were officially taught 
as part of the legal education in a higher educational institution. Along with the 
subjects of tarih-i ilm-i fıkh and hilâfiyât, there was another subject distinct from the 
Darülfünûn curriculum: mukâyese-i ahkâm (comparison of ordinances in fiqh). It is 
clear from this curriculum that the main objective of scholarly legal education based 
on fiqh, in its higher level, was no longer the transmission of a systematic body of 
knowledge accumulated within the Hanafi madhhab tradition through certain 
classical texts. It was rather a revision of the fiqh discipline as a whole through 
delving into the hitherto neglected areas and issues. All in all, one can easily state 
that the disciplinary structure of scholarly legal education offered in the Darülfünun 
and the higher madrasa in 1914 had far more commonalities than differences. 
4.5. The First World War Years and The Foundation of the Turkish Republic: 
The Forced End of Both the Competition in Higher Educational Ecology and 
the Disciplinary Transformation of Legal Education 
The counteraction of the Meşihat to the foundation of a faculty of religious sciences 
within the Darülfünun by the madrasa reform yielded fruits in the short run. As the 
madrasa assumed its reformed structure, the Darülfünun’s faculty of religious 
sciences was considered to be non-functional and abolished (Aynî 2007, 49). The 
students of the faculty of religious sciences were transferred to the higher madrasas. 
The education of religious sciences would enter into the Darülfünun again when the 
madrasas were wholesale abolished in 1924. Until then, the madrasa system 
continued its monopoly over providing higher religious education, and scholarly 
legal education, after a short period of sharing its jurisdiction with the Darülfünun. 
Although the promulgation of the Islah-ı Medaris Nizamnamesi and the partial 
implementation of reforms had enabled the Meşihat to regain its jurisdiction, the 
reforms envisioned by the regulation could not be implemented due to the warfare 
conditions that followed the initiation of the reform program. A great part of the 
madrasa students as well as many professors were recruited and died in the 
battlefront during the World War I (Yörük 2014, 57-8). From the beginning of the 
war onwards, total number of the madrasa students had decreased to the half 
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(Sarıkaya 1997, 152). Furthermore, “the number of enrolled students during the long 
war years plunged to about a third of the figures projected in the reform legislation of 
1914” (Bein 2011, 65). The unwillingness of the state to finance the madrasa reform, 
which had been a constant matter of grievance among the reform-minded scholars, 
had transformed into a de facto absence during the war years (Sarıkaya 1997, 136–8, 
154). Although a new attempt to reform the madrasas, which did not introduce major 
changes, was initiated in 1917, it ultimately “failed to clear the air of negativity and 
sense of failure that increasingly hung over the medreses by the end of the Great 
War” (Bein 2011, 67).  
The first article of Medaris-i İlmiye Hakkında Kanun (Law of the Madrasas), 
promulgated in 1917, reflected well how insecure and fragile was the Meşihat’s 
perception of its own jurisdiction within the higher educational ecology in these 
years. Following a law promulgated two weeks ago, which stipulated the 
subordination of all sharia courts to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, the 
first article of the Medaris-i İlmiye Hakkında Kanun stipulated that “all madrasas in 
the Ottoman lands were subsidiary to the office of Meşihat and the right to establish 
a new madrasa belonged to the Meşihat” (Yörük 2014, 53). Although this article was 
no more than a statement of the obvious for the time, the Meşihat’s concern over a 
coming challenge to its jurisdiction over the madrasas and need to strengthen the 
latter by an article, was certainly not unfounded. The homological processes of 
transformation the judicial and higher educational ecologies had underwent until 
then, as I tried to show so far, must have been alarmed the Meşihat of a possible 
decision to come subordinating the madrasas to the Maarif Nezareti.   
 The main impetus behind the madrasa reform, which was on the front burner 
after 1908 and implemented from 1914 onwards, was succinctly expressed firsthand 
by the then şeyhülislam Mustafa Hayri Efendi in his answer to a question about the 
reason why the madrasa curricula was designed in line with the new schools: “We do 
not want to render the madrasa graduates more backwards and weaker than the 
mekteb graduates in terms of scholarship and status. This is why we emulated the 
mektebs’ programs in designing the madrasas’” (Muallim Cevdet 1978, 43) . This 
statement is highly representative of the tension arising from the spontaneous needs 
felt by the actors affiliated with the Meşihat at the same time to compete with the 
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rival higher educational institutions within the jurisdiction of the Maarif Nezareti and 
increasingly to take them as models in order to be able to compete with them.  
The fact that the higher educational collective actors within the jurisdiction of 
the Meşihat had been increasingly more compelled to emulate the types of legal 
education developed and provided under the jurisdiction the Maarif Nezareti was due 
to the amount of symbolic power the latter had accumulated to the detriment of the 
former throughout the historical process of the transformation of higher educational 
ecology as part of the overarching process of modern state formation. The 
accumulation of this symbolic power had been less due to the capacity of acquiring 
symbolic capital the Maarif Nezareti had on its own than to the economic and 
political power transferred to it by the central political-bureaucratic organs. 
However, the Maarif Nezareti was not also totally independent in organizing higher 
educational institutions of legal education it established. It had to take into 
consideration both the judicial practice and the content of the existing fiqh education, 
in defining both of which the Meşihat had still a considerable amount of symbolic 
power accumulated throughout the centuries of the Ottoman higher educational and 
judicial experience, although increasingly wasting away since the Mahmud II’s 
political-bureaucratic reforms that had significantly undermined the administrative 
and symbolic power of the ilmiye corps.  
At the eve of 1924, which marked a critical milestone in the competition over 
higher education, this process of competition had yielded the paradoxical result of 
coexisting higher educational institutions providing legal education that were very 
similar in physical and curricular settings yet rival in both jurisdictional and 
ideopolitical terms. Had the process of competition over legal education within 
higher educational ecology continued a similar course after 1924, an overall 
synthesis would probably have been achieved between different types of both 
vocational and scholarly legal education. Vocational legal education would probably 
have been essentially law-centered while including a significant amount of fiqh 
knowledge in parallelity with the governing law and judicial practice. Scholarly legal 
education would likely have been mainly based on an amalgam of both revisionist 
and classical education of fiqh discipline provided along with other Islamic sciences 
as well as social sciences and humanities within a general framework of Islamic 
sciences education. Yet the revolutionary reforms of 1924 regarding both the 
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madrasas and the Meşihat would not permit the continuation of a similar course of 
competition within higher educational ecology. Instead, a quite sharp rupture would 
take place in configuration of both vocational and scholarly legal education.  
 The year 1924 marked the official end of the madrasa system within the 
higher educational ecology. With the Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu, the madrasas were 
first subordinated to the Maarif Nezareti, and then decisively abolished immediately 
after. Medresetü’l-Kuzât was also abolished along with the madrasas. Within the two 
months after the abolition of the madrasas, Darülfünûn İlahiyat Fakültesi was 
founded. Thus, after the denial of any jurisdiction to the Meşihat in the judicial 
ecology from 1917 onwards, the Meşihat was now deprived of its jurisdiction within 
the higher educational ecology. Two types of higher educational institutions it had 
under its jurisdiction, namely the higher madrasas (including the Medresetü’l-
Mütehassisîn) and the Medresetü’l-Kuzât, were no more functioning. From then on, 
the Darülfünûn remained almost the sole institution dominating higher educational 
ecology.  
The faculty of law had continued education without interruption after 1908 
including the war years. Moreover, the foundation of new schools of law in Salonica, 
Konya, Bagdad, and Beirut further expanded the jurisdiction of the law-centered 
vocational legal education. With the abolition of the Medresetü’l-Kuzât, the faculty 
of law in the Darülfünûn along with the other law schools remained the only 
alternative for vocational legal education, thus the Maarif Nezareti finally acquired 
the monopoly of symbolic power for defining legitimate vocational legal education, 
for which it had vied for almost a century. As for scholarly legal education, it is 
difficult to speak of one after 1924. The process of diminution of the centrality of 
fiqh within the curricula of Islamic sciences education, initially triggered by the 1913 
curriculum of the faculty of religious sciences of the Darülfünûn, arrived at a level 
where no education of fiqh as discipline is present in the curriculum (İhsanoğlu 
2010b, 2:630–33). Except for the first year, when Seyyid Bey taught a subject on the 
methodology of fiqh, the only subject related to the fiqh in the curriculum of the 
faculty of theology was tarih-i ilm-i fıkh. Actually all core Islamic disciplines were 
no more in the curriculum but as the objects of the discipline of history, except for 
hadith and tafseer. The latter two were also to be taught along with their histories, as 
the names of the subjects implied: tefsir ve tefsir tarihi, and hadis ve hadis tarihi. 
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Others were not taught but their histories: fıkıh tarihi, kelam tarihi, and tasavvuf 
tarihi.  
As the ultimate losers of the competition of the last century, both the Meşihat 
and the core Islamic disciplines were officially sent into history, one in social space, 
and the other in curricular space. A similar development took place in the curriculum 
of the faculty of law. The subject of usûl-i fıkıh was removed from curriculum in 
1925, and all education pertaining to fiqh was enclosed within the subject of tarih-i 
hukuk (history of law), which was introduced into the curriculum from 1926 on 
(İhsanoğlu 2010b, 2:668, 673–80). This was and remained the case after 1926 until 
1933, when the faculty of theology was completely abolished with the university 
reform of 1933 and the fiqh discipline was totally excluded from the now completely 
reconfigured higher educational ecology. The only place fiqh survived within legal 
education was a minimal part of the content of the subject of hukuk tarihi within the 
curriculum of the law faculty of Istanbul University. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 CONCLUSION 
I did not produce any new substantial knowledge in this thesis. I rather made use of 
an existing theoretical model with minor revisions in order to make sense of a 
particular historical process. The model is derived from Abbott’s theory of 
interactional fields and the revisions from Bourdieu’s analysis of modern state 
formation as monopolistic accumulation of symbolic power. The object of analysis is 
the historical process of transformation of the Ottoman legal education from 1826 to 
1926. Thus the thesis does not contribute to the existing scholarship by means of 
producing new knowledge from the raw data; it rather mobilizes existing stock of 
knowledge within the available historical scholarship, making use of sociological 
tools, in order to link its diverse elements together in a way to achieve a more 
systematic, and hopefully better, understanding of the body of knowledge we have in 
stock, and thus of the historical process it narrates and explains. 
In this conclusion, I will first offer a general summary of the second and third 
chapters, which reasserts my central arguments as well as the auxiliary ones. This 
summary will be in a more theoretically articulated language than that in the 
chapters. Then I will engage in a brief reanalysis of the transformation of legal 
education in a different perspective, focusing on the relations between different ideo-
political positions advocating for different types of legal education on the one hand, 
and the actual forms of legal education that were instituted in the process on the 
other. I will also touch upon the changing relations between the set of positions and 
the set of institutions throughout the process. Finally, I will conclude with a brief 
remark on Abbott’s conception of social conflict as competition and its relative 
weakness in the empirical context of the late Ottoman period.  
 One of the most peculiar characteristics of the Ottoman dynastic system, 
especially from the late 15th century onwards, was the gradual incorporation of the 
ilmiye corps, i.e. the group of scholars graduated from madrasas, into the dynastic 
bureaucratic ecology as a quasi-corporate collective actor. Although this 
incorporation meant a loss of autonomy to some degree from the Ottoman dynast, the 
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ilmiye corps still preserved a significant autonomy as well as symbolic power within 
the dynastic bureaucratic ecology vis-à-vis other bureaucratic actors in controlling its 
jurisdiction over higher educational ecology and judicial ecology. The ilmiye corps 
had accumulated over centuries a considerable amount of symbolic power, 
recognized by both dynastic actors and other social actors, and enjoyed a quasi-
monopolistic use of this power in configuring higher educational ecology and 
judicial ecology, mainly through the madrasa system and the judicial system of 
sharia courts, respectively. The occasional and limited interventions of the dynastic 
actors notwithstanding, the ilmiye corps as a collective actor remained essentially 
unrivalled in its use of symbolic power in configuring higher educational and judicial 
ecologies after its incorporation into the dynastic bureaucratic ecology. Yet this 
incorporation had lasting effects on the structural linkage between bureaucratic 
ecology and higher educational ecology.  
The process of incorporation into the dynastic bureaucratic ecology went 
hand-in-hand with the emergence and proliferation of a particular type of scholar, 
which Atçıl calls “scholar-bureaucrat,” who was inclined to melt in the same pot the 
ideals of Islam and the ideals of the Ottoman dynasty. Scholar-bureaucrats gradually 
became the dominant type of scholars that constituted the ilmiye corps as a collective 
bureaucratic actor, which were organized in increasingly more hierarchical terms. 
One could easily assume the bureaucrat part of scholar-bureaucrats outweighs the 
scholar part as they advance in the bureaucratic hierarchy of the ilmiye corps. In the 
same vein, a scholar-bureaucrat enjoyed and exercised more of symbolic power as he 
climbed up in the bureaucratic hierarchy, for the effective use of symbolic power in 
higher educational and judicial ecologies had been more and more dependent upon 
bureaucratic rather than scholarly position46, as a corollary of the bureaucratization 
process of the ilmiye corps, in the sense of both its internal bureaucratization and its 
emergence as a collective bureaucratic actor. This process consequently made higher 
educational ecology more directly linked than ever with dynastic bureaucratic 
ecology, thus less autonomous from it. Since the ilmiye corps remained essentially 
unchallenged within dynastic bureaucratic ecology over its jurisdiction in higher 
                                                 
46 This statement does not imply that the scholars in bureaucratic positions lack scholarly excellence; 
it rather states that scholarly excellence on its own without a corresponding bureaucratic position was 
not enough to exercise effective symbolic power in a way to transform higher educational and judicial 
ecologies. 
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educational ecology, this structural loss of ecological autonomy did not pose a 
significant problem for the ilmiye corps’ exercise of symbolic power within higher 
educational ecology and the organization of higher education remained within the 
administrative realm of the ilmiye corps. It would be no more the case from the early 
nineteenth century on, however. 
Mainly defined by the ilmiye corps as a collective actor, who orchestrated the 
linkages between the bureaucratic and the higher educational ecologies, the Ottoman 
legal education was based on fiqh discipline. The Ottoman legal education and the 
fiqh discipline were not isolated, neither as institution nor as discipline, from the 
general education in the madrasa. Although the fiqh discipline had been taught along 
with other core Islamic sciences, however, it had preserved a central position within 
the madrasa education, as providing legal education was the main objective of the 
latter. This centrality of fiqh had been a permanent and characteristic feature of the 
Ottoman higher educational ecology from its early configurations and had mainly 
three dimensions.  
First of all, the fiqh discipline had been central to the cultural space of the 
ecology as it was both the central and most studied subject of the madrasa curricula 
regardless of the period and a central discipline to the scholarly production. Second, 
the fiqh had been central to the social structures of the madrasa system, as it had 
provided the legal framework within which the madrasa system operated, especially 
through the legal regulation of the endowments. Finally, the fiqh had been the 
foremost discipline to provide the madrasa graduate with the kind of knowledge he 
would need in his vocational career, either as a judge or mufti in judicial ecology or 
as a professor in higher educational ecology.  
Although the madrasa education provided a corpus of legal knowledge 
necessary for later vocational careers of its graduates, the legal education it provided 
was mainly designed as a scholarly education more than a vocational education. The 
essentials of vocational know-how were to be apprehended through a process of 
apprenticeship in the related ecology. No particular higher educational institution for 
providing vocational legal education had emerged in the Ottoman higher educational 
ecology until the nineteenth century, and the legal education à la madrasa remained 
unrivalled as the sole type of legal education. The nineteenth century witnessed not 
only specialization in legal education with the emergence of a vocational type of 
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legal education, but also the ever-mounting challenges the fiqh discipline met to its 
centrality in all of the aforementioned three dimensions. The emergence of new 
collective bureaucratic actors, along with their counterparts in higher educational and 
judicial ecologies, and the increasing challenges they posed to the quasi-monopolistic 
use of symbolic power the ilmiye corps had enjoyed over its jurisdiction in higher 
educational and judicial ecologies triggered and maintained century-long processes 
of competition between the aforementioned collective actors within the interactional 
field of modern state formation at the intersection of bureaucratic, higher 
educational, and judicial ecologies. The disciplinary transformation of the Ottoman 
legal education would take place within this interactional field. 
The reign of Mahmud II set the initial stage for later competitions over higher 
education. As the initiator of the transition from dynastic bureaucratic ecology to 
modern bureaucratic ecology, which constituted arguably the most crucial part of 
modern state formation, Mahmud II established two new collective actors in the 
extending bureaucratic ecology, namely Meclis-i Umûr-ı Nâfia and Meclis-i Vâlâ-yı 
Ahkâm-ı Adliye, which would transform in time assuming different names and forms 
and ultimately have morphed into the Maarif Nezareti and Adliye Nezareti, 
respectively. In the transition process to modern bureaucratic ecology, Mahmud II 
also undermined both economic and symbolic power of the ilmiye corps as a 
collective bureaucratic actor with two crucial moves: taking over the administration 
of endowments under the direct control of the central government from the 
jurisdiction of the ilmiye corps, and subjugation of the ilmiye corps under more strict 
control of central government by leveling down the office of Meşihat, head of the 
ilmiye corps, to the same status with those of other ministries. Finally, it is during the 
reign of Mahmud II that a new concept of education burgeoned. Termed as maarif, 
the main objective of this new concept of education was acquiring and providing 
technical and practically useful knowledge for the needs of the emerging modern 
state. Within the cultural and institutional space of maarif that new types of legal 
education would emerge, and law as legal discipline would be established and 
gradually extend its academic settlement during the Long Tanzimat period, namely 
between 1839 and 1908. 
The Long Tanzimat period saw the formation of a new interactional field at 
the intersection of bureaucratic, higher educational, and judicial ecologies, which one 
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may call interactional field of modern state formation, where old/rooted and 
new/emergent collective actors in these ecologies engaged in competitions over 
accumulating symbolic power. These competitions would shape transformation of 
legal education in the Ottoman Empire. We may distinguish between four 
interrelated yet also distinct processes of competition within this interactional field.  
The first competition was between the Meşihat on the one hand, and the 
Maarif Nezareti and Adliye Nezareti on the other, over accumulating symbolic power 
within the extending bureaucratic ecology. The course of this competition directly 
affected other related processes of competition, since the symbolic power 
accumulated at this level was mobilized in configuring linked ecologies. The second 
competition was between the Meşihat and the Adliye Nezareti over organizing 
judicial system within judicial ecology. Different dimensions of this competition, 
such as the codification of new laws, the reorganization of sharia judiciary, and the 
establishment of the Nizamiye courts had direct effects on transformation of legal 
education. Since legal education was provided within higher educational ecology, we 
could call the first two processes of competition as ecologically external 
competitions affecting legal education.  
The other two competitions were ecologically internal. The first internal 
competition was between the collective higher educational actors, i.e. higher 
educational institutions, affiliated with the Meşihat on the one hand, and those 
affiliated with the Ministry of Education on the other. There were two dimensions of 
this competition. Muallimhane-i Nüvvâb/Mekteb-i Nüvvâb competed with Mekteb-i 
Hukuk (which assumed different forms through the process) over defining and 
providing legitimate vocational legal education on the one hand, and over staffing the 
judicial system on the other. Second, the madrasa competed with the Darülfünûn 
over defining and providing legitimate scholarly legal education.  
The final competition was between two legal disciplines as collective actors, 
mainly fiqh and law, over extending their academic settlements. This competition 
over academic settlement was made in both social and cultural space of higher 
educational ecology and had many dimensions, such as competition over controlling 
physical space, dominating scholarly production, determining the content of the 
governing laws, obtaining financial resources, and so on. I mainly focused, however, 
on one aspect of this competition, namely competition of settlement over curricular 
   
 
113 
 
space. During these century-long competitions within the interactional field of 
modern state formation, the Maarif Nezareti and the Adliye Nezareti, along with their 
affiliated actors, had accumulated increasingly more symbolic power to the detriment 
of the Meşihat and its affiliated actors who had increasingly lost the significant 
amount of symbolic power they once quasi-monopolistically enjoyed in both higher 
educational and judicial ecologies. All in all, the transformation of legal education 
from 1826 to 1926 would take place as a result of the aforementioned processes of 
competition and of the changes in the distribution of symbolic power among actors 
that occurred simultaneously and interrelatedly within the interactional field of 
modern state formation involving bureaucratic, higher educational, and judicial 
ecologies. 
 Within this interactional field, several ideo-political positions advocating for 
different types of legal education had competed as part of the aforementioned 
institutional processes of competition and this competition resulted in varying 
configurations of legal education in different historical contexts. There were mainly 
five ideopolitical positions and five corresponding configurations of legal education 
in different higher educational institutions.   We can locate these positions within an 
analytical spectrum of change/continuity that goes from the advocacy of total change 
in legal education on the one pole to the advocacy of total continuity on the other 
pole. In between the poles there are a plethora of positions that adopt diverse degrees 
of synthesis between change and continuity. Within this spectrum, we can distinguish 
five types of collective position by regrouping similar individual positions together, 
thus reducing the empirical complexity for the sake of analytical clarity.  
I will now briefly describe these positions and point to their institutional 
counterparts in higher educational ecology, if they had any. The first position 
advocates for the preservation of legal education exactly as it had been before, i.e. 
exclusively based on the fiqh discipline and without any innovation either in content 
or in methodology/pedagogy, and certainly without the introduction of any 
knowledge pertaining to the law discipline into the curriculum. This position finds its 
counterpart in the classical scholarly legal education provided in the madrasa 
institution until the Meşrutiyet period, as it had been exclusively based on the fiqh 
discipline without any significant innovation.  
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The second position argues for a total change of legal education in line with 
the Continental law and thus for a total exclusion of the fiqh discipline from legal 
education. This position had not a direct institutional counterpart in the higher 
educational ecology until the foundation of the Republic. As an exceptional and 
short-winded experience, the legal education in the Kavanin ve Nizamat Dershanesi 
was the closest institutional equivalent to this position, as it did not include any 
subject in the fiqh proper. Yet the fiqh knowledge was still part of the education in 
the Dershane through the courses on the Mecelle.  
The third position defends for a legal education based on the fiqh knowledge 
while making concessions to the introduction of the law knowledge into the 
curriculum, for it considers the latter as inevitable, to varying degrees according to 
historical context, due to the diverse reasons and constraints, the pressures of the 
functioning of the judicial system being the most prominent. This position 
corresponds to the vocational legal education provided by the institutional line from 
the Muallimhane-i Nüvvab and Mekteb-i Nüvvab to the Medresetü’l-Kuzât. Although 
the Muallimhane-i Nüvvab was initially founded in order to train competent judges 
for the sharia judiciary, it had gradually adopted the subjects on the law, as it had to 
compete against the Mekteb-i Hukuk and the law faculty of Darülfünun for training 
officials for the Nizamiye courts.  
The fourth position advocates for a legal education based on the law 
discipline while according some place to the fiqh in the curriculum to the extent that 
it constituted some part of the codified law implemented in the judicial system, or in 
an auxiliary position for the understanding of the “actual” legal knowledge found in 
the law discipline. The counterpart of this position in the higher educational ecology 
was the vocational legal education provided by the institutional line from the 
Mekteb-i Hukuk to the Darülfünûn law faculty, of which Kavanin ve Nizamat 
Dershanesi marked an embryotic inception.  
Finally, the fifth position advocates for a legal education mainly based on the 
fiqh discipline yet renovated in terms of both curricular content and educational 
perspective. This position corresponded to the revisionist scholarly legal education 
first envisioned in the 1913 curriculum of the Darülfünûn’s faculty of religious 
sciences, then in the 1914 curricula of both the higher madrasas and the Medresetü’l-
Mütehassısîn, designed with the madrasa reform of 1914.  
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 The holders of these positions enjoyed varying degrees of symbolic power in 
time and their institutional existence consequently changed according to historical 
context. The first position had preserved its existence within the form of scholarly 
legal education provided in the madrasa system until the Meşrutiyet period without 
significant change. The madrasa reform of 1914 and the comprehensive curricular 
changes it brought about seriously challenged this position, yet the ultimate failure in 
the implementation of the madrasa reform especially outside Istanbul allowed this 
position to survive within most of the madrasas, even after the abolition of the latter 
as “underground” scholarly legal education. The most serious challenge to this 
position came from the fifth position when the holders of the latter had actualized 
their vision both within the 1913 curriculum of the Darülfünûn’s faculty of religious 
sciences and within the 1914 curricula of the reformed madrasas. Both positions 
defended the centrality of fiqh in scholarly legal education and did not tolerate but a 
marginal settlement, if any, to the law discipline in curriculum. Yet the fifth position 
deemed urgent a revision of the classical fiqh education whereas the first position 
had not felt any need for revision as urgent as to initiate a change in the classical fiqh 
education.  
Another interesting point here is that both of the aforementioned 1913 and 
1914 curricula were actualizations of the fifth position, yet they were designed by 
rival higher educational institutions under the jurisdiction of different collective 
bureaucratic actors. The 1913 curriculum was designed for the Darülfünûn’s law 
faculty and approved by the Maarif Nezareti whereas the 1914 curriculum was for 
the higher madrasas and approved by the Meşihat. This fact demonstrates well where 
the competition over symbolic power for defining legal education arrived to in the 
Meşrutiyet period. Rival collective bureaucratic actors and higher educational 
institutions assumed increasingly more similar positions in the Meşrutiyet period in 
order to be able to compete with each other. Thus, competition over symbolic power 
and jurisdiction for defining legal education paradoxically resulted in increasingly 
similar definitions of legal education produced by the parties of competition. During 
the Long Tanzimat period, the emergent collective bureaucratic actors needed and 
used both the human and cultural resources of the rooted collective bureaucratic 
actors, and this allowed to the latter to permeate to varying degrees into the 
jurisdiction of the former. Thus, although the emergent forms of legal education 
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mainly emulated the Western models, they were also affected by the existing forms 
of legal education mainly through the agency of the actors affiliated with the 
Meşihat. Towards and during the Meşrutiyet period, however, the rooted collective 
actors had felt increasingly more need to emulate the emergent actors in defining and 
designing legal education in order to be able to compete with them, mainly due to the 
increasing symbolic power the latter had accumulated during this process to the 
detriment of the former.  
A similar process of curricular convergence may be observed in the 
competition over vocational legal education between the third and fourth positions. 
The third position found its first institutional embodiment in the Muallimhane-i 
Nüvvab’s vocational legal education, which was solely based on the fiqh discipline 
while renovated both in overall curriculum and in pedagogical approach with regard 
to the madrasa. Having had no rival higher educational institution and thus no direct 
challenge to its monopoly over vocational legal education until 1874, the 
Muallimhane’s curriculum included no single subject from law discipline. With the 
foundation of first Mekteb-i Hukuk-i Sultani in 1874 and then Mekteb-i Hukuk in 
1880, a process of competition between the third and the fourth positions and their 
institutional counterparts began. This process of competition shaped the 
configurations of vocational legal education both parties defined and implemented. 
Although they were mainly modeled after their Western counterparts, both the 
Mekteb-i Hukuk-i Sultani and the Mekteb-i Hukuk still adopted parts of education 
provided in the Muallimhane pertaining to the fiqh, such as the subjects on the 
Mecelle, or the methodology of fiqh.  
After the establishment of the former schools, however, the fourth position 
gained the upper hand and increasingly more symbolic power in defining legitimate 
vocational legal education. Consequently, the Muallimhane had undergone several 
curricular reorganizations (along with the name changes), beginning in 1874 yet 
accelerating from 1908 on, in order to be able to compete with the institutional 
embodiments of the fourth position. Yet these very attempts to compete made the 
Mekteb-i Nüvvab/Medresetü’l-Kuzât become increasingly more similar to the 
Mekteb-i Hukuk/Darülfünûn law faculty in terms of the configuration of vocational 
legal education, especially in the law education they provided. Within this process of 
competition, thus, the third position got increasingly closer into the fourth position 
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while remaining distinct from the latter with the greater place it allocated to the fiqh 
discipline. 
Had the aforementioned processes of competition over accumulation and use 
of symbolic power followed similar patterns after the war years, the preceding course 
of events suggests the achievement of two consensuses that would determine the 
dominant institutional forms of both vocational and scholarly types of legal 
education in higher educational ecology. The first consensus would probably be 
achieved between the third and the fourth positions, and their institutional 
counterparts, and result in a vocational legal education mainly based on the law 
discipline while including a fiqh education enough to provide its graduates with the 
necessary knowledge they would need in order to take office in both the Nizamiye 
and the sharia courts. The second consensus would likely be reached between the 
Meşihat and the Maarif Nezareti at bureaucratic level, and between the reformed 
madrasa and the Darülfünûn at higher educational level, on the fifth position and 
resulted in a scholarly legal education mainly based on the fiqh discipline, the latter 
conceived in a revisionist perspective. Neither of these consensuses was achieved, 
however; for the aforementioned processes of competition did not continue after the 
war years as they had been proceeding.  
The second position, which had not any institutional counterpart in the 
Ottoman higher educational ecology during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, dominated the higher educational ecology from the 1924 on. This 
domination was made possible by the fact that the holders of the second position 
monopolized the symbolic power within bureaucratic ecology and denied the holders 
of other positions any use of symbolic power to institute their visions of legal 
education. The monopolization of symbolic power by the holders of the second 
position became possible mainly due to the successful accumulation and use of 
physical power they managed in the process. This is another story, however, which 
may be subject of a separate thesis. As of 1925, in short, the weakest ideo-political 
position during the late Ottoman period had dominated higher educational ecology 
and defined legitimate legal education. Within this legitimate legal education, there 
was no longer place for the fiqh discipline except as the object of history. The 
domination of the ecology by the former weakest position and the total exclusion of 
the fiqh discipline from ecology’s cultural space also meant a total loss of ecological 
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autonomy; for the preceding internal logic and functioning of higher educational 
ecology was sabotaged for a total reorganization which would be radicalized in the 
following years. 
To conclude the conclusion, I would like to state that this thesis contributes to 
the existing scholarship on the late Ottoman history by offering an alternative model 
for explaining complex social processes of the the late Ottoman history without 
being captured by the substantialist, teleological, and dichotomist historiographical 
perspectives that had dominated much of the historiography on the late Ottoman 
history. The interactional field approach, as developed by Abbott, offers considerable 
opportunities for dealing with the complexity, multidimensionality, and intricacy of 
social processes, more so in times of intensive change when conflict outweighs 
harmony in social space. However, conceiving social conflict as competition between 
actors, thus in somewhat more liberal terms than Bourdieu, who conceives social 
conflict as struggle, Abbot’s model underemphasizes power relations that condition 
processes of competition. Thus, I would argue, Bourdieusian concepts, especially 
those related to power and domination, can be articulated into the Abbotian 
theoretical model as a booster shot against empirical invalidity if necessary. 
Transformation of legal education in the late Ottoman period as an empirical 
historical process necessitated such a vaccination, for the process of concern cannot 
be understood without seriously dealing with struggles for accumulation of both 
physical power and symbolic power as two central dimensions of modern state 
formation.   
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Lamont, Michèle. 2009. How Professors Think: Inside the Curious World of 
Academic Judgment. Harvard University Press. 
 
Latour, Bruno. 1987. Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers 
through Society. Harvard University Press. 
 
Latour, Bruno, and Steve Woolgar. 1986. Laboratory Life: The Construction of 
Scientific Facts. Princeton University Press. 
 
Laudan, Rachel. 1993. “Histories of the Sciences and Their Uses: A Review to 
1913.” History of Science, no. 31: 1–34. 
 
Lee, Richard E. 2003. Life and Times of Cultural Studies: The Politics and 
Transformation of the Structures of Knowledge. Duke University Press. 
 
Lemaine, Gerard, Roy Macleod, Michael Mulkay, and Peter Weingart. 1976. 
Perspectives on the Emergence of Scientific Disciplines. Maison Sciences de 
l’Homme, Paris Publications. 
 
Lenoir, Timothy. 1997. Instituting Science: The Cultural Production of Scientific 
Disciplines. Stanford University Press. 
 
Lepenies, Wolf. 1978. “Wissenschaftsgeschichte Und Disziplingeschichte.” 
Geschichte Und Gesellschaft, no. 4: 437–51. 
 
Levine, Donald N. 1995. Visions of the Sociological Tradition. University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Levtzion, Nehemiah, and John O. Voll. 1987a. Eighteenth Century Renewal and 
Reform in Islam. Syracuse University Press. 
———. 1987b. “Introduction.” In Eigtheenth-Century Renewal and Reform in Islam, 
Nehemiah Levtzion and John O. Voll. Syracuse University Press. 
 
Lévy-Bruhl, Lucien. 1910. Les Fonctions Mentales Dans Les Sociétés Inférieures. F. 
Alcan. 
 
Lewis, Bernard. 1968. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. Oxford University Press. 
 
Loveman, Mara. 2005. “The Modern State and the Primitive Accumulation of 
Symbolic Power.” American Journal of Sociology 110 (6): 1651–83. 
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APPENDIX 
ILLUSTRATIVE FIGURE AND CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 
The figure in the following page is designed to illustrate a visual representation of 
the field of interaction I tried to explain in the fourth chapter of the thesis. The events 
are virtucally aligned, according to chronological order, within different columns that 
represent both ecologies and collective actors. The arrow marks represent the 
relations between events. The colors of arrow marks imply different types of 
relations, as explained in the box at the bottom left of the figure. 
Following the figure, there is a chronological table of disciplinary transformation of 
Late Ottoman Legal Education.
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